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Of Spies, Saboteurs, and Enemy Accomplices:
History’s Lessons for the Constitutionality of
Wartime Military Tribunals
MARTIN S. LEDERMAN*
Congress has recently authorized military commissions to try enemies not
only for violations of the international law of war, but also for domestic-law
offenses, such as providing material support to terrorism and conspiring to
commit law-of-war offenses. Moreover, President Trump has indicated support
for further military trials, including trials against U.S. citizens. Such military
tribunals lack the civilian jury and independent judge that Article III of the
Constitution prescribes. The constitutionality of such an abrogation of Article
III’s criminal trial guarantees has been debated during many of the nation’s
wars without clear resolution, and the constitutional question is now at the
heart of a potentially landmark case, al Bahlul v. United States, currently before
the Supreme Court.
In the rare cases where the Supreme Court has recognized exceptions to
Article III’s criminal trial protections, it has typically invoked functional and
normative justifications. When it comes to adjudication of war-related domesticlaw offenses, however, neither the government nor the appellate judges who
have defended commission trials have offered any such functional or normative
considerations sufficient to justify denial of the independent judge and jury that
Article III guarantees. Defenders of the military tribunals have instead relied
almost exclusively upon historical claims of two kinds to defend the constitutionality of using military commissions in this context. This Article addresses one of
those historical claims—namely, that the Constitution should be understood to
have preserved, rather than to have modified, the federal government’s power to
prosecute a war as it did during the Revolutionary War. According to this
argument, the Constitution was ratified against, and should be presumed not to
have called into question, a practice of military adjudication of offenses that
were not violations of the international law of war: court-martial proceedings,
authorized by the Second Continental Congress and approved by General
George Washington, against certain spies and against disloyal civilians who
aided the British. The earliest Congresses purportedly confirmed this constitu-
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tional understanding by enacting statutes permitting military trials for spying
and for aiding the enemy—statutes that have remained in the federal code ever
since.
This Article offers the first comprehensive account of the Revolutionary War
precedents. It discusses how they were understood in the ensuing decades and
the ways in which they, and the post-1789 statutes, have been invoked and
mischaracterized as authority in later wars. This history demonstrates that the
received wisdom about these precedents is almost entirely mistaken, and that
they provide little, if any, support for a new Article III exception for military
adjudication of war-related domestic-law offenses. The Article thus offers an
object lesson in how a complex history can be misunderstood and distorted in
the course of constitutional interpretation, particularly on questions of war
powers.
The pre-constitutional history does, however, include one conspicuous aberration: a 1778 congressional resolution authorizing trial by court-martial of
civilians who provided a particular kind of aid to the British army. General
Washington relied upon this resolution in 1780 as authority to convene a
court-martial to try Joshua Hett Smith for assisting Benedict Arnold in the plot
to surrender West Point to the British. This Article shows why it would be a
mistake to accord much interpretive weight to the Smith case—a striking
deviation from Washington’s otherwise consistent conduct—in crafting exceptions to Article III’s criminal trial guarantees.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the United States has been engaged in an armed conflict with
al-Qaeda for more than fifteen years, it has not abandoned prosecution of
criminal conduct as a principal means of combatting terrorism. To the contrary,
criminal prosecution was the Obama Administration’s preferred method of
dealing with terrorist suspects, even when they belonged to an organized armed
group, such as al-Qaeda, against which the United States also employs tradi-
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tional military force.1 In still other cases, the federal government has prosecuted
individuals in Article III courts for providing material support to al-Qaeda and
other groups at war with the United States.
Congress, however, has been considerably less hospitable to the prospect of
Article III prosecutions of terrorists. The legislature has not only authorized
al-Qaeda members to be tried by military commissions,2 but has also enacted
legislation precluding the Executive Branch from transferring detainees at the
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base to the United States for Article III trials.3 Thus,
for those Guantánamo detainees alleged to have committed crimes, all of whom
were apprehended before President Obama took office, the only prosecutorial
option in recent years has been a military proceeding. Moreover, we may see
even more such military trials now that President Obama has left office. During
the 2016 election campaign, President Trump expressed disdain for Article III
trials of terrorist suspects and signaled that he intends to continue trying
detainees, including even U.S. citizens, before military commissions.4
These military trials raise an age-old, still unresolved, constitutional question:
When, if ever, can the federal government use military tribunals—in which
military officers, rather than tenure-protected judges and civilian juries, preside
and render judgments—to try individuals for war-related criminal offenses?
The text of Article III—particularly its reference to “all Crimes”—appears to
offer an unequivocal answer: Such trials are unconstitutional.5 And yet the
government has used military tribunals to adjudicate federal offenses in several
of the nation’s major wars, including the current conflict with al-Qaeda.

1. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws, Address at Harvard Law School (Sept. 16,
2011) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarksjohn-o-brennan-strengthening-our-security-adhering-our-values-an [https://perma.cc/LB6K-7ZSW]) (expressing the Administration’s “strong preference” to incapacitate threats “through prosecution, either in
an Article III court or a reformed military commission”); Barack Obama, NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM 6 (2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/counterterrorism_
strategy.pdf [https://perma.cc/3H35-9HMZ] (criminal prosecution should “continue to play a critical
role in U.S. [counterterrorism] efforts”). Thus, almost without exception, whenever the Obama Administration captured, and retained long-term custody of, a member of al-Qaeda or an associated force
against which the nation was engaged in armed conflict, it treated that individual within the traditional
Article III criminal justice system, and took pains to develop the evidentiary case for prosecuting him in
a civilian tribunal for violations of the U.S. criminal code.
2. See Military Commissions Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, tit. XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 948a(7)(C), 948c (2012).
3. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, § 1031,
129 Stat. 726, 968 (2015).
4. See Donald Trump, Speech in Youngstown, Ohio (Aug. 15, 2016) (transcript available at
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-presidential-candidates-isis-extremism [https://perma.cc/B8X2RWLH]) (“Foreign combatants will be tried in military commissions.”); Patricia Mazzei, Trump:
Americans Could Be Tried in Guantánamo, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/
news/politics-government/election/donald-trump/article95144337.html [https://perma.cc/6W5A-2M9X]
(“I know that they want to try them in our regular court systems, and I don’t like that at all. . . . I would
say they could be tried [in military commissions], that would be fine.”).
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; see also infra notes 66–69 and accompanying text.
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This practice is explained in part by the 1942 decision in Ex parte Quirin, in
which the Supreme Court held that Congress can prescribe military trials for
members of enemy forces, or individuals who are otherwise subject to the
enemy’s direction and control, for violations of the international law of war,
even if the defendants are U.S. citizens.6 As I will explain, that holding’s logic
and rationale are problematic because the Court relied upon misunderstandings
of international law.7 Whether or not the Court’s reasoning was well-grounded,
however, Quirin is now the well-established basis for military adjudication of
law-of-war offenses—such as the current proceedings against five Guantánamo
detainees, including Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, for the deliberate attacks on
civilians on September 11, 2001.
But what about cases in which there are no allegations of international law
offenses? Can Congress likewise authorize military tribunals to try charges of
domestic-law offenses committed by persons who are part of, or who have
aided, enemy forces in an armed conflict? The Supreme Court has offered one
important guidepost relevant to that question. In Ex parte Milligan, the Court
famously opined—technically in dicta—that Congress cannot subject individuals who are not part of enemy forces, or subject to the direction and control of
the enemy, to military trial for domestic-law offenses where Article III courts
are not “actually closed” and are thus available to try them for their misdeeds.8
Milligan and Quirin, however, hardly suffice to establish the constitutional
parameters. Most importantly, the Supreme Court has never decided whether
the federal government may use military courts to try persons who are part of
enemy forces for violations of domestic law, a question that is now of exceptional importance because of two interrelated contemporary developments.
First, in the United States’ current armed conflicts against non-state armed
terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, individuals frequently engage in conduct that is not directly governed by Milligan and Quirin as a result of several
considerations:
1. The individuals are members of enemy forces in an armed conflict with the
United States, or engage in conduct at the direction of such enemy forces,
and therefore are not covered by Milligan’s “holding” on congressional
power;9
2. The conduct of the individuals—such as conspiring to engage in war
crimes, or attacking U.S. armed forces—did not violate the international

6. See 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942).
7. See infra Section III.A.
8. 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866) (“If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is
impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then . . . there is a necessity to furnish a
substitute for the civil authority . . . .”). This “holding” of Milligan was not, by its terms, limited to
domestic-law offenses. The Court in Quirin, however, later distinguished Milligan as having not
addressed violations of the international law of war committed by persons acting at the enemy’s
direction. See 317 U.S. at 45; see also infra note 304 and accompanying text.
9. See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127.
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law of war, and therefore is not governed by Quirin;10
3. The law of war nevertheless does not privilege the conduct—that is,
international law permits the United States to subject the individuals who
engage in such conduct to criminal sanctions;11 and such conduct violates
ordinary U.S. criminal laws, and thus could be prosecuted in an Article III
court, with a civilian jury and tenure-protected judge.
Second, in the Military Commissions Act of 2009 (MCA),12 Congress authorized military commissions to try “alien unprivileged enemy belligerent[s]” for
many domestic-law offenses, including knowingly and intentionally aiding an
enemy in breach of an allegiance or duty to the United States (which usually
constitutes treason, as well);13 soliciting or advising another to commit a
substantive offense triable by military commission;14 conspiring to do the
same;15 providing material support or resources intending that they be used in
preparation for, or in carrying out, an act of terrorism;16 and providing material
support or resources to an international terrorist organization engaged in hostilities against the United States or one of its co-belligerents17 (a potentially
capacious offense the government has used to try numerous persons in Article
III courts). Therefore, as far as federal statutory law is concerned, a substantial
number of terrorism-related activities constitute offenses that can now be tried
either by a military tribunal or in an Article III court.

10. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45–46; infra note 294 and accompanying text.
11. In most international conflicts (wars between states), the law does not deem the actions of the
vast majority of combatants to be criminal or blameworthy. To the contrary, international law affords
combatants within state armed forces a privilege to engage in conduct—such as killing enemy soldiers
or destroying property—that would violate the host state’s domestic laws in almost any other context.
See Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Privilege in Asymmetric and Covert Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L
L. 337, 342–43 (2015); see also Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 art. 57 (promulgated Apr. 24, 1863) (Washington,
Government Printing Office 1898) [hereinafter “Lieber Code”].
The general view of affected states, however, is that international law does not privilege most of the
conduct undertaken by al-Qaeda or similar terrorist groups, not only because much of that conduct
violates the law of war (for example, targeting civilians), but also because the actors are not members
of a legitimate armed force to which the privilege attaches. Therefore, even when those actors engage in
conduct—such as the targeting of state armed forces—that would be privileged if committed by
members of a state military in a traditional international armed conflict, the injured state generally can
prosecute them for violation of its domestic laws (for example, a law prohibiting the murder of U.S.
personnel abroad). See SANDESH SIVAKUMARAN, THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 514–15
(2012); see also Ohlin, supra, at 368, 370–71 (such terrorist groups are not entitled to the privilege
because they “typically make no effort to distinguish themselves from the civilian population, nor do
they limit their targeting to military objectives”). Moreover, individuals who are not part of al-Qaeda
forces can be prosecuted under U.S. “material support” laws if they provide assistance to al-Qaeda or
endeavor to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012).
12. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–950t (2012).
13. See id. § 950t(26).
14. See id. § 950t(30).
15. See id. § 950t(29).
16. See id. § 950t(25).
17. See id.
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That number might expand still further if Congress were to add other
domestic-law offenses to the MCA. Congress might also expand the category of
individuals subject to military justice. For example, although the MCA does not
presently authorize the trial of U.S. citizens,18 President Trump has expressed
interest in trying U.S. citizens in military commissions,19 and it is conceivable
that the current Republican-controlled Congress might amend the MCA to
permit such trials. Even without such an amendment, the Trump Administration
could dust off a long-overlooked and almost never-used provision of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that authorizes the trial in military
tribunals—with a potential penalty of death—of U.S. persons who attempt to
aid or correspond with the enemy.20
Not only is the Article III question suddenly of great importance; it is also
being litigated, for the first time in many decades, in a case currently pending
before the Supreme Court.21 A military commission at Guantánamo Bay convicted Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman al Bahlul, a member of al-Qaeda, of several
war-related offenses that are not violations of the international law of war—
such as providing material support to terrorism. The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit overturned all but one of those
convictions on other constitutional grounds, leaving only a single remaining
conviction for an inchoate conspiracy to violate the law of war.22 The United
States conceded that such an agreement is not itself a violation of the international law of war.23 The government has nevertheless argued that it was

18. The MCA limits the personal jurisdiction of military commissions to offenses committed by
“alien unprivileged enemy belligerent[s].” 10 U.S.C. § 948c (2012). Although the definition of
“unprivileged enemy belligerent” is broad, including anyone who is not entitled to the combatant’s
privilege and has “engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners” or “has
purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners,” id.
§ 948a(7)(A)–(B), the MCA does not authorize commission trials of U.S. citizens. See id. § 948a(1).
19. See Mazzei, supra note 4.
20. See 10 U.S.C. § 904 (2012). Section 904 contemplates trial by a court-martial or a military
commission—but expressly excludes a military commission “established under” the MCA. Id. This
provision, which has been part of the federal code in one form or another since the Founding, is one of
the principal subjects of this Article. As I will explain, for most of the nation’s history the better reading
of the provision was that it applied only to persons in or affiliated with the armed forces—and therefore
did not raise any significant constitutional question. When Congress re-enacted it in 1920, however, the
legislature might have assumed it was authorizing military trials of civilians unconnected to the military
for treason-like conduct, at least to the (uncertain) extent the Constitution allowed—even if that is not
what Congress had intended in earlier iterations of the regulation. See infra notes 694–97 and
accompanying text. And by 1950, when Congress enacted the most recent version of the aiding-theenemy article as part of the UCMJ, legislators almost surely thought that it applied to civilians
unconnected to the military. See infra note 786 and accompanying text.
21. al Bahlul v. United States, No. 16-1307 (petition docketed May 1, 2017). The Court will likely
decide whether to hear the case early in the October 2017 Term.
22. See al Bahlul v. United States, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) [hereinafter “al Bahlul I”],
aff’d on remand, 792 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) [hereinafter “al Bahlul II”], rev’d in part per curiam on
reh’g en banc, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016) [hereinafter “al Bahlul III”].
23. See Brief for United States at 2, al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (No.
11-1324) [hereinafter “U.S. al Bahlul III Brief”]. For an extended discussion of why such a conspiracy
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constitutional for Congress to authorize a military tribunal to try al Bahlul for
such a domestic-law offense.
In a recent en banc decision, the Court of Appeals divided sharply on that
constitutional question: Four judges concluded that the military trial of al
Bahlul for conspiracy did not violate Article III;24 four others concluded that it
did;25 and three judges either did not participate or did not opine on the merits
question.26
In trying to justify such a military exception to Article III, the government
and the judges who voted in its favor have not placed much reliance on
constitutional text.27 Nor, for the most part, have they relied upon any compelling functional, pragmatic, or normative justifications for abandoning civilian
judges and juries in such a case.28 Indeed, the most striking thing about the al
Bahlul litigation is that the government has offered only a single functional or
normative argument for why it is important, let alone essential, to use military
commissions to try domestic-law offenses. Further, that single rationale, relating
to different evidentiary rules in the two tribunals, is ill-suited to the task,
because it does not purport to explain why such trials should be held without the
juries and independent judges that Article III guarantees.29
The government’s case for military tribunals, as well as Judge Kavanaugh’s
opinion in al Bahlul III defending the constitutionality of such an Article I trial,
is therefore predicated almost exclusively on historical antecedents, and
upon the Supreme Court’s insistence, in several recent cases, that “longstanding practice of the government . . . can inform our determination of what
the law is.”30

does not violate international law, see al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 813–16 (joint opinion of Rogers, Tatel
and Pillard, JJ., dissenting).
24. See al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 759–74 (Kavanaugh J., joined by Brown and Griffith, JJ.,
concurring); id. at 759 (Henderson, J., concurring, and incorporating by reference her dissenting
opinion in al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 27–72).
25. See id. at 809–26, 835–37 (joint opinion of Rogers, Tatel and Pillard, JJ., dissenting); id. at 800
(Wilkins, J., concurring) (stating that if he were to reach the merits, “I would be inclined to agree with
the dissent”).
26. Judge Millett concluded that the conviction could be affirmed because it was not “plain error.”
Id. at 788–95. Chief Judge Garland and Judge Srinivasan did not participate in the decision.
27. See al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 768 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“Based solely on the text of
Article III, Bahlul might have a point.”).
28. See id. at 828 (joint opinion of Rogers, Tatel, and Pillard, JJ., dissenting) (“[R]emarkably,
throughout this protracted litigation, the government has offered no reason to believe that expanding the
traditionally understood scope of Article III’s exception for law-of-war military commissions is
necessary to meet a military exigency. . . . Perhaps the government has eschewed a claim of military
necessity because of the many other tools at its disposal. Congress remains free to enact, and the
President to employ, domestic laws to bring terrorists to justice before Article III courts, as they have on
hundreds of occasions already with remarkable success.”); see also infra Section II.B.1.
29. See infra notes 212–19 and accompanying text.
30. U.S. al Bahlul III Brief, supra note 23, at 30 (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2560 (2014)); see also al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 764–65 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); al Bahlul II, 792
F.3d 1, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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The government and the judges who have rejected the application of Article
III make two different sorts of historical arguments.
The first is, in effect, a type of originalist argument—not so much about the
alleged original “meaning” of the words of Article III, but about early understandings or expectations concerning whether and to what extent the new Constitution would alter wartime practices familiar at the Founding. In particular, the
government points to resolutions the Second Continental Congress enacted,
authorizing courts-martial proceedings for spies and for persons alleged to have
aided the British during the Revolutionary War. It also relies upon actual
court-martial cases convened pursuant to those resolves, and approved by
General George Washington, in the years 1778–1780.31 Judge Kavanaugh has
further stressed that even after the Constitution was ratified, the very first
Congresses codified the pre-constitutional articles of war that included certain
of those wartime offenses;32 and in 1806, the Ninth Congress expressly established two new articles of war authorizing military trials for certain forms of
assistance to the enemy, as well as for spying in specified circumstances, as part
of its comprehensive codification of the military’s Articles of War.33 According
to the government, and to several of the judges in al Bahlul III, we should
understand the Constitution as having preserved, rather than repudiated, these
early pre- and post-ratification practices.
This argument evokes an intuitively appealing presumption the Supreme
Court articulated in a post-Civil-War case—namely, that, with rare exceptions
(such as the Third Amendment), the Constitution was designed to afford the
government “the power of carrying on war as it had been carried on during the
Revolution.”34 Indeed, during the Second World War the Court actually used
precisely this form of argument-from-origins to establish the Article III exception for military adjudication of international law-of-war offenses.35 In Quirin,
Chief Justice Stone wrote that the Court had “often recognized” that
it was not the purpose or effect of § 2 of Article III, read in the light of the
common law, to enlarge the then existing right to a jury trial. The object was
to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases in which it had been
recognized by the common law and in all cases of a like nature as they might
arise in the future, but not to bring within the sweep of the guaranty those

31. U.S. al Bahlul III Brief, supra note 23, at 32–36.
32. See al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 765 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
33. I discuss these post-constitutional enactments in Part V, infra.
34. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 312 (1871); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 n.60
(1957) (plurality opinion) (looking to Revolutionary War cases to inform whether and when the
Constitution permits military trials of dependents of the armed forces who accompany the forces: “We
have examined all the cases of military trial of civilians by the British or American Armies prior to and
contemporaneous with the Constitution that the Government has advanced or that we were able to find
by independent research.”).
35. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942).
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cases in which it was then well understood that a jury trial could not be
demanded as of right.36

Quirin thus relied on what Stephen Sachs has called a “constitutional backdrop”—a pre-constitutional common-law norm or practice that the Framers are
presumed to have preserved, even if the plain text of the Constitution might
suggest otherwise.37
By the same logic of constitutional preservation, if the Second Continental
Congress and General Washington did indeed use military tribunals to try
offenses that were not violations of the international law of war during the
Revolutionary War, then arguably Article III should be understood not to apply
to at least some such cases.
The government’s second type of historical argument extends well beyond
the Framing. It rests upon a scattered handful of political branch precedents
long after 1789 that might be said to have effectively settled, or, in Madison’s
terms, “liquidated,” what had originally been an open question about the scope
of Article III’s application in wartime.38
Part of this alleged liquidation consists of Congress’s longstanding treatment
of spies and disloyal residents. From the Framing to the present day, the federal
code has included variations on the Second Continental Congress’s resolutions,
permitting military trials for aiding the enemy, and for spying in at least some
circumstances, even though those offenses are not violations of the international
law of war.39 As I explain later in this Article, those enactments have mostly
lain dormant: The Executive has rarely used them, apart from a flurry of trials
during the Civil War and a single prosecution in World War II. Nevertheless,
according to Judge Kavanaugh, the “consistent congressional practice requires
our respect.”40
The government’s post-Framing historical account is not limited to the spying
and aiding-the-enemy statutes, however. As Judge Kavanaugh stressed in al
Bahlul III, during the Civil War and the Second World War the Executive
Branch used military tribunals to try individuals for other offenses (conspiracy,
in particular) that were not violations of the international law of war.41 In

36. Id. at 39 (citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63 (1930)) (emphasis added).
37. See Stephen E. Sachs, Constitutional Backdrops, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1813, 1817–18 (2012).
38. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 229 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“All new laws,
though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation,
are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained
by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”); see also Letter from James Madison to
Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 8 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 447, 450 (G. Hunt ed., 1908) (“[It]
was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties and differences of opinion might
occasionally arise in expounding terms & phrases necessarily used in such a charter . . . and that it
might require a regular course of practice to liquidate & settle the meaning of some of them.”).
39. Today, the two offenses are codified as 10 U.S.C. §§ 904, 906 (2012).
40. al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 766.
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particular, Kavanaugh pointed to what he called “[t]he two most important
military commission precedents in U.S. history”: the trial of the individuals
accused of conspiring to assassinate Abraham Lincoln, and the trial of the Nazi
saboteurs in Quirin.42 This historical practice, he wrote, “cannot be airbrushed
out of the picture. Prosecuting conspiracy and other non-international-law-ofwar offenses is not at the periphery of U.S. military commission history and
practice,” but instead “lies at [its] core.”43 Invoking the Supreme Court’s recent
admonition in NLRB v. Noel Canning, Kavanaugh concluded that “we must be
‘reluctant to upset this traditional practice where doing so would seriously
shrink the authority that Presidents have believed existed and have exercised for
so long.’”44
****
In this and a forthcoming article,45 I closely examine these two different sorts
of arguments from history. The present Article focuses on the Founding-era use
of courts-martial to try spies and individuals accused of aiding the enemy, and
the ways in which later generations have grappled with—and often misrepresented or misunderstood—that Revolutionary War practice and the statutes
enacted by the first few Congresses.
The tension between the apparent commands of Article III and the early
practice of prescribing military trials for spying and aiding the enemy has been
a longstanding source of debate among scholars, military lawyers, and courts,
across many of the nation’s wars. As I will explain, there is good reason to
question whether Article III was, in fact, designed to preserve the Revolutionary
War status quo rather than to establish new guarantees.46 But even if one
accepts the premise of constitutional continuity, the historical debate has been
beset by a misunderstanding of the Eighteenth Century history, based upon a
mischaracterization that took hold during the Civil War and later became the
standard-issue account of how Washington and the early Congresses understood
the place of military courts in the constitutional scheme. One of the principal
functions of this Article is to recover a more faithful understanding of that early
history—a history that, if anything, undermines the notion that the Constitution
preserves a discrete, implicit exception for wartime military tribunals.
To be sure, during the nation’s first war, certain types of spies found behind
enemy lines were subject to court-martial, even though—contrary to Chief
Justice Stone’s assumption in Quirin47—such spying did not violate the international law of war.48 This treatment of spies in military proceedings, however,
42. Id.
43. Id. at 768.
44. Id. (quoting 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2573 (2014)).
45. Martin S. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, 118 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming
2018).
46. See infra Section III.B.
47. See 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942).
48. See infra notes 346–57 and accompanying text.
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was a function of idiosyncratic characteristics unique to spying—in particular,
that the conduct was not typically viewed as wrongful. That practice, then, did
not reflect an understanding that the jury right was inapposite to particular sorts
of war-related criminal offenses. Spying truly was, and remains, a sui generis
case, and thus it is hazardous, at best, to draw any broader principle from that
example.49
At first glance, the Revolutionary War congressional resolutions prohibiting
the provision of aid to the enemy would appear to be a more difficult precedent
to reconcile with the text of Article III. Not surprisingly, then, military officers
and commentators in subsequent wars often pointed to such “quasi-treason”
enactments as the basis for a broader theory of permissible military jurisdiction,
and did so even after the Court’s later decision in Milligan, which appeared to
impose severe constitutional constraints on the use of military tribunals to try
U.S. citizens for providing aid to the enemy.50 The Revolutionary War enactments, however, were generally much more limited in scope than has commonly been assumed. The Second Continental Congress designed them to apply
only to persons in or associated with the Continental Army and, rarely, in places
where the civilian courts were truly unavailable to try persons accused of
treason. And, for the most part, General Washington rigorously adhered to this
limited understanding of the resolutions’ scope—in fact, Washington was something of a stickler for ensuring due deference to the civil courts to deal with the
problem of British loyalists aiding the enemy.51
Thus, as this Article demonstrates, the constitutional “backdrop” of wartime
justice against which Article III and the Sixth Amendment were written and
ratified is not nearly as clear-cut as many have long assumed—indeed, if
anything, it points in the other direction. Moreover, there is no reason to think
that when the first few Congresses “ratified” the authorization of military courts
to try the offense of aiding the enemy, the legislature intended to allow military
trials of that offense against ordinary civilians unassociated with the armed
forces—a practice that would appear to conflict not only with Article III,
Section One and the Sixth Amendment, but also with the Treason Clause.52
There is, however, a conspicuous breach in this narrative. In 1780, General
Washington authorized the trial by court-martial of Joshua Hett Smith, a citizen
of New York, for having allegedly abetted Benedict Arnold in his scheme to
help the British capture the Army encampment at West Point, even though the

49. See infra Section IV.B.
50. See 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866).
51. See infra Section IV.C. Therefore, those resolves were less inconsistent with the Court’s later
Milligan decision than has often been understood.
52. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1 (“Treason against the United States, shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
Confession in open Court.”).
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New York Constitution guaranteed Smith the right to trial by jury.53 Indeed, the
Continental Congress was arguably complicit in Smith’s court-martial: that
proceeding was conducted pursuant to a 1778 resolution that did not appear to
be limited to cases of true exigency, as were other congressional resolutions
involving disloyal residents during the War.54
Not surprisingly, then, when the military was pressed to justify the constitutionality of the military commission proceedings against those alleged to have
conspired to kill President Lincoln in 1865, prosecutor John Bingham invoked
General Washington—“the peerless, the stainless, and the just, with whom God
walked through the night of that great trial”55—as having sanctioned a precedent that established the legitimacy of the assassins’ trial.56 The government
also invoked the Smith trial as a significant precedent in the landmark Milligan
case.57
This is a familiar sort of move in constitutional debate—what Jack Balkin has
referred to as the “argument[] from honored authority.”58 It is tempting to
dismiss such arguments as a form of mere hero-worship. Yet to the extent one
believes the Constitution’s true nature might, at least in part, be established by
“the way the framework has consistently operated”—by the proverbial “gloss
which life has written upon” the words of the document59—then it is only
natural to look to the nation’s wars, and the ways in which Congress and
successful wartime Presidents have prosecuted those wars, for guidance.60
53. See infra Section IV.C.5.
54. See infra Section IV.C.3, IV.C.4.
55. THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT LINCOLN AND THE TRIAL OF THE CONSPIRATORS 362 (compiled and
arranged by Benn Pitman) (1989 ed.) [hereinafter PITMAN].
56. See infra notes 631–33 and accompanying text.
57. See 71 U.S. 2, 100–01 (1866) (argument of Benjamin Butler for the government); see also infra
notes 638–43 and accompanying text.
58. Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 672
(2013). For understandable reasons, Lincoln himself is the President most frequently invoked as
authority for arguable wartime deviations from constitutional norms. See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Civil War as Constitutional Interpretation, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 691 (2004); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257 (2004); John Yoo, Lincoln at War, 38 VT.
L. REV. 3 (2013). This type of argument predates the Civil War, however. Indeed, during that war itself,
in the infamous case involving the military detention and trial of Clement Vallandigham, a government
lawyer remarked that the defendant’s challenge to the Lincoln Administration’s use of military tribunals
was necessarily an indictment of a much longer, storied history: “[T]he practice, now complained of as
strange and unprecedented, was commenced under the administration of Washington. Jefferson and
Jackson are also implicated. When Vallandigham shoots his poisoned arrows at President Lincoln, if
there should prove to be strength enough in the bow, the same aim will pierce a succession of illustrious
defenders of liberty.” Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 908 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1863) (No. 16,816)
(argument of Aaron Perry for the government).
59. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
60. In a pair of previous articles, for instance, David Barron and I showed how great wartime
Presidents such as Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt regularly declined to assert, or acknowledged
that it would be improper to assert, a purported war-powers prerogative that is now the subject of
contestation—a purported authority of the Commander in Chief to disregard statutory constraints on the
conduct of war. Such a longstanding historical consensus, we argued, reflected in virtually (but not
quite) uniform practice of executives who were nonetheless able to successfully prosecute the nation’s
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Washington’s example, in particular, has frequently been a touchstone for
constitutional understandings. “In the American constitutional tradition,” writes
Akhil Amar, “what Washington did . . . has often mattered much more than
what the written Constitution says, at least in situations where the text is
arguably ambiguous and Washington’s actions fall within the range of plausible
textual meaning.”61 To be sure, Washington’s constitutional authority is most
pronounced with respect to his actions as President, when he was implementing
the new Constitution itself. Yet there is also a storied tradition of looking to
Washington’s actions as Commander in Chief during the war as a model the
Framers presumably did not intend to jettison when it came time to craft the
Constitution shortly after that successful military campaign.62
To assess how much weight to assign such “honored authority,” however, it is
necessary to pay careful heed to what that alleged authority consists of, and how
it was justified, defended, and treated in its own era—and whether such
examples have withstood the test of time.
The first three parts of this Article set the stage for the history that follows by
providing the broader constitutional context. Part I examines the rationales for
the judge and jury guarantees in Article III (and the Sixth Amendment’s jury
right) and the reasons why military trials in particular raise acute constitutional
concerns. Part II canvasses the various Article III exceptions the Supreme Court
has recognized in the context of criminal trials—alleviating the requirement of a
civilian jury, an independent Article III judge, or both—and demonstrates that,
apart from one prominent counterexample (Quirin’s exception for violations of
the law of war), each of those exceptions ultimately rests upon pragmatic or
functional justifications, rather than on text or history. Part II then proceeds to
explain why the government barely relies upon any such pragmatic or functional (or normative) considerations to justify the use of military tribunals to try
domestic-law offenses against persons unconnected with the U.S. armed forces,
and why it is no longer plausible (if it ever was) simply to say that wartime
enemies (even enemy aliens, such as al Bahlul) are unprotected by Article III’s

armed conflicts, ought to bear heavily on modern understandings of whether the Constitution is best
understood to establish, or countenance the exercise of, that contested prerogative. See generally David
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem,
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) [hereinafter “Barron & Lederman
I”]; David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008). The Article III issue discussed in the present
Article raises what might be seen as the converse question—namely, whether and how the occasional
exercise of a particular wartime authority by some of those same, esteemed executives, such as
Washington, Lincoln and Roosevelt, often pursuant to statutory authorization, might affect constitutional understandings.
61. AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE
BY 309–10 (2012); see also id. at 309 (“Much as modern Christians ask themselves, ‘What would Jesus
do?,’ presidents over the centuries have quite properly asked themselves, ‘What would President
Washington do?’ and, even more pointedly, ‘What did President Washington do?’”).
62. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman I, supra note 60, at 773–80.
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guarantees: For this particular proposed exception to Article III, it’s history
or bust.
Part III offers reasons to be skeptical about the assumption that Article III
was not designed to alter the prevailing norms during the Revolutionary War
and shortly thereafter. Part III also explains how the Supreme Court nevertheless embraced this “preservationist” account of Article III in its opinion in
Quirin. Rightly or wrongly, Chief Justice Stone insisted that Article III’s
criminal trial protections extended only to those categories of cases where the
right to trial by jury had previously been recognized by the pre-constitutional
common law “and in all cases of a like nature as they might arise in the
future.”63 And Quirin’s rationale thus tees up the substantive question at the
heart of this Article: Was it “well understood” at the Framing that “a jury trial
could not be demanded as of right”64 for, and that an Article III judge need not
preside over, the trial of certain war-related domestic-law offenses?
Part IV recounts the story of the spying and aiding-the-enemy offenses during
the Revolutionary War, and how General Washington implemented the relevant
congressional resolves. Part V examines the period immediately after ratification of the Constitution, including Congress’s 1806 enactment of new Articles
of War concerning spying and treasonous conduct, and the treatment of civilians
accused of aiding the British enemy in the War of 1812. Part VI then examines
how the Revolutionary War history, and the spying and aiding-theenemy prohibitions more broadly, have been understood—or, more often,
misunderstood—in subsequent wars. Finally, Part VII offers some concluding
thoughts on what, if anything, this historical account demonstrates with respect
to the Article III question.65

63. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942) (citing District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63
(1930)).
64. Id.
65. In a forthcoming article, I examine the second sort of historical argument on which the
government and Judge Kavanaugh rely—the idea that post-Framing-era practice “liquidated” an Article
III exception for war-related domestic-law offenses. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45. That article focuses on the ways in which the Article III question was negotiated
during and shortly after the Civil War, with particular attention to the Lincoln assassination trial. It also
traces the ways in which the Lincoln assassination trial was—or, more often, was not—treated as
constitutional authority over the course of the past 150 years, and demonstrates that the nascent respect
for the Lincoln trial as a constitutional precedent in the past few years is an historical anomaly. That
proceeding might, indeed, “lie[] at the core of U.S. military commission history and practice.” al Bahlul
III, 840 F.3d 757, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Even so, until recently it
was folly for anyone to rely upon that proceeding as a valid precedent that might support the argument
that domestic-law offenses in wartime can be tried in military commissions rather than in Article III
courts. As the nation’s then-leading expert on military law, Frederick Bernays Wiener, wrote to Justice
Frankfurter shortly after the Quirin decision in 1942, the Lincoln conspirators’ trial was a precedent that
“no self-respecting military lawyer will look straight in the eye.” Letter from Frederick Bernays Wiener
to Justice Felix Frankfurter, at 9 (Nov. 5, 1942), Felix Frankfurter Papers, Harvard Law School Library,
Part III, Reel 43.
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I. ARTICLE III, CRIMINAL TRIALS, AND MILITARY TRIBUNALS
With respect to criminal trials, Article III generates two important guarantees—
one related to the jury, the other to the judge—that are not honored in trials
under the Military Commissions Act (MCA).
A. A CIVILIAN JURY

Article III provides that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of
Impeachment, shall be by Jury”66—a constitutional guarantee so important that
it reappears in similar form in the Sixth Amendment, which provides that “[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law.”67 That is just about as unconditional as constitutional language gets: As
the Court stated in Milligan, “all crimes” and “all criminal prosecutions” are
“provisions . . . too plain and direct, to leave room for misconstruction or doubt
of their true meaning.”68 These provisions are “expressed in such plain English
words, that it would seem the ingenuity of man could not evade them.”69
Yet evade them the Court has. As I explain below, the Court has identified
certain limited exceptions to the jury guarantee, including one exception the
Milligan Court itself identified only a few paragraphs after insisting that there
was no room for textual misconstruction—namely, the trial by court-martial of
active-duty service members “for offences committed while the party is in the
military or naval service.”70
Even so, such exceptions are strongly disfavored because the right to be
tried by jury—what Justice Scalia called “the spinal column of American
democracy”71—is one of the most fundamental of constitutional guarantees,
“reflect[ing] a profound judgment about the way in which law should be
enforced and justice administered.”72 Not only was that “profound judgment”

66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
67. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., joined
by Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (remarking that “this guarantee [is]
the only one to appear in both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights”). The Supreme Court
has held that, notwithstanding the difference in terms between the two formulations (compare “the trial
of all crimes” with “all criminal prosecutions”), the Sixth Amendment “did not enlarge” the scope of
the jury trial right that Article III established. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942). As Professor
Amar notes, the distinct function of the Sixth Amendment was to guarantee that the jurors would come
from the local community affected by the crime. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION
AND RECONSTRUCTION 105–06 (1998).
68. 71 U.S. 2, 119 (1866).
69. Id. at 120. To be sure, the phrase “[t]he trial of all crimes” in Article III presumably refers only
to trial for violations of federal law. The Supreme Court has held, however, that the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial is incorporated against the states. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148–49
(1968).
70. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 123.
71. Neder, 527 U.S. at 30 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
72. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155.
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reflected in the Declaration of Independence;73 in addition, “the right to trial by
jury in criminal cases was the only guarantee common to the twelve state
constitutions that predated the Constitutional Convention, and it has appeared in
the constitution of every State to enter the Union thereafter.”74 Alexander
Hamilton, in The Federalist, went so far as to remark that
[t]he friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree in
nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by jury; or if
there is any difference between them it consists in this: the former regard it as
a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of
free government.75

This extraordinary and deep consensus explains why the right to a jury trial in
criminal cases was “provided for, in the most ample manner, in the plan of the
convention.”76
The MCA does not provide the right to trial by jury that Article III and the
Sixth Amendment guarantee. Whereas “the essential feature” of that jury right
“obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
commonsense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from that group’s determination of
guilt or innocence,”77 a military commission panel consists of commissioned
officers of the armed forces on active duty.78 Moreover, the Constitution
guarantees a jury of at least six members,79 yet the MCA authorizes fivemember panels for non-capital cases.80 And although the Constitution requires
that the jury verdict be unanimous in a federal trial,81 the MCA permits a
conviction upon the vote of two-thirds of the members.82
B. AN INDEPENDENT PRESIDING JUDGE

Article III provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may

73. One of the charges against King George III was that he had “subject[ed] us to a Jurisdiction
foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our Laws,” by approving legislation “depriving us,
in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury.” THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 15, 20
(1776).
74. Neder, 527 U.S. at 31 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 495 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
76. Id.
77. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (emphasis added).
78. See 10 U.S.C. § 948i(a) (2012).
79. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
80. See 10 U.S.C. § 948m(a) (2012).
81. See Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356,
369 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 382 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 395 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 399 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 400 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Andres v. United
States, 333 U.S. 740, 748 (1948).
82. See 10 U.S.C. § 949m(a) (2012).
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from time to time ordain and establish,” and further specifies that the judges of
such courts “shall hold their offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated
Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”83 However, the text of Article III
does not guarantee that all trials of federal crimes be held in Article III courts
with Article III judges; rather, it merely empowers Congress to create federal
courts with the jurisdiction to adjudicate such cases. And so, as the Supreme
Court once assumed,84 perhaps Congress could opt to have federal offenses
tried outside the federal government, in state courts.85
Whether or not that is a constitutionally available option, however, there is no
such historical practice of state courts hosting prosecutions under federal criminal law86 and Congress has long prohibited such trials.87 Accordingly, it is and
always has been the responsibility of the federal government to try federal
criminal offenses. This triggers the Supreme Court’s strong presumption that
such trials must be in an Article III court, with a presiding judge who enjoys the
protections of lifetime tenure and emoluments, thereby to ensure “maximum
freedom from possible coercion or influence by the executive or legislative
branches of the Government.”88 Because Executive Branch judges and other
officials do not have such protections, there is a presumption that they may not
exercise adjudicative authority, criminal or otherwise, that is “brought within
the bounds of federal jurisdiction”89—that is to say, authority that is part of the
“judicial Power” of Article III.90
83. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
84. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 402 (1973).
85. The Court’s assumption in Palmore that state courts could entertain federal criminal trials is in
tension with understandings both before and after that case. In Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, for example,
Justice Story opined in dicta that the jurisdiction to try federal crimes is exclusive to Article III courts,
and that “[n]o part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently with the
Constitution, be delegated to state tribunals.” 14 U.S. 304, 337 (1816); see also Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. 1, 69 (1820) (“It has been expressly held by this Court, that no part of the criminal jurisdiction of
the United States can consistently with the constitution be delegated by Congress to State tribunals; and
there is not the slightest inclination to retract that opinion.” (citation omitted)). Scholars have recently
explained that Justice Story’s presumption in Hunter’s Lessee was widely shared throughout much of
the Nineteenth Century, including in several other Supreme Court cases. See generally Michael G.
Collins & Jonathan Remy Nash, Prosecuting Federal Crimes in State Courts, 97 VA. L. REV. 243
(2011); see also Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Congressional Power and State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J.
949, 992–1000 (2006). To similar effect, Chief Justice Roberts recently stated that a defendant “may
not agree to stand trial on federal charges before a state court.” Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
135 S. Ct. 1932, 1955–56 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.).
86. See, e.g., Collins & Nash, supra note 85, at 266–78 (discussing the practice in the early
Republic).
87. See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2012) (“The district courts of the United States shall have original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.”
(emphasis added)).
88. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 16 (1955); see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
2, 122 (1866) (“One of the plainest constitutional provisions was, therefore, infringed when Milligan
was tried by a court . . . not composed of judges appointed during good behavior.”).
89. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011).
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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The protections of tenure and salary, the Court has explained, guarantee the
federal judiciary’s independence from the political branches, in order
to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the
guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the
administration of justice without respect to persons and with equal concern
for the poor and the rich.91

As Hamilton famously put the point in Federalist No. 78, quoting Montesquieu,
“there is no liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers.”92 “The standard of good behavior for the continuance
in office of the judicial magistracy,” explained Hamilton, “is
the best expedient which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady,
upright, and impartial administration of the laws.”93 Chief Justice Roberts
recently elaborated upon how such separation of adjudicative function within
the federal government protects liberty:
The colonists had been subjected to judicial abuses at the hand of the Crown,
and the Framers knew the main reasons why: because the King of Great
Britain “made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their
offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.” The Framers undertook in Article III to protect citizens subject to the judicial power of the new
Federal Government from a repeat of those abuses. By appointing judges to
serve without term limits, and restricting the ability of the other branches to
remove judges or diminish their salaries, the Framers sought to ensure that
each judicial decision would be rendered, not with an eye toward currying
favor with Congress or the Executive, but rather with the “[c]lear heads . . . and
honest hearts” deemed “essential to good judges.”94

An Article III judge does not preside over a military commission proceeding.
Instead, such a trial is overseen by a “military judge”—a commissioned officer
of the armed forces95 who does not enjoy the protections of lifetime tenure and
emoluments and who is subject to political-branch influence.

91. Evans v. Gore, 253 U.S. 245, 253 (1920).
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (quoting
MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF LAWS 181 (1748)).
93. Id.
94. Stern, 564 U.S. at 483–84 (first quoting The Declaration of Independence ¶ 11, then quoting 1
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 363 (J. Andrews ed., 1896)); accord Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (Article III “safeguard[s] litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before
judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’” (quoting United
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 218 (1980)).
95. See 10 U.S.C. § 948j(b) (2012).
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C. THE SPECIAL CONCERNS ASSOCIATED WITH MILITARY TRIALS, ESPECIALLY
IN WARTIME

As I discuss in Part II, when it comes to criminal prosecutions for federal
offenses, the only contexts in which the Supreme Court has sanctioned exceptions to both of the Article III guarantees—the requirements of tenure- and
salary-protected judges and civilian juries—involve tribunals administered by
the military.96 And yet it is in military tribunals that the absence of Article III’s
protections can raise the most acute concerns.
“Traditionally military justice has been a rough form of justice emphasizing
summary procedures, speedy convictions and stern penalties . . . .”97 To be sure,
in recent decades Congress has taken steps “to make the system of military
justice more like the American system of civilian justice”98 in a manner
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause by prohibiting direct command influence over the conduct of military
judges,99 and by authorizing eventual civilian court review of the judgments and
legal determinations of military courts.100 Even so, the structural differences
between Article III courts and military tribunals remain substantial:
[C]onceding to military personnel that high degree of honesty and sense of
justice which nearly all of them undoubtedly have, it still remains true that
military tribunals have not been and probably never can be constituted in such
way that they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution
has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts.101

Start with the difference in the presiding judges. Article III courts are
supervised by judges with tenure and salary protections “during good Behaviour,”102 who have “maximum freedom from possible coercion or influence by
the executive or legislative branches of the Government.”103 That is not the case
in a military court. Indeed, for most of the nation’s history there was no such
thing as a military judge at all; courts-martial and military commissions were
composed of panels of military officers chosen by, and beholden to, a military
commander.104 The panels themselves decided all questions of fact and law. It
96. Except where noted, in this Article I do not draw distinctions between the two principal types of
military tribunals that Congress has traditionally authorized—courts-martial and military commissions.
Both types of tribunals can try civilians and members of enemy forces under certain circumstances, see,
e.g., id. §§ 802(a)(7)–(13), 904–906 (courts-martial); id. §§ 948c, 948a(7) (military commissions), and
neither has an Article III judge or a civilian jury.
97. United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 918 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in relevant part) (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
98. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 179 (1994).
99. See 10 U.S.C. § 837(a) (2012) (courts-martial); id. § 949b (military commissions).
100. See id. § 867a(a) (courts-martial); id. § 950g (military commissions).
101. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955).
102. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
103. Toth, 350 U.S. at 16.
104. See United States v. Norfleet, 53 M.J. 262, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2000).
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was not until the 1950 enactment of the UCMJ that Congress established the
position of a “law officer” who performed some of the traditional roles of a trial
judge.105 In the Military Justice Act of 1968, Congress overhauled the military
justice system in an effort to “civilianize” court-martial procedures (that is, to
adopt many, but hardly all, Article III structures and protections).106 The 1968
enactment designated the law officer of a court-martial as a “military judge,”107
required such judges to be commissioned officers of the armed forces and
members of a bar,108 authorized such judges to rule on legal questions and
instruct the court-martial panel on the relevant law,109 and afforded such judges
increased protection from influence by convening authorities and other officers.110
Nevertheless, the prospect of subtle forms of command influence, and the
incentives for military judges to act in ways that find favor with their superior
officers, remains a structural reality, especially when compared with the independence and impartiality of Article III judges.111 Military judges not only lack
lifetime salary and tenure protections; they are also assigned to judicial duty by
another executive officer (their service branch’s Judge Advocate General), and
they enjoy no statutory tenure protection against at-will removal, in the form of
reassignment.112 Moreover, their future prospects for promotion and reassignment remain in the hands of superior officers in the command structure; and the
judges also have reason to stay in Congress’s good graces because promotion to
a higher rank is an appointment to a new office that requires Senate consent.113
The deviation from Article III courts is even starker when we move from the
judge to the adjudicative panel—the finders of fact who determine whether the
prosecution has met its burden. “Members” of court-marital and military commission panels are officers of the armed forces, “detailed” by the convening
authority.114 These members have more expertise than lay jurors with respect to
both matters of military discipline and culture, and the rules and practices of
armed conflict (in trials involving alleged law-of-war offenses). “[I]nherent in

105. See id. at 266–67.
106. Pub. L. No. 90–632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
107. See 10 U.S.C. § 826(a) (2012).
108. See id. § 826(b).
109. See id. § 851(b).
110. See id. § 837. On the statutory protections that are designed to ensure judicial independence,
see Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 180–81 (1994). For more detail about this historical
evolution, see, e.g., Fredric I. Lederer & Barbara S. Hundley, Needed: An Independent Military
Judiciary—A Proposal to Amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
629, 633–41 (1994); CHARLES A. SHANOR & L. LYNN HOGUE, MILITARY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 1–29 (4th ed.
2013).
111. See Lederer & Hundley, supra note 110, at 648–69; see generally Luther C. West, A History of
Command Influence on the Military Judicial System, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1970).
112. See EUGENE R. FIDELL, MILITARY JUSTICE: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 69–71 (2016).
113. See 10 U.S.C. § 624 (2012).
114. See id. § 825 (courts-martial); id. § 948i (military commissions).
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the institution of trial by jury,” however, is the idea that “laymen are better than
specialists”115 in determining guilt or innocence:
Juries fairly chosen from different walks of life bring into the jury box a
variety of different experiences, feelings, intuitions and habits. Such juries
may reach completely different conclusions than would be reached by specialists in any single field, including specialists in the military field. On many
occasions, fully known to the Founders of this country, jurors—plain people—
have manfully stood up in defense of liberty against the importunities of
judges and despite prevailing hysteria and prejudices.116

Military panels raise particular questions of independence not only because
they are hand-picked by the convening authority, but also because the members,
no matter how conscientious they might be, remain acutely aware that their
professional prospects are in the hands of their commanding officers (and of
senators), some of whom may not be indifferent to the results of the trial. As
Luther West wrote in 1970, “the military future of every member of the
court-martial is still within the absolute discretion of the military commander
who convenes the court-martial.”117 Such officers are only human, and thus
could hardly be faulted if they were to be concerned about how their verdict
might affect those prospects. For all these reasons, although a military panel
may endeavor to be quite faithful to its oath, it cannot possibly exercise the
same independence that an Article III jury enjoys. Furthermore, the military
panel does not bring to bear the diverse sentiments and perspectives of a distinct
civilian community that the local jury is designed to reflect.118

115. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955).
116. Id. at 18–19 (citations omitted). The Toth Court added that in those cases where jurors
“betrayed the cause of justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures,” Article III tribunals—unlike
their Article I military counterparts—have “independent trial judges” with the “power to set aside
convictions.” Id. at 19.
117. West, supra note 111, at 151.
118. In addition to the differences respecting judges and juries, military tribunals also deviate from
Article III courts in a third fundamental way: they do not comply with the Grand Jury requirement of
the Fifth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public
danger . . . .”). Charges in military tribunals have traditionally been brought by military commanders,
and today are proffered by the Secretary of Defense or his designee within the armed forces. See U.S.
DEP’T OF DEF., MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS, Rule 401, at II-19 (2010 ed.). For the most part, this
Article does not focus on the right to a grand jury as much as on the Article III protections of a
tenure-protected judge and a civilian jury—not only because the grand jury right is often of less
practical significance, but also because it does not derive from Article III. Because its genesis is “only”
in the Bill of Rights, the right to grand jury presentment therefore might present a distinct doctrinal
puzzle of its own in cases not involving U.S. persons—that is to say, virtually all of the cases that are
likely to be at issue under the MCA and possible similar statutes. It is an open question whether the
Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment would protect an alien defendant tried by the federal
government overseas. Cf. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 782–85 (1950) (leaving open the
question of whether alien defendants could invoke the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment). The
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As pronounced as these problems are in the context of the most common
form of military adjudication—the trial of fellow members of the armed
services—they are exponentially greater in the “war tribunal” cases that are the
subject of this Article, namely, the trial of enemy belligerents, or of civilians
who have come to the aid of enemy forces, during an armed conflict. The
principal aim of the military arm of the government, after all, is to win the war;
and members of the armed services, including those serving as judges or
members of military tribunals, are generally devoted to using all of their
resources and skills to that end. Can such military officers—even very principled officers, endeavoring to be true to their oath that they will assess the facts
and the law without prejudice or preconceptions—realistically be expected to
dispense justice without fear or favor in such situations? To put out of mind the
fact that the defendants before them may be committed to using lethal force
relentlessly against the U.S. armed forces themselves?
Not only is it unrealistic to expect that most military tribunal judges and
members can and will discard their biases; it is also not something expected of
them—indeed, it has often been invoked as a justification for the use of military
tribunals. For example, William Winthrop, the “Blackstone of Military Law,”119
asserted that the military commission is “an instrumentality for the more
efficient execution of the war powers vested in Congress and the power vested
in the President as Commander in chief in war.”120 More recently, the Court in
Hamdan invoked Winthrop in explaining that the military commission “derives
its original sanction” from “those provisions of the Constitution which empower
Congress to ‘declare war’ and ‘raise armies,’ and which, in authorizing the
initiation of war, authorize the employment of all necessary and proper agencies
for its due prosecution.”121 Accordingly, proponents of military wartime tribunals have often been quite forthright in acknowledging that they prefer such
courts precisely because they are not subject to the constraints of an Article III
court, and by the vagaries of a civilian jury, and thus are more likely to dispense
swift and severe sentences. As Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt—perhaps
the most zealous Civil War advocate of such courts—explained in 1865,
military commissions are “un[e]ncumbered by the technicalities and inevitable
Court’s decisions in In re Yamashita and Quirin, however, suggest that aliens would not be treated any
differently from citizens with respect to the Grand Jury Clause in a trial occurring in the United States
or on U.S. territory. See 327 U.S. 1, 23 (1946); 317 U.S. 1, 35 (1942). Assuming that is so, it is quite
likely that the Grand Jury Clause would apply to an Article III trial of an enemy alien in the United
States or at Guantánamo. It is also fairly certain that if the protections of Article III do not apply to a
particular military trial, then neither would the protection of the Grand Jury Clause. See Quirin, 317
U.S. at 40–41 (suggesting that the jury and grand jury rights rise or fall together). All of which is to say
that if a particular defendant is not entitled to a jury, then he almost surely would not be entitled to
grand jury presentment, either.
119. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2006) (plurality opinion) (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
120. WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831 (2d ed. 1920) [hereinafter “WINTHROP 2d
ed.”].
121. 548 U.S. at 592 n.21 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 831).
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embarrassments attending the administration of justice before civil tribunals.”122
There is nothing illegitimate or unusual about this perspective, or about
designing military courts to help prosecute a military campaign. After all, any
army would wish to swiftly and decisively punish and incapacitate enemies (and
their abettors) who violate the law in the conduct of an armed conflict. For
present purposes, however, the important point is simply that military officers
on a wartime panel are differently situated from their counterparts on an Article
III jury, in perspective and in motivation: By virtue of their roles in the military,
and in the armed conflict, they have an acute stake in the outcome. Inevitably,
then, at least some such officers will be inclined to perform their functions not
only with an eye to adjudicating guilt and innocence—to see that justice is
done—but also to incapacitate the enemy, and to deter future violations of the
law of war, so as to more effectively and successfully prosecute the conflict
itself. That might be a very valuable thing when it comes to winning the war,
but it is in deep tension with the purposes of Article III’s guarantees.
II. THE CRIMINAL TRIAL EXCEPTIONS TO ARTICLE III AND THEIR JUSTIFICATIONS
Notwithstanding the plain language of Article III, adjudication within the
Executive Branch is ubiquitous in the modern administrative state. The Supreme Court has therefore often opined on the circumstances in which Congress
can assign adjudicatory civil authority to Article I officers.123 That topic is a
staple of Federal Courts courses, and has a prominent pride of place in the
canonical casebook.124
Scholars have paid far less attention, however, to deviations from Article III
in the context of criminal trials.125 That is not because the question is less
important in that setting: Indeed, the liberty-based concerns that Chief Justice
Roberts invoked in Stern126 are far more pronounced in the context of criminal
prosecution. Moreover, the threats to judicial independence and objective factfinding are all the greater in the criminal setting because the Executive Branch

122. Report of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt to Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War, Nov. 13,
1865, in THE WAR OF THE REBELLION: A COMPILATION OF THE OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE UNION AND
CONFEDERATE ARMIES, Series III, vol. 5, at 493 (United States Department of War 1900) [hereinafter
OFFICIAL RECORDS].
123. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
124. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 345–90 (7th ed. 2015) [hereinafter “HART & WECHSLER”].
125. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 124, barely mentions the topic, except for a relatively recent,
short section on law-of-war military commissions. Id. at 402–09. Fortunately, Stephen Vladeck has
recently begun to fill this gap, with the first comprehensive analytic treatment of the variety of
“military” exceptions to Article III. See generally Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III,
103 GEO. L.J. 933 (2015).
126. See 564 U.S. at 483.
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serves not only as a “party,”127 but as an adversarial prosecutor, endeavoring to
abridge the defendant of his liberty. This explains why the “public rights
doctrine”—the most familiar and important exception to Article III in the
civil context—“does not extend to any criminal matters, although
the Government is a proper party.”128
A. THE FUNCTIONAL AND PRAGMATIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ALL BUT ONE OF THE
RECOGNIZED ARTICLE III CRIMINAL EXCEPTIONS

Even absent the public rights doctrine, however, the Supreme Court has
sanctioned five circumstances in which the judge and jury protections of Article
III do not apply, in full or in part, to criminal prosecutions. The first two, which
do not involve military courts, are partial exceptions: One, the trial of “petty”
offenses, involves the denial of a jury within a tribunal with a presiding Article
III judge; whereas the other, criminal trials in territorial courts, preserves the
jury trial, but permits non-Article III judges to preside. The other three “full”
exceptions—in which neither the Article III judge nor jury is present—all
involve military tribunals.
In all but one of the contexts in which it has recognized exceptions to Article
III’s judge and/or jury protections in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has
relied principally on functional or pragmatic considerations, rather than on
constitutional text, history, or Founding-era understandings, to justify the departure from Article III. This section describes the Court’s functional justifications
for those four exceptions. In section II.B, I examine whether any such functional reasons, or other nonhistorical rationales, might justify a further Article
III exception for the trial of domestic-law offenses in the nation’s current armed
conflicts. Then, in Part III, I turn to the fifth of the Court’s recognized exceptions, the only one that the Court has clearly premised on Founding-era history:
the exception, recognized in Quirin, for trial of violations of the international
law of war.
1. The Partial Exceptions
a. Petty Offenses. In an 1888 opinion, the Supreme Court assumed in dicta
that the right to a jury does not attach to the trial of certain minor, or “petty,”
offenses.129 It first issued a holding to that effect in 1904, in Schick v. United
States.130 By 1930, in a case holding that a reckless driving charge triggered the
jury right, the Court deemed it “settled” that “there may be many offenses
called ‘petty offenses’ which do not rise to the degree of crimes within the

127. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (extending judicial power of the United States “to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”).
128. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 70 n.24 (1982) (plurality
opinion).
129. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552, 557 (1888).
130. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
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meaning of Article III, and in respect of which Congress may dispense with a
jury trial.”131 Notably, however, this was a “partial” Article III exception: the
Court did not suggest that “petty” crimes could be tried in a tribunal lacking an
Article III judge.
The Court has never settled upon a single, let alone satisfactory, explanation
for why Article III’s prescription of a jury trial for “all crimes” permits such a
“minor offense” exception. In Schick, the Court tendered a textual argument. It
noted that the Framers at the Philadelphia Convention voted to change the
phrase “the trial of all criminal offenses” to “the trial of all crimes,” at a time
when the “popular understanding” of the word “crimes” in the common law
arguably denoted “‘such offenses as are of a deeper and more atrocious dye’”
than most misdemeanors.132 This reading, based solely on the use of the word
“crimes,” is hardly convincing.133 Among other things, it would have absurd
implications for the use of the same term elsewhere in the Constitution, such as
in Article IV’s Extradition Clause,134 which certainly applies to petty crimes,
and also in the “all Crimes” clause of Article III itself, which provides not only
that the trial of “all Crimes shall be by Jury,” but also that they “shall be held in
the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.”135
Sixteen years before Schick, in Callan v. Wilson, the Court acknowledged that
the term “all Crimes” in Article III could encompass “every violation of public
law.”136 The Callan Court also suggested, however, that the term might alternatively have a more “limited” scope, embracing only “offen[s]es of a serious or
atrocious character.”137 The basis for this suggestion was the Court’s understanding of Article III’s relationship to the pre-constitutional common law. The Court
opined that the phrase “all Crimes” should “be interpreted in the light of the
principles which, at common law, determined whether the accused, in a given
class of cases, was entitled to be tried by a jury.”138 In other words, the Callan
Court assumed that Article III was designed not to make a sharp break with the
pre-1789 common-law practice when it came to the jury right, but instead to
reflect, if not the specific holdings of the common law, at least the “principles”
that animated common-law decisions about which offenses did and did not
131. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1930).
132. Schick, 195 U.S. at 69–70 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Commentaries *5).
133. See Stephen A. Siegel, Textualism On Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision, the “Petty Offense” Exception, and Other Departures from Clear Constitutional Text, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 89, 107–42
(2013).
134. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 (“A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive
Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.”).
135. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. Professor Siegel has further demonstrated the flaws in the Schick
Court’s reliance upon the change of phrasing in Philadelphia, and on Blackstone. See Siegel, supra note
133, at 120–42.
136. 127 U.S. 540, 549 (1888).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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trigger a right to trial by jury. By those lights, the jury right would attach to the
trial of not only “felonies, or offenses punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary,” but also “some classes of misdemeanors, the punishment of which
involves or may involve the deprivation of the liberty of the citizen.”139 In
1926, Professor Felix Frankfurter, writing with his protégé Tommy Corcoran,
published an elaborate defense of the “petty offense” exception, in which they
enthusiastically endorsed the Callan Court’s presumption that Article III should
be interpreted to sustain, rather than to have overturned, distinctions that the
Framing-era common law drew between those offenses that did, and those that
did not, require a trial by jury.140 Shortly after Frankfurter and Corcoran
published their article, the Supreme Court appeared to embrace their “preservation of the common law” argument.141
More recently, however, the Court has largely abandoned the Founding-era
common law as a touchstone for determining when the “petty offense” exception applies. The modern Court looks instead primarily to “objective indications
of the seriousness with which society regards the offense,” especially to the
maximum authorized penalty.142 This evolution, to a more self-consciously
normative balancing test for determining which charges are not sufficiently
serious to warrant a jury guarantee,143 is partly a function of the fact that “many
contemporary statutory offenses lack common-law antecedents.”144 It is also,
however, the Court’s concession to reality—a recognition that the doctrine itself
139. Id.
140. See generally Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926).
141. See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72 (1930) (reasoning that Article III’s jury
clause should be “interpreted in the light of the common law”).
142. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 326 (1996) (quoting Frank v. United States, 395 U.S.
147, 148 (1969)). Under current doctrine, a jury trial is required as to all offenses for which the statute
authorizes a term of imprisonment of more than six months. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S.
506, 512 (1974). If the maximum prison term is less than six months, the Court presumes that the jury
right does not attach, see id., but as cases such as Callan (conspiracy) and Colts (reckless driving)
demonstrate, that presumption can be overcome, even for maximum terms of less than six months, if
there are other indicia that the offense is “of a grave character, affecting the public at large.” Callan,
127 U.S. at 556; see also Colts, 282 U.S. at 70.
143. The modern Court’s doctrine is concededly dependent upon normative judgments, more so than
on text or on analogies to the framing-era common law. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S.
538, 542–43 (1989) (explaining that although a defendant will usually consider a term of less than six
months anything but “petty,” the Court has “found that the disadvantages of such a sentence, ‘onerous
though they may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from speedy and inexpensive
nonjury adjudications’”) (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970) (plurality opinion)).
For example, when the Court abandoned its traditional view that criminal contempt trials were
categorically exempt from the jury requirement, it offered a survey of the pre-constitutional history that
was not “simple or unambiguous”—and then admonished that “[i]n any event, the ultimate question is
not whether the traditional doctrine is historically correct but whether the rule that criminal contempts
are never entitled to a jury trial is a necessary or an acceptable construction of the Constitution.” Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 200 n.2 (1968). The Court now treats criminal contempts no differently from
other potentially “petty” offenses, with the same six-month-sentence presumption. See United Mine
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 826–27 (1994); Bloom, 391 U.S. at 197–98, 210.
144. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 325 (quoting Blanton, 489 U.S. at 538, 541 n.5).
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has strayed far from the Founding-era common law, requiring jury trials in cases
where the old common law almost surely would not have insisted upon them.
As Stephen Siegel notes: “Summary proceedings were used in England, the
colonies, and the newly independent states to try offenses that were far more
serious, both in terms of the gravity of the crime and the severity of the
punishment, than the Supreme Court’s conception of the petty offense exception
has ever permitted.”145
As things now stand, “the ultimate question” the Court asks about whether
any particular offense is so “minor” as to fall outside of Article III’s jury
guarantee “is not whether the traditional doctrine is historically correct but
whether . . . [denial of] a jury trial is a necessary or an acceptable construction
of the Constitution.”146 That is to say, the modern Court predicates the “petty
offense” exception to the jury right upon normative considerations and is no
longer tethered to the pre-constitutional common law.
b. Territorial Courts, and Courts of the District of Columbia. The second
partial deviation from Article III is a converse of the first. Whereas the “petty
crimes” exception justifies denial of a jury but not of an Article III judge, in
U.S. territories the right to a criminal jury usually applies,147 but there is no
requirement that an independent Article III judge preside over the trial.
The genesis of this territorial exception—“[t]he authority upon which all the
later cases rest”148—is Chief Justice Marshall’s 1828 opinion in the Canter
case.149 In dicta, Marshall opined that a court Congress established in Florida,
with judges serving fixed four-year terms, could have entertained an admiralty

145. Siegel, supra note 133, at 137.
146. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 200 n.2; see also David L. Shapiro & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Fetish of
Jury Trial in Civil Cases: A Comment on Rachal v. Hill, 85 HARV. L. REV. 442, 449 n.26 (1971) (noting
the Court’s “rejection of history as affording a controlling test” with respect to the guarantee of jury
trial in criminal cases) (citing Bloom, 391 U.S. at 200 n.2).
147. Although the right to a jury usually applies in Article I territorial courts such as the current
courts for the District of Columbia, see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 71–74 (1930),
the Court held in the Insular Cases that it does not apply to tribunals within certain “unincorporated
territories,” in part because it was not a “fundamental” right. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298
(1922) (Puerto Rico); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (Philippines). Those holdings are no
longer valid with respect to the trial of U.S. citizens. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7 (1957) (plurality
opinion). Even as to noncitizens, it is at best uncertain whether the Court would reaffirm the holding of
the Insular Cases respecting the jury right in such unincorporated territories if it were to revisit the
question today, especially in light of the Court’s intervening holding in Duncan that trial by jury in
serious criminal cases is “fundamental to the American scheme of justice.” 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968);
see also United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 249, 252–53 (D. Berlin 1979) (holding that “the Insular
Cases do not apply when the United States is acting as prosecutor in its own court” and that “the
holdings in the Insular Cases that trial by jury in criminal cases was not ‘fundamental’ in American
law” was “authoritatively voided” in Duncan); see also, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,
757–59 (2008); Reid, 354 U.S. at 14 (plurality opinion). Such a judicial reconsideration is unlikely,
however, because there is a statutory right to trial by jury in the territories. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1616
(2012) (Virgin Islands).
148. O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 535 (1933).
149. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. 511 (1828).
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suit that would otherwise have come within the jurisdiction of an Article III
court.150 Marshall did not offer much reason for this conclusion, except to note
that, in legislating for federal territories, “Congress exercises the combined
powers of the general, and of a state government.”151 As Stephen Vladeck
notes, the consensus modern view is that Marshall’s rationale is a non sequitur
that “fails to persuade.”152 “[F]rom [Marshall’s] irreproachable statement that in
legislating for a territory Congress has both general and local powers,” David
Currie rightly explained, “it does not follow that the Framers were unconcerned
about the independence of territorial judges.”153
Much later, the second Justice Harlan, in an admirable effort to defend
Marshall’s ipse dixit, suggested that there might be a functional justification for
the territorial exception, namely, that “the realities of territorial government
typically made it less urgent that judges there enjoy the independence from
Congress and the President envisioned by [Article III].”154 Indeed, Harlan
invoked Canter and other cases to make a more general point that whether
Article III admits of exceptions in particular circumstances is, and should be,
resolved based upon concededly functional considerations:
Whether constitutional limitations on the exercise of judicial power have been
held inapplicable has depended on the particular local setting, the practical
necessities, and the possible alternatives. When the peculiar reasons justifying
investiture of judges with limited tenure have not been present, the Canter
holding has not been deemed controlling.155

Whatever the best rationale for Canter might be, the Court has long since
come to accept that Congress may create territorial courts for the territories, if
only because of the longstanding historical practice.156 It was not until its 1973
decision in Palmore v. United States,157 however, that the Court considered
whether territorial courts could exercise criminal jurisdiction over offenses
arising under federal law. Palmore was convicted of a felony under the law of
the District of Columbia, in a local D.C. court that Congress established in

150. See id. at 546.
151. Id.
152. Vladeck, supra note 125, at 971.
153. DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789–
1888 122 (1985).
154. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962) (plurality opinion). Of course, such a
justification is dependent upon the particular nature of territorial judges and their relationships to the
territorial and national governments. The same presumably could not be said if, for instance, Congress
were to authorize military officers, within the chain of command, to act as territorial judges.
155. Id. at 547–48.
156. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 504–05 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that
“Article III judges are not required in the context of territorial courts” because of the “firmly established
historical practice to the contrary”); N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,
64–65 (1982) (plurality opinion).
157. 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
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1970, with judges who served fifteen-year terms.158 Writing for the Court,
Justice White appeared to acknowledge that Congress’s Article I “police power”
to govern the District of Columbia159 was not sufficient, in and of itself, to
establish an exception to Article III’s requirement of judicial salary and tenure
protection for D.C. criminal trials—an implicit rebuke to Chief Justice Marshall’s rationale in Canter.160
Justice White instead offered three related reasons why such Article III
guarantees were not constitutionally required. Two of them were obvious
makeweights—or, in any event, no more persuasive than Marshall’s Article I
powers argument that White rejected.161 Justice White’s third rationale, however, was more interesting and important—namely, that the Court has recognized Article III exceptions based upon a “confluence of practical
considerations.”162

158. The D.C. criminal laws, unlike offenses under Title 18 of the U.S. Code, apply only to conduct
within the District. Nevertheless, that body of local law—which is prosecuted by a United States
Attorney in the name of the United States—“aris[es] under . . . the laws of the United States” for
purposes of Article III. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see, e.g., Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,
687 (1980) (explaining that the D.C. Code “certainly come[s] within this Court’s Art. III jurisdiction”);
Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(explaining that whenever Congress “create[s] some right for the inhabitants of the District, it could
choose to provide for the enforcement of that right in any court of the United States, because the case
would be one arising under ‘the Laws of the United States’”); but see generally Note, Federal and
Local Jurisdiction in the District of Columbia, 92 YALE L.J. 292 (1982) (arguing that the criminal law
governing the District should not be understood as “arising under” federal law).
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
160. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 399 (“[Palmore’s] conviction was clearly within the authority granted
Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 17, unless, as Palmore contends, Art. III of the Constitution requires that
prosecution for District of Columbia felonies must be presided over by a judge having the tenure and
salary protections provided by Art. III.”).
161. First, pointing to the assumed power of state courts to entertain prosecutions under federal law,
Justice White rejected the categorical view “that criminal offenses under the laws passed by Congress
may not be prosecuted except in courts established pursuant to Art. III.” Id. at 400–02. As noted
previously, it is open to question whether state courts can, in fact, entertain prosecutions for violations
of federal criminal law, something they have never done. See supra note 85. Moreover, state court
adjudication would not raise the same constitutional concerns as adjudication in an Article I court, as
the Court has explained in rejecting Justice White’s similar argument in the context of civil cases. See
N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64 n.15 (plurality opinion) (“Justice White’s dissent finds particular significance in the fact that Congress could have assigned all bankruptcy matters to the state courts. But, of
course, virtually all matters that might be heard in Art. III courts could also be left by Congress to state
courts. This fact is simply irrelevant to the question before us. Congress has no control over state-court
judges; accordingly the principle of separation of powers is not threatened by leaving the adjudication
of federal disputes to such judges.”) (citing Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297, 304–05 (1981)).
Second, Justice White invoked the “constitutional history and practice” supporting other Article III
exceptions—principally Canter itself, and the subsequent tradition of criminal proceedings in territorial
courts, but also the long-established practice of trying members of the armed forces in court-martial
proceedings “in the military mode, not by courts ordained and established under Art. III.” Palmore, 411
U.S. at 402–03, 404. That history, however, only serves to show that Article III is not airtight in the
criminal context—it does not offer a reason for an additional exception.
162. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 404 (citing both Justice Harlan’s functionalist account of the territorial
exception in Glidden Co., see 370 U.S. 530, 546 (1962), and the Court’s explanation that the
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But what, then, were the “practical considerations” that permitted Palmore to
be tried before an Article I judge? After all, his crime (and trial) took place not
in a remote territory with attenuated historical ties to the United States, but in
the District of Columbia163—and the Court had already held that the District
was not similarly situated to the overseas territories for purposes of Article III
and, in particular, that the pre-1970 courts in the District did have to be staffed
by judges with the tenure and salary protections of Article III.164 The fact that
the protections of Article III are arguably inapplicable to the overseas territories
because of “peculiar reasons,” explained the Court in O’Donoghue v. United
States, does not mean “that they are likewise inapplicable to the District where
these peculiar reasons do not obtain.”165 The Canter line of cases itself,
therefore, could not be invoked to identify the “practical” considerations that
justified the denial of a presiding Article III judge in the District.
To the contrary, explained the O’Donoghue Court in 1933, far from being “an
‘ephemeral’ subdivision of the ‘outlying dominion of the United States,’” the
District of Columbia is “the capital—the very heart—of the Union itself.”166
Therefore, the protections of Article III are, if anything, even more important
within the District than elsewhere in the nation, because the judges “are in
closer contact with, and more immediately open to the influences of, the
legislative department, and exercise a more extensive jurisdiction in cases
affecting the operations of the general government and its various
departments.”167
For present purposes, it is not important how Justice White, in Palmore,
attempted to distinguish O’Donoghue and thereby justify the use of Article I
judges for some criminal trials in the District, whether that distinction was
persuasive, or what it means for the current state of the territorial exception.168

court-martial exception is justified by the “exigencies of military discipline requir[ing] the existence of
a special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural protections deemed
essential in Art. III trials need apply” (quoting O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969))).
163. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 399.
164. See O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 541–42 (1933).
165. Id. There is good reason to question whether there are even “peculiar,” practical reasons to
permit criminal trials outside of Article III in the overseas territories. See Vladeck, supra note 125, at
973 n.248. But even if there were, those reasons would be inapposite to the District of Columbia. To be
sure, just as Congress has a plenary power over the territories, so, too, does it have a similar authority
with respect to the District. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17. But that power of District governance,
held the Court, does not afford Congress the authority “to destroy the operative effect of [Article III]
within the District, where, unlike the territories occupying a different status, that clause is entirely
appropriate and applicable.” O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 546.
166. 289 U.S. at 539 (internal citations omitted).
167. Id. at 535.
168. The District of Columbia courts before 1970, Justice White explained—including of course, the
trial court in O’Donoghue itself—were (as the Article III courts in the District are today) principally
devoted to adjudication of questions of federal, i.e., national, law. See Palmore, 411 U.S. at 396. Those
pre-1970 D.C. courts also were obliged to hear claims under the law specially governing the District,
but their “consideration of ‘purely local affairs [was] obviously subordinate and incidental.’” Id. at 407
(quoting O’Donoghue, 289 U.S. at 539). In 1970, however, Congress largely split these local and

2017]

OF SPIES, SABOTEURS, AND ENEMY ACCOMPLICES

1561

The important point is simply that the Court in Palmore ultimately relied,
persuasively or not, on functional considerations to justify a limited rule that an
Article I court in the District of Columbia that focuses “primarily” on matters
“strictly of local concern” may try local crimes “under statutes that are applicable to the [locality] alone,”169 despite the absence of an Article III judge,
albeit with a civilian jury.
2. The Full Exceptions for Military Trials
The other exceptions the Court has recognized in the criminal context all lack
both of the Article III protections. Each of these exceptions involves trials by
military officers.
a. Courts-martial of Service Members. The most common, and wellestablished, military exception to Article III is for the courts-martial trial of
members of the U.S. armed forces (and certain persons closely associated with
the armed forces). Since the beginning of the Republic, Congress has authorized
such military trials in a series of “Articles of War.”170 From the start, and
continuing to the present day, the Articles of War (now codified within the
UCMJ) have been designed not only as a means of punishing wrongdoing by
service members, but also as a system of military discipline and good order,

national functions, and assigned primary coverage of the former to new “local” courts in the District,
including the one in which Palmore was tried, “the focus of whose work is primarily upon cases arising
under the District of Columbia Code and to other matters of strictly local concern. They handle criminal
cases only under statutes that are applicable to the District of Columbia alone.” Id. “O’Donoghue did
not concern itself with courts like these, and it is not controlling here,” according to Justice White. Id.
It is far from obvious why this factual distinction makes a functional difference sufficient to establish
an exception to Article III. Be that as it may, this much is clear: After Palmore, if the focus of a
particular Article I court is “primarily” on matters “strictly of local concern,” Congress can confer upon
that court the authority to try local crimes, that is, criminal cases “under statutes that are applicable to
the [locality] alone.” Id. It remains an open question, however, whether Congress can authorize
territorial Article I courts to try crimes of general federal jurisdiction (that is, offenses under Title 18
of the United States Code). That is not an issue in the District of Columbia, where Congress has
precluded the local D.C. courts from hosting such cases, or in Puerto Rico, where Congress has
established Article III courts. In three other current territories, however—Guam, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and the Virgin Islands—there are no Article III courts, and therefore local courts regularly
entertain criminal trials alleging Title 18 offenses. See Vladeck, supra note 125, at 934 n.3 (citing
statutes). The constitutionality of that practice has rarely been challenged, but one court of appeals
rejected the Article III argument in 1983. See United States v. Canel, 708 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983). That
court relied primarily on longstanding practice, see id. at 896–97 (“Congress assumed that it had the
plenary sovereignty recognized in American Insurance Co. v. Canter. . . . Outside the geographical
limits of the states which are members of the federal union, however, the tenure and compensation
guarantees of article III, section 1 have been recognized for too long to be matters of legislative grace
rather than constitutional right for this court to hold otherwise.”), and on the immediate practical impact
of a contrary holding, see id. at 896 (“Were we to hold that Title 18 could not be enforced in the District
Court of the Virgin Islands, the entire title would be for all intents and purposes a dead letter in the
territory.”).
169. Palmore, 411 U.S. at 407.
170. The first formal codification of those articles after ratification of the Constitution occurred in
1806. See Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, 2 Stat. 359 (1806).
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“with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.”171 The
current UCMJ sets out approximately fifty offenses,172 an article that authorizes
courts-martial jurisdiction over violations of the law of war,173 and a “General
Article” that authorizes courts-martial of service members who commit “all
disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed
forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and
crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be
guilty.”174
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of such courts-martial
in Dynes v. Hoover, in 1858.175 In his opinion for the Court, Justice Wayne
invoked a hodge-podge of constitutional text to explain why such trials are
permissible: the provision of Article I, Section 8 authorizing Congress
“[t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval
Forces”;176 the Article II designation of the President as Commander in Chief of
those same forces;177 and the Fifth Amendment, which specifically excepts
“cases arising in the land or naval forces” from its mandate that “[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”178 These three clauses, together,
wrote Justice Wayne,
show that Congress has the power to provide for the trial and punishment of
military and naval offences in the manner then and now practiced by civilized
nations; and that the power to do so is given without any connection between
it and the 3d article of the Constitution defining the judicial power of the
United States.179

This catch-all textual enumeration in Dynes was hardly a satisfactory explanation of why service members are not entitled to the protections of Article III
when being tried for criminal offenses. That Congress has an Article I power,
for example, does not mean it can exercise that power in contravention of other
specific constitutional limits, such as those found in Article III and the Sixth
Amendment. After all, Congress has Article I authority to enact the corpus of

171. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957) (plurality opinion).
172. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 877–933 (2012).
173. Id. § 818.
174. Id. § 934.
175. 61 U.S. 65 (1858). By the time it considered Dynes, the Court already had decided several
cases involving such military courts-martial, without considering the constitutional question. See, e.g.,
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19 (1827); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1 (1820); Wise v. Withers, 7 U.S. 331
(1806).
176. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
177. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
178. Id. amend. V; see Dynes, 61 U.S. at 78–79.
179. Dynes, 61 U.S. at 79; see also Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 123 (1866) (“[T]he framers of the
Constitution, doubtless, meant to limit the right of trial by jury, in the sixth amendment, to those
persons who were subject to indictment or presentment in the fifth.”).
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criminal offenses in Title 18, too—but surely it does not follow that Congress
can jettison the judge and jury protections of Article III for the trial of all those
offenses. Likewise, although it is true, as Justice Wayne noted, that the Fifth
Amendment includes an express military exemption to the grand jury requirement for “cases arising in the land or naval forces,”180 neither the Fifth
Amendment nor any other provision of the Constitution includes a parallel
exemption to the petit jury right prescribed in Article III and the Sixth Amendment.181 Moreover, the notion that the Fifth Amendment created an exception to
a protection earlier established by Article III is implausible. Accordingly, almost
a century after Dynes, the Court finally acknowledged that the Grand Jury
Clause “does not grant court-martial power to Congress; it merely makes clear
that there need be no indictment for such military offenses as Congress can
authorize military tribunals to try under its Article I power to make rules to
govern the armed forces.”182 Finally, the Commander-in-Chief Clause183 is
simply inapposite. It affords the President the authority to “command” members
of the armed forces, but says nothing about the power of Congress to strip them
of Article III’s guarantees when they are not being “commanded” but are
instead subjected to trial to determine their guilt and possible punishment
(including penalties that might extend long beyond their term of military
service).
Not surprisingly, then, the Court in more recent cases has emphasized
functional justifications for the service-member exception. In particular, it has
invoked the “exigencies of military discipline requir[ing] the existence of a
special system of military courts in which not all of the specific procedural
protections deemed essential in Art[icle] III trials need apply.”184 These function180. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI. Interestingly, Madison’s original proposal in
1789 was to replace the criminal trial clause of Article III with a provision similar to the eventual Fifth
and Sixth Amendment jury guarantees—except that that proposal would have expressly exempted
“cases arising in the land or naval forces” from the petit jury guarantee. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 452 (1789).
The House eventually decided not to amend the original articles, but instead only to approve supplementary amendments. See id. at 795; see also id. at 809 (forwarding the approved amendments to the
Senate for concurrence). The Tenth Article of the House-approved amendments, like Madison’s
proposal, would have exempted “cases arising in the land or naval forces” from the petit jury guarantee.
See S. JOURNAL, 1st. Cong., 1st Sess., at 64 (1789). On September 4, however, the Senate struck most of
that amendment, including the petit jury guarantee. See id. at 71. Five days later it rejected a motion to
reconsider the petit jury guarantee by an equally divided vote, but it voted to approve a grand jury
guarantee, with an “arising in” exception, that eventually became the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury
Clause. See id. at 77. The Conference Committee reinserted the petit jury guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment, but it did not include the “arising in the land and naval forces” exception that appeared in
the final Constitution. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 948 (1789). The recorded proceedings offer no
explanation for this migration of the “arising in” exception from the petit jury guarantee to the eventual
Grand Jury Clause.
182. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.5 (1955).
183. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
184. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969); see also, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36
(1957) (plurality opinion) (“Because of its very nature and purpose the military must place great
emphasis on discipline and efficiency.”); Toth, 350 U.S. at 17 (“Unlike courts, it is the primary business
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alist explanations do not necessarily withstand careful scrutiny, either.185 Nevertheless, as Stephen Vladeck explains, no matter how “light on analysis” Dynes
and subsequent cases may be, “their understanding [has] only bec[o]me more
ingrained in the Court’s jurisprudence over time.”186
Even so, there remain significant constitutional limits to the jurisdiction of
courts-martial—limits that are, at least in part, tied to the functional justification
for the exception itself: “[M]ilitary tribunals must be restricted ‘to the narrowest
jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to maintaining discipline among troops
in active service.’”187
Most importantly, the Court has held that Congress can only authorize
military trials of persons while they are on active duty in the armed services,
and only for offenses they committed while on such duty.188 The Court has also
held, in a series of rulings, that it is unconstitutional to use courts-martial to try
persons who are not service members but who are alleged to have committed
offenses while accompanying the military overseas.189 These cases collectively
resolved that “courts-martial have no jurisdiction to try those who are not

of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise. But trial of soldiers to
maintain discipline is merely incidental to an army’s primary fighting function. To the extent that those
responsible for performance of this primary function are diverted from it by the necessity of trying
cases, the basic fighting purpose of armies is not served.”).
185. See Vladeck, supra note 125, at 948–51.
186. See id. at 953.
187. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 240 (1960) (quoting Toth, 350 U.S.
at 22).
188. See Toth, 350 U.S. at 22 (“It is impossible to think that the discipline of the Army is going to be
disrupted, its morale impaired, or its orderly processes disturbed, by giving ex-servicemen the benefit of
a civilian court trial when they are actually civilians.”). At one point, the Court also held that service
members could not be court-martialed for non-service-connected crimes committed during their active
duty. See O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 272. The Court later reversed that ruling, however. See Solorio v.
United States, 483 U.S. 435, 436 (1987).
One other, more obscure Article III exception bears mention here. In Kahn v. Anderson, the Court
held that an offense committed by an individual while in military custody can be tried by court-martial,
even if the defendant was not a service member at the time of the offense. 255 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1921). This
explains the current provision of the UCMJ subjecting persons serving a sentence imposed by a
court-martial to further court-martial proceedings for offenses committed while in custody. See 10
U.S.C. § 802(a)(7) (2012); see also id. § 802(a)(9) (same as to prisoners of war in custody of the armed
forces). The Court in Kahn did not address Article III specifically, and its reasoning was sparse—Chief
Justice White merely noted that the power to authorize such courts-martial was “long established and
recognized,” which Congress had “exerted from the beginning.” 255 U.S. at 8. Moreover, the certitude
of Kahn’s authority was “rudely unsettled” by the line of modern cases beginning with Toth. See Joseph
W. Bishop, Jr., Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Reservists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 372 (1964); see also Simcox v. Madigan, 298
F.2d 742, 747–48 (9th Cir. 1962) (Duniway, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has not revisited the
question, however, and the lower courts therefore have continued to apply Kahn. See, e.g., id. at 744–47
(majority opinion); see also Bishop, supra, at 375–76 (offering functional reasons why the situation in
Kahn should not be subject to the Toth rationale for affording civilians the protections of Article III, at
least with respect to many custody-related offenses committed by former service members).
189. See, e.g., Kinsella, 361 U.S. at 240–46; McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S.
281, 283–84 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278, 280 (1960); Reid, 354 U.S. at 21 (plurality
opinion).
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members of the Armed Forces, no matter how intimate the connection between
their offense and the concerns of military discipline.”190
b. Occupation Courts and Martial-Law Courts. In rare situations where the
military has effectively and lawfully displaced civilian government, and in
which no Article III or other civilian courts are available, military courts may
try cases involving active-duty members of the armed forces and civilians for
all manner of crimes.
The most well-accepted example of this exception is “occupational” criminal
jurisdiction: the “recognized power of the military to try civilians in tribunals
established as a part of a temporary military government over occupied enemy
territory or territory regained from an enemy where civilian government cannot
and does not function.”191 In these cases, the military court is effectively a
surrogate for the civil courts of the occupied jurisdiction, and thus it typically
applies the law of the occupied territory itself rather than that of the United
States.192 The Supreme Court has rarely, if ever, entertained an Article III
challenge to these occupational courts in the context of criminal proceedings,193
but it has confronted such criminal cases without raising constitutional doubts.194
As a plurality of the Court recently confirmed in Hamdan, in both the civil and
criminal contexts, such a military occupational tribunal is a court of exigency,

190. O’Callahan, 395 U.S. at 267. There remains one discrete, lingering question in this respect: the
constitutionality of Article 2(a)(10) of the UCMJ, which authorizes court-martial jurisdiction “[i]n time
of declared war or a contingency operation [over] persons serving with or accompanying an armed
force in the field.” 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2012). The United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces recently upheld that law as applied to a non-citizen civilian contractor working with the armed
forces in Iraq. See United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 265–71 (C.A.A.F. 2012). That decision is
vulnerable to serious criticism. See Vladeck, supra note 125, at 955–56. The best defense of the
judgment in Ali is found in Judge Baker’s concurrence. Relying principally upon functional considerations, Judge Baker would have limited the Court’s holding to cases “where it is not feasible or
practicable to suspend military operations to pursue the transfer of persons back to the United States for
trial.” Ali, 71 M.J. at 274 (Baker, J., concurring in part and in the result). He stressed that in Ali the
defendant “was enmeshed within a military unit both during duty time, when he was a required and
integral part of accomplishing the military mission, and during off-duty time, when he lived in close
proximity with and relied on the military unit to control the society within which he lived.” Id. at 275.
Judge Baker also pointed to a finding that the absence of Ali’s victim, a combat translator, “rendered his
squad ‘mission incapable’ for five days.” Id. “If Congress could not extend court-martial jurisdiction to
Appellant in this context,” reasoned Judge Baker, “the United States could not at one time hold
Appellant responsible for his criminal offenses and provide for the military discipline and readiness of a
combat unit in the field.” Id. at 275–76. Whether Judge Baker’s empirical presumptions were correct,
his reasoning was quite narrow and might only be sufficient to sustain the law in a small handful of
accompanying-contractor cases.
191. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 314 n.8 (1946) (citing cases).
192. See, e.g., Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 356 (1952) (explaining that a U.S. occupational
court applied the German Criminal Code in occupied Germany following the end of World War II).
193. The Court rejected Article III challenges to civil cases heard by a Civil War occupational court
in New Orleans in The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. 129, 131–33 (1870), and in Mechs. & Traders’ Bank v.
Union Bank, 89 U.S. 276, 294–97 (1875).
194. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950); Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356–61.
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“born of military necessity.”195
Similarly, Congress might authorize military courts to adjudicate criminal
cases within the United States in the even rarer situation in which martial law
has properly been declared over a specified area and the civilian courts in that
area are, literally or in effect, closed. Once again, however, this would be an
exception defined by necessity—a situation in which the choice is between
military justice and no justice at all. As the Court explained in Milligan:
If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is
impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre
of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to
furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the
safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is
allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As
necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is
continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power.
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and
unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of
actual war.196
****

The Court has recognized one further Article III criminal exception, too—the
“Quirin” exception for trials of offenses against the international law of war.
The basis for this final exception, however—unlike all the others—was the
Court’s account of a pre-constitutional practice that the Court assumed the
Framers intended to preserve. I address the Quirin exception separately in Part
III. Before doing so, however, it is important to understand why the government, and its judicial defenders, rely on a Quirin-like historical argument, rather
than on functional, pragmatic, or other non-historical justifications, as the basis
195. 548 U.S. 557, 590 (2006) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 595 n.26 (“The limitations on
these occupied territory or military government commissions are tailored to the tribunals’ purpose and
the exigencies that necessitate their use. They may be employed ‘pending the establishment of civil
government . . . .’”) (quoting Madsen, 343 U.S. at 354–55).
196. 71 U.S. at 127. Chief Justice Chase’s concurrence for four Justices famously disagreed with the
majority’s categorical statement respecting martial-law courts. Chase would have offered a narrow
opening for Congress to authorize the use of military tribunals in circumstances where the majority
might not. Id. at 140–41 (Chase, C.J., concurring). He reasoned that in times of war, when all parts of
the nation are “exposed to invasion,” Congress (but not the President) could authorize the use of
military courts even where civil courts were nominally open, in cases where those civil courts were, in
Congress’s view, “wholly incompetent to avert threatened danger, or to punish, with adequate promptitude and certainty.” Id. at 141. This could occur where the civil judges and marshals are “in active
sympathy with the rebels,” such that the courts have become the rebels’ “most efficient allies.” Id.
In the aftermath of the Civil War, Congress did authorize the use of military commissions to
adjudicate ordinary criminal cases during Reconstruction in the South, on the theory that the civilian
courts in the South were incapable of performing their functions properly. See Lederman, The Law(?) of
the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45. The constitutionality of those Reconstruction military
tribunals—whether they were consistent with the majority view in Milligan—remains an unresolved
question.
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for establishing yet another Article III exception for war-related domestic-law
offenses.
B. THE SURPRISING DEARTH OF FUNCTIONAL AND OTHER NON-HISTORICAL
JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE MILITARY TRIAL OF WAR-RELATED OFFENSES

As discussed above, in all but one of the contexts in which it has recognized
exceptions to Article III’s protections in criminal cases, the Supreme Court has
ultimately relied upon functional considerations, rather than on constitutional
text, history, or even Founding-era understandings.197 For example, the Court
has countenanced courts-martial because of the “exigencies of military discipline requir[ing] the existence of a special system of military courts,”198 “with a
view to maintaining obedience and fighting fitness in the ranks.”199 It has
permitted jury trials without Article III judges in the territories—at least for
local crimes—in large measure because there is little risk of the territorial
judges being subject to influence from the political branches. And the Court has
approved of occupational courts, and in theory of some martial-law courts, as
well, because resort to domestic Article III courts would be impracticable in
those discrete contexts.
Are there similar functional justifications that might justify the use of military
tribunals for prosecution of war-related offenses?
1. The Absence of Compelling Functional Justifications
It is difficult to see how there are any “exigencies of war” in the nation’s
current armed conflicts that might “g[i]ve rise” to a current need to use military
tribunals to try domestic-law offenses200—or, at a minimum, no apparent need
that is sufficiently compelling to justify the denial of juries and independent
judges.201 The military commissions Congress has created are not, after all,
tribunals “called upon to function under conditions precluding resort” to civilian
juries and Article III judges.202 They are not makeshift courts in, say, Afghanistan, established to meet a “need to dispense swift justice, often in the form of
execution, to illegal belligerents captured on the battlefield.”203 The defendants
currently charged in military commissions are detained at Guantánamo Bay,
half a world away from the battle and more than a decade since their capture.
Furthermore, nothing other than possible statutory restrictions limits the pros197. See supra Section II.A.
198. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 261 (1969).
199. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957) (plurality opinion).
200. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590; see also Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 346–48 (1952) (“Since
our nation’s earliest days, [military commissions and occupational courts] have been constitutionally
recognized agencies for meeting many urgent governmental responsibilities related to war” and were
“adapted in each instance to the need that called it forth.”).
201. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 591 (“Exigency alone, of course, will not justify the establishment
and use of penal tribunals not contemplated by Article I, § 8, and Article III, § 1, of the Constitution.”).
202. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38 (1942).
203. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 607.
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pect of Article III trials for future defendants. For many years now, the military
has regularly transferred al-Qaeda fighters whom it has captured overseas, in the
midst of war, to the civilian court system, where the government has had
overwhelming prosecutorial success.204 Indeed, as former President Obama
noted, whereas “our Article III federal courts have proven to have an outstanding record of convicting some of the most hardened terrorists,” military commissions, by contrast, have been “very costly [and] have resulted in years of
litigation without a resolution.”205
In al Bahlul II, Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson identified several national
security considerations that legislators mentioned during the 2006 congressional
deliberations preceding enactment of the original MCA—concerns that might,
in her view, justify the use of military commissions even where Article III
courts are available.206 Those national security justifications, however, do not
withstand even cursory scrutiny and certainly do not explain why it might be
necessary or important to dispense with Article III judges and juries.207 Accord-

204. See, e.g., Mary B. McCord, Federal Prosecution is a Viable Option for Enemy Combatants,
LAWFARE (July 24, 2017, 2:19 p.m.), https://lawfareblog.com/federal-prosecution-viable-option-enemycombatants [perma.cc/JYN2-DV5H]; CTR. ON LAW & SEC., NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001–SEPTEMBER 11, 2010 (2010), http://www.
lawandsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/01_TTRC2010Final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNW4-ET
VN].
205. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks on Plan to Close Prison at Guantanamo
Bay (Feb. 23, 2016) (transcript available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/
02/23/remarks-president-plan-close-prison-guantanamo-bay [https://perma.cc/AYM2-7GRQ]); see also
Brennan, supra note 1 (“Our federal courts are time-tested, have unquestioned legitimacy, and, at least
for the foreseeable future, are capable of producing a more predictable and sustainable result than
military commissions. . . . In short, our Article III courts are not only our single most effective tool for
prosecuting, convicting, and sentencing suspected terrorists—they are a proven tool for gathering
intelligence and preventing attacks.”).
206. See al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 67–68 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
207. Judge Henderson identified five concerns cited during the 2006 congressional deliberations:
“[1] the potential disclosure of highly classified information; [2] the efficiency of military-commission
proceedings; [3] the military’s expertise in matters of national security; [4] the inability to prosecute
enemy combatants due to speedy-trial violations; and [5] the inadmissibility of certain forms of
evidence.” Id. At least three of these five things (Nos. [1], [4] and [5]) have nothing to do with the
denial of judge and jury—that is, with whether the trial is convened in a commission or an Article III
court. Two of them (Nos. [1] and [5]) are based upon statutory rules that, if constitutionally permissible,
Congress could prescribe for both types of tribunals, or for neither. Congress has, for instance, enacted
rules to protect classified information in each tribunal that are equivalent to one another in virtually
every material respect. Compare 10 U.S.C. § 949p-1 (2012) (procedures for treatment of classified
information in military commissions proceedings), with 18 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (Classified Information
Procedures Act provisions applicable in Article III trials). Likewise, although the speedy trial guarantee
(No. [4]) is constitutional in origin, its application, too, does not depend on whether the tribunal has a
civilian judge and jury—and, in any event, it has not proved to be a serious barrier to Article III trials of
al-Qaeda defendants many years after their criminal conduct, see, e.g., United States v. Ghailani, 733
F.3d 29, 41–55 (2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam). As for “efficiency” (No. [2]), there is no reason to think that
commissions proceedings will be more efficient than Article III trials, in light of the fact that the MCA
prescribes processes for commissions designed to emulate those in Article III courts in almost every
respect. And in fact, commission proceedings have proved to be far less efficient than Article III trials,
by a fair margin. See McCord, supra note 204; Obama, supra note 205.
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ingly, even the government itself in its al Bahlul briefings has not invoked the
“national security” justifications that some legislators mentioned in 2006, nor
did Judge Kavanaugh rely upon them in his opinion in al Bahlul III.208
To be sure, shortly before Congress enacted the amended version of the MCA
in 2009, some senators mentioned yet another reason to avoid civilian trials:
“the risk of terrorist attacks on domestic courts.”209 Such a risk is, if anything, a
function of the location of the trial, not the presence of judge and jury—which
explains why the legislators in question invoked that concern not in the context
of amending the MCA but instead in support of legislation to prevent the
transfer of detainees from Guantánamo Bay to the United States. Of course, it is
true that if detainees do remain at Guantánamo they likely cannot be tried by an
Article III court there: Article III, Section 2 provides that a trial of federal
crimes “shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed.”210 And even if Congress could establish an Article III court at
Guantánamo, it would be virtually impossible to convene a jury pool there.
Therefore, if there were some basis—contrary to experience—for members
of Congress to think that safe trials of al-Qaeda defendants could not occur
within the United States, they might well have concluded that military tribunals
were necessary, due to the obstacles of convening Article III trials outside the
United States.211 Such a justification, however, would appear to prove far too

That leaves only one of the 2006 concerns: “the military’s expertise in matters of national security.”
al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 67. Perhaps it would be reasonable for Congress to assume that military
officers have greater expertise than lay juries with respect to understanding the traditional, international
law of armed conflict: such officers are, after all, extensively trained in the law of war. Thus, as
explained below, see infra notes 288–89 and accompanying text, that could have been (but was not) a
pragmatic justification for the Court’s decision in Quirin that military tribunals may try offenses against
the law of war. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39. There is no similar basis, however, to conclude that lay
juries and Article III judges are not up to the task of understanding domestic-law offenses related to
national security. Surely, the extensive experience of trying terrorism cases in domestic courts refutes
any such notion. Moreover, the whole premise of Article III’s protection of the jury right is the
constitutional presumption that “laymen are better than specialists,” including military specialists, in
assessing guilt or innocence. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955).
208. Judge Henderson, writing only for herself in al Bahlul III, did, however, incorporate by
reference her earlier opinion, which discussed those rationales. See 840 F.3d 757, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(Henderson. J., concurring).
209. al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 68 (Henderson, J., dissenting). For example, Senator McConnell stated
that “[w]e know what happened when you had a terrorist trial in Alexandria, VA. . . . The Moussaoui
trial . . . made the[] community a target for attacks. When they moved Moussaoui to and from
the courtroom, they had to shut down large sections of the community.” 155 CONG. REC. S5589 (daily
ed. May 19, 2009) (statement of Sen. McConnell); see also, e.g., id. at S6434 (daily ed. June 10, 2009)
(statement of Sen. Kyl) (“You start with the proposition that there are huge security concerns.”); accord
Scott L. Silliman, Prosecuting Alleged Terrorists by Military Commission: A Prudent Option, 42 CASE
W. RES. J. INT’L L. 289, 294 (2009) (“Since the [military commissions] trial would take place within a
military facility, the active duty armed forces could provide an extremely high level of security in a
manner which would be virtually impossible in a civilian community.”).
210. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
211. As it happens, experience belies the plausibility of this safety-related justification for prohibiting trial of such persons in the United States. As Attorney General Eric Holder explained, although
“hundreds of individuals have been convicted of terrorism or terrorism-related offenses in civilian
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much: After all, there are many other contexts—cases involving gang violence
and organized crime, for example—in which federal trials raise some risk of
harm to jurors, judges, and the community. Surely such risks would not justify
Congress moving such trials outside the United States to military installations,
where Article III courts cannot sit. Understandably, then, the government has
opted not to invoke any security-based justification in its arguments for military
commissions, either.
If all of these reasons cited by Judge Henderson are unavailing, then what
exactly is the justification for military trials of inchoate conspiracies, and other
domestic-law offenses, apart from historical pedigree? The government’s briefs
have not (thus far, anyway) offered any such reasons—nor did Judge Kavanaugh, in his opinion in al Bahlul III, so much as advert to any such
justifications.
At oral argument before the en banc court in al Bahlul III, the Deputy
Solicitor General was asked this very question about the functional need for
commissions in such a case.212 He responded by invoking a single practical
consideration—namely, that military commissions are not bound by the constitutional rules of Miranda v. Arizona213 and Crawford v. Washington,214 both of
which preclude the prosecution from introducing certain forms of evidence in
its case-in-chief (voluntary-but-unwarned statements of the accused, and certain
hearsay, respectively).215 In the MCA, Congress included both a Miranda exception, allowing the prosecution to introduce certain voluntary-but-unwarned statements
made by accused alien enemy belligerents, and a circumscribed hearsay exception
that would not be Crawford-compliant.216 Congress has not prescribed parallel excep-

courts” since 2001, “[n]ot one of these individuals has escaped custody” and “[n]ot one of the judicial
districts involved has suffered retaliatory attacks.” Eric Holder, Attorney General, Speech at the
American Constitution Society Annual Convention, Washington, D.C. (June 16, 2011) (transcript
available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-theamericanconstitution-society-convention [https://perma.cc/MRS4-XDZV]); see also Richard B. Zabel & James
J. Benjamin, Jr., IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 121–27
(Human Rights First 2008).
212. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc)
(per curiam) (No. 11-1324) [hereinafter “al Bahlul III Oral Argument”].
213. 384 U.S. 346 (1966).
214. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
215. See al Bahlul III Oral Argument, supra note 212, at 50.
216. See 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c)(1)–(2) (2012) (providing that an unwarned statement of the accused
may be admitted in evidence if the military judge finds “that the totality of the circumstances renders
the statement reliable and possessing sufficient probative value” and that the statement was either
“voluntarily given” or “was made incident to lawful conduct during military operations at the point of
capture or during closely related active combat engagement, and the interests of justice would best be
served by admission of the statement into evidence”); id. § 949a(b)(3)(D)(ii) (providing that hearsay
evidence not otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence applicable in trial by general courtsmartial may be admitted in a trial by military commission if, inter alia, the judge, “after taking into
account all of the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement, including the degree to which
the statement is corroborated, the indicia of reliability within the statement itself, and whether the will
of the declarant was overborne determines that . . . direct testimony from the witness is not available as
a practical matter, taking into consideration the physical location of the witness, the unique circum-
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tions for trials of alien enemy belligerents in Article III courts.
The requirements of Miranda and Crawford should not be much of a problem
for prosecution of future detainees in Article III courts, at least as long as the
Trump Administration follows the lead of the Obama Administration and makes
it a priority to anticipate and prepare for such trials whenever al-Qaeda forces
are captured.217 Nevertheless, the prosecution’s case in the trials of some of the
detainees captured during the Bush Administration may depend upon custodial
admissions that were not preceded by Miranda warnings, or upon the hearsay
statements of other detainees who are not available to testify. And where that is
the case, perhaps such prosecutions would be stymied in Article III courts,
where such statements would be inadmissible. For that reason, the government’s
desire to use commissions so as to be able to introduce statements that would
not comply with Miranda and/or Crawford is understandable.
That is hardly a justification, however, for trying cases in a military commission, and thereby denying the constitutional guarantees of a civilian jury and a
tenure-protected Article III judge. If Congress perceives a need for such exceptions to Miranda and/or Crawford in certain cases involving collection of
evidence in the heat of an armed conflict (assuming the Constitution would
permit such exceptions),218 it can simply codify such exceptions within the
Article III system. Eliminating the protections of a civilian jury and a tenureprotected judge is an unmeasured, inapposite response to this perceived problem.219 Indeed, if there were such statutory exceptions, it presumably would be
preferable for an Article III, tenure-protected judge, rather than a military
officer, to decide questions such as whether an accused’s custodial statement
was made voluntarily, or whether and to what extent the Fifth Amendment
allows admission of voluntary-but-unwarned statements by alien enemy belligerents or admission of hearsay against such defendants—which is all the more
reason to address this prosecutorial concern in the context of Article III trials.
Thus there do not appear to be any compelling functional or practical reasons,
at least as things currently stand, that would be constitutionally sufficient to
justify eliminating Article III’s judge and jury protections for trials of domesticlaw offenses in the circumstances of our current armed conflicts.220

stances of military and intelligence operations during hostilities, and the adverse impacts on military or
intelligence operations that would likely result from the production of the witness”).
217. See supra note 1.
218. The constitutionality of such exceptions under the Fifth Amendment presumably would not turn
on which sort of tribunal is hearing the case—either they would be constitutional in both tribunals or in
neither.
219. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 470–71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we
perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected from judges who
hold their offices by a temporary commission.”).
220. In an article devoted to an ostensible functionalist defense of military commissions, Peter
Margulies contends that use of the current commissions is appropriate “where more formal Article III
proceedings would be ‘impracticable and anomalous.’” Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military
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2. Two Fairness Arguments
Before proceeding to address other types of potential arguments in support of
the constitutionality of military trials, however, two normative justifications are
worth flagging, even though the government has not yet relied upon them in the
recent Article III challenges to military commissions.
a. Fairness to Defendants. The first such argument is that military trials
might actually be fairer to the defendants than trials in Article III courts—a
notion that actually finds some support in modern international law. In a
traditional state-to-state, international armed conflict, Article 84 of the Third
Geneva Convention not only approves of the use of military courts to try
prisoners of war, but actually reflects a preference for such courts.221 It provides
that a prisoner of war “shall be tried only by a military court, unless the existing
laws of the Detaining Power expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of
the armed forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offence
alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.”222 Article 84 appears to
be premised on the assumption that, in wartime, civilian juries would be more
biased against enemy soldiers than would military officers, who might have
greater incentives to treat their adversaries fairly due to reciprocity
considerations.223

Tribunals and Article III, 49 U.C.D. L. REV. 305, 349 (2015). Margulies offers almost no specific
reasons why the Article III trial of domestic-law offenses in current conflicts would be impracticable or
anomalous, however. At one point, he echoes Judge Henderson’s concern that such trials would
“risk . . . disclosure of sensitive national security information.” Id. at 379 (citing al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d
at 67–68 (Henderson, J., dissenting)). As I have explained, however, there is no reason to believe such
risks would be higher in Article III courts, in light of the parallel protections Congress has prescribed
for protection of classified information in both sorts of tribunals. See supra note 207. Furthermore, the
denial of an independent judge and a jury is hardly a tailored remedy for such concerns. Margulies also
refers in passing to Justice Jackson’s concern in Eisentrager that giving enemies held overseas the right
to petition the courts for habeas relief might “hamper our war effort and bring aid and comfort to the
enemy.” Marguiles, supra, at 361 (quoting 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950)). Margulies surmises that “resort
to more formal [Article III] tribunals” for the trial of such alien enemies “could impair the war effort.”
Id. This is a fairly audacious suggestion to offer during a conflict in which such detainees have both
regularly petitioned the courts for habeas relief and regularly been tried, and convicted, in Article III
courts, without any noticeable harmful effect on the nation’s efforts to defeat al-Qaeda. In any event,
even if Margulies were correct that military tribunals are more likely to convict defendants and thereby
more effectively advance the nation’s effort to defeat the enemy, that would hardly be an admissible
reason to deny Article III’s judge and jury guarantees. This explains why neither the government nor
Judge Kavanaugh has alluded to such a justification.
221. Geneva Convention Relative to Penal and Disciplinary Sanctions art. 84, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T 3316, 3382, T.I.A.S 3364 [hereinafter “Article 84”].
222. Id.
223. See also 155 CONG. REC. S5652 (daily ed. May 20, 2009) (statement of Sen. Graham)
(surmising that when an enemy prisoner is tried in civilian court, it is possible “that civilian justice,
jurors and judges, will have revenge on their mind”). This sort of argument has been raised in earlier
wars, too. In the Vallandigham case in the Civil War, for example, counsel for the government argued
that military justice should be invoked for cases involving disloyal citizens “in the interests of mercy,”
as an “amelioration” rather than an “aggravation of dangers,” because lay juries were apt to convict and
execute “without sufficient evidence.” Ex parte Vallandigham, 28 F. Cas. 874, 894 (C.C.S.D. Ohio)
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Such a presumption hardly seems realistic in our present conflicts, however—
which is no doubt why defendants ordinarily do not prefer to be tried by
military commissions. The drafters of the Third Geneva Convention presumably
anticipated that trials of POWs from another state army would be for alleged
violations of the international law of war. As I explain below, there are
potentially strong reasons to think that military personnel are better-suited than
lay juries to try such offenses.224 In particular, because the customary law of
war governs the conduct of all belligerents in armed conflicts, military officers
are likely to be more sensitive to the manner in which that custom develops in
trials for violations of those norms, and will be more understanding than lay
juries of the circumstances in which enemy forces use force that pushes up
against the legal limits. Moreover, such military actors adjudicating a case
against a traditional enemy might take into consideration the impact of verdicts
upon trials of U.S. forces by the opposing belligerent power (that is to say, a
reciprocity concern).
These considerations, however, surely have “lesser force in the asymmetrical
context of conflict between a state and a non-state actor.”225 The offenses at
issue are not part of the universal international law norms that govern the
everyday conduct of military actors. And there is no prospect of the enemy
conducting reciprocal trials, let alone fair trials, of U.S. forces. Moreover, even
in the unlikely event Congress did prescribe military trials based upon a
paternalistic concern to avoid the vagaries and vengeance of a lay jury when
confronted with enemy fighters, that would not be sufficient reason to ignore the
dictates of Article III, any more than Congress could more broadly remove trial
of certain especially gruesome or disfavored offenses from the aegis of the jury
based upon such fairness concerns. The judge and jury guarantees of Article III
are designed not only to protect defendants, but also as “an inseparable element
of the constitutional system of checks and balances.”226 Thus, “to the extent that
this structural principle is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by
consent cure the constitutional difficulty”; the Article III judge and jury provisions “serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.”227 To be sure, there may be cases in which lay juries “betray[] the cause of

(1863) (argument of Aaron Perry). “When society is imperiled by intestine war,” counsel continued,
“the passions rage which occasioned the war, the entrails of the volcano, covered for a while, have at
length broken forth. Smoke and ashes obscure the sky. Fiery floods pour along the earth. No good man
could be impartial . . . . Believing his government to be in the right, interest, feeling, lawful duty,
compelled him to uphold it with all his power . . . . Its enemies are, and in the nature of the case must
be, his enemies; its friends his friends.” Id.
224. See infra notes 288–89 and accompanying text.
225. Gerald L. Neuman, Comment, Counter-terrorist Operations and the Rule of Law, 15 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 1019, 1023 (2004).
226. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986).
227. Id. at 850–51. But cf. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944–45 (2015)
(holding that Article I bankruptcy courts can adjudicate certain claims only by consent of the parties,
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justice by verdicts based on prejudice or pressures.”228 In such cases, however,
it is precisely the “independent trial judges” guaranteed by Article III who
“have a most important place under our constitutional plan since they have
power to set aside convictions.”229
b. Fairness to Service Members. The second possible fairness argument for
military tribunals is premised on an inequity that cuts in a different direction.
There is something disconcerting about the notion that enemy forces would be
entitled to the Article III protections for trials of domestic-law offenses when
Congress denies those same protections to members of the U.S. armed forces.
One therefore might contend that it is simply unfair, at best, to afford enemy
forces greater procedural protections than those to which our own armed forces
are entitled.230
There is good reason that the government has not raised this argument, either:
The functional justification that the Court has long identified for courts-martial
of service members—the need to preserve a self-contained system of military
discipline and good order, “with a view to maintaining obedience and fighting
fitness in the ranks”231—is simply inapposite with respect to alien enemy
belligerents.232
3. Arguments that the Constitution Does Not Apply
During the Bush Administration, the Department of Justice briefly rehearsed
a more categorical argument in support of military adjudication, in response to a
Guantánamo detainee’s contention that the President had overstepped his consti-

due to a set of particular circumstances that ensure the practice will not have a significant impact on the
judiciary’s constitutionally assigned role).
228. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 19 (1955).
229. Id.
230. The Supreme Court has articulated a similar-sounding rationale in the course of holding that
enemy soldiers can be tried in military tribunals for violations of the international law of war. See
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 783 (1950) (“If [the Fifth] Amendment invests enemy aliens in
unlawful hostile action against us with immunity from military trial, it puts them in a more protected
position than our own soldiers. . . . It would be a paradox indeed if what the Amendment denied to
Americans it guaranteed to enemies.”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 44 (1942) (doubting that the
drafters of the Bill of Rights would have “intended to extend trial by jury to the cases of alien or citizen
offenders against the law of war otherwise triable by military commission, while withholding it
from members of our own armed forces charged with infractions of the Articles of War punishable by
death”).
231. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 36 (1957) (plurality opinion); see also supra notes 184–86 and
accompanying text.
232. Moreover, under the current MCA, enemy aliens are not afforded trial rights equivalent to those
that members of the armed forces receive under the UCMJ. In particular, Crawford’s exclusion of
certain hearsay statements applies in courts-martial proceedings against military personnel, see, e.g.,
United States v. Gardinier, 65 M.J. 60, 64–65 (C.A.A.F. 2007), and the UCMJ itself includes a statutory
exclusionary rule for unwarned statements of the accused, 10 U.S.C. § 831(b), (d) (2012), that is, in
some respects, more forgiving than the rule under Miranda. See, e.g., United States v. Rogers, 47 M.J.
135, 136–38 (C.A.A.F. 1997). The government often opts for military commission trials precisely to
avoid the constraints of Crawford and Miranda. See supra notes 212–19 and accompanying text.
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tutional authority by unilaterally establishing military commissions, allegedly
without statutory authorization. “As an alien enemy combatant detained outside
the United States,” the Solicitor General wrote, “petitioner does not enjoy the
protections of our Constitution.”233
Although some judges continue to invoke this argument, even as to the judge
and jury guarantees of Article III,234 the government has not revived it in the
al Bahlul litigation contesting the constitutionality of the use of commissions
for domestic-law offenses.235 As we will see, there is good reason for the
government’s reluctance. The broad notion that the “Constitution does not
apply” in such cases has roots in three other, often-overlapping arguments of
more ancient vintage, relating to (a) geography, (b) alienage, and (c) the
exercise of belligerent authorities. None of those three arguments, however, has
much, if any, purchase today.
a. Extraterritorial Limitations. The first such older argument was simply that,
as the Supreme Court announced in In re Ross in 1891, “[t]he Constitution can
have no operation in another country,”236 even with respect to U.S. nationals.
For example, in Ross itself the Court held that a U.S. seaman could be denied
the jury right in a criminal trial aboard a U.S. vessel in Japan, even though he
would be entitled to a jury if he were “brought [to the United States] for trial for
alleged offenses committed elsewhere.”237 As Gerald Neuman has elaborated,
this strict geographical understanding of the Constitution—that its coverage
extended only to places where the nation’s power of legislation was plenary, “to

233. See Brief for Respondents at 43, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184). The
Supreme Court did not address this argument in Hamdan because it held that although Congress had
authorized the use of military commissions, the tribunals President Bush established did not comply
with statutory requirements. See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.
234. See al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 71 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (“Even if the
Criminal Jury Clause [of Article III] did limit military-commission jurisdiction, it has no application
here because Bahlul is neither a U.S. citizen nor present on U.S. soil.”); see also United States v. Ali, 71
M.J. 256, 266–69 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (holding that the Sixth Amendment jury right does not protect an
alien who is being tried abroad for a crime committed outside the United States).
235. Most notably, when the defendant in Ali petitioned to the Supreme Court, the government did
not rely upon the majority’s rationale that the Constitution does not protect the defendant. See Brief for
the United States in Opposition, Ali v. United States, No. 12-805 (U.S. Apr. 5, 2013), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2338 (2013); see also Vladeck, supra note 125, at 955 (criticizing Ali’s reasoning).
236. 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
237. Id. As Kal Raustiala explains, the Court denied the extraterritorial effect of the right to a jury
trial in Ross “largely on the grounds of expediency and practicality.” KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE
CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?: THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 65 (1st ed. 2009);
see also Ross, 140 U.S. at 464 (explaining that enforcement of the grand jury and petit jury rights
“abroad in numerous places, where it would be highly important to have consuls invested with judicial
authority, would be impracticable from the impossibility of obtaining a competent grand or petit jury”
and thus “would, in a majority of cases, cause an abandonment or all prosecution”). Indeed, the Court
went so far as to suggest that such trials in Japan might be inconsistent with treaty arrangements with
the host nation. See id. (“When . . . the representatives or officers of our government are permitted to
exercise authority of any kind in another country, it must be on such conditions as the two countries
may agree, the laws of neither one being obligatory upon the other.”).
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cases where it could govern by right, not by consent or comity”—was a
dominant view until well into the Twentieth Century.238
As the nation’s extraterritorial regulation and law enforcement expanded,
however, this argument became increasingly difficult to defend, and the Court
abandoned the strict geographical understanding of constitutional coverage in
1957, in Reid v. Covert.239 Justice Black’s plurality opinion in Reid explained
that “[t]he Ross approach that the Constitution has no applicability abroad” is
“obviously erroneous,” and that “[a]t best, the Ross case should be left as a relic
from a different era.”240 Justice Frankfurter likewise wrote in his separate
opinion that “[i]nsofar as the [Ross] opinion expressed a view that the Constitution is not operative outside the United States . . . it expressed a notion that has
long since evaporated,” and that “[g]overnmental action abroad,” including
“proceedings before American military tribunals,” is “performed under both the
authority and the restrictions of the Constitution.”241 More recently, in Boumediene, the Court conclusively rejected a “formal sovereignty-based test” for
assessing when aliens are entitled to constitutional protections.242 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court identified a “common thread” in the Court’s case law
that unites not only Reid and other modern cases, but also the Insular Cases
(including Ross) and Eisentrager—namely, that questions of constitutional
extraterritoriality “turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism.”243
This does not mean that extraterritorial considerations play no role at all in
determining the circumstances under which various constitutional guarantees
attach. It does, however, preclude the argument that Article III and the Sixth
Amendment can be abandoned simply because the operative conduct occurred,
or because the trial will take place, outside the United States.
b. The “Protection/Allegiance” Argument. The second of the older arguments, like the first, is not limited to wartime; unlike the first argument,
however, it is not strictly geographical, either. It is instead predicated on an
alleged absence of constitutional protection for aliens who have not developed

238. GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION 82–83, 89–94 (1996); see also RAUSTIALA,
supra note 237, at 59–93. This older principle, even if credited, would not affect the Article III question
if a trial were convened in the United States. Hamdan’s trial, however, like al Bahlul’s, took place at
Guantánamo Bay, over which Cuba has formal sovereignty.
239. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
240. Id. at 12 (plurality opinion).
241. Id. at 56 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result); accord id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result) (“I also think that we were mistaken in interpreting Ross and the Insular Cases as standing for
the sweeping proposition that the safeguards of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
automatically have no application to the trial of American citizens outside the United States, no matter
what the circumstances.”).
242. 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008).
243. Id.; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 487 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(“Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far removed from
any hostilities.”).
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sufficient ties to the nation. The gist of the argument is that the protections of
the Constitution are available only for persons who have an “allegiance” to the
nation, in the sense of being obligated to comply with the laws of the United
States, by virtue of citizenship, residence or otherwise.244 On this view, allegiance and protection are said to be “reciprocal,” or a two-way street: “[A]llegiance was given on the condition of protection, and similarly . . . protection
was given on the condition of allegiance.”245 Persons who “submitted to the
laws” of the state, “whether they were citizens or foreigners, deserved both the
punishment and the protection of the laws.”246 But those who do not “submit”
to such laws—including, arguably, most aliens overseas, and especially enemy
aliens, wherever they are found—would not be entitled to invoke the protection
of the Constitution.247 A vestige of this argument can be found in more recent
Court holdings that the national government is not required to comply with
certain constitutional constraints when dealing with aliens outside the United
States.248
Whatever the general merits of such an argument might be, there is no basis
for concluding that it applies with respect to the question whether the Constitution applies when the government subjects aliens to criminal trial. Indeed, the
existence of such trials calls into question the underlying premises of the basic
argument. The protection/allegiance theory depends upon the assumption that
U.S. law simply does not apply to constrain the conduct of aliens overseas (and
hostile aliens who make war within the United States): “Enemy aliens . . . were
not accountable at law; . . . This meant that, whether in civil or criminal proceedings, they could be neither defendants nor plaintiffs.”249 It has long been
accepted, however, that U.S. law can and does bind aliens found overseas, even
for conduct outside the United States, and even in cases where the individuals
have not in any meaningful sense “submitted” themselves to such U.S. legal
obligations. The United States has extended its criminal laws to conduct of
non-nationals overseas pursuant to several established international-law principles, including the “protective principle,” which provides jurisdiction over

244. See generally Philip Hamburger, Beyond Protection, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1823 (2009).
245. Id. at 1823, 1834; see also id. at 1876 (explaining that an enemy alien who came within the
country during the war “could . . . be dealt with as a prisoner of war under the laws of war” but “had no
obligation under the [U.S.] law and could not be prosecuted as a criminal”).
246. Id. at 1860; see also Andrew Kent, Judicial Review for Enemy Fighters: The Court’s Fateful
Turn in Ex parte Quirin, the Nazi Saboteur Case, 66 VAND. L. REV. 153, 176–211 (2013).
247. This argument would not have been relevant to several of the historical cases I discuss in this
Article, in which the defendants were, or included, U.S. persons. The current MCA, however, applies
only to “enemy alien belligerents.” See 10 U.S.C. § 950t(26) (2012).
248. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to search and seizure by U.S. agents of property owned by a nonresident
alien in Mexico).
249. Hamburger, supra note 244, at 1861.
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acts committed outside a state that harm the security of the state;250 the “passive
personality principle,” which confers jurisdiction over acts that harm a state’s
citizens abroad;251 and, on occasion, the “universality principle,” which provides for jurisdiction over certain especially egregious extraterritorial acts
condemned by all civilized nations.252 And, more to the point, the current cases
involving Article III challenges to military courts are precisely those in which
the United States is asserting the authority to hold foreigners criminally responsible for transgressing U.S. law, thereby undermining the fundamental premise
of the “protection/allegiance” argument.
Thus, even in a case holding that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable to
a search of an alien overseas, the Supreme Court was careful to explain that
such an alien would be entitled to the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination if and when the federal government brought him before a
criminal court.253 And the doctrinal case against the “protection/allegiance”
argument is, if anything, even plainer when it comes to the guarantees of Article
III. In cases such as Quirin254 and Yamashita,255 the Court failed even to
mention the possibility that Article III does not apply in all criminal trials of

250. See United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 110–11 (2d Cir. 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (FOURTH)
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: JURISDICTION § 201 cmt. i (AM. LAW. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT Draft No. 2].
251. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 91 n.24; see also RESTATEMENT Draft No. 2, supra note 250,
§ 201 cmt. h.
252. See Yousef, 327 F.3d at 91 n.24; see also RESTATEMENT Draft No. 2 supra note 250, § 201 cmt. j.
To be sure, Congress did not commonly authorize these forms of prescriptive jurisdiction until recent
decades. See, e.g., Monika B. Krizek, Note, The Protective Principle of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A
Brief History and an Application of the Principle to Espionage as an Illustration of Current United
States Practice, 6 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337 (1988) (describing history of protective principle in U.S.
law). The Supreme Court recognized the power of the federal government to do so, however, as early as
1804. See Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. 187, 234–35 (1804). There have long been
OF

provisions in the law of the United States . . . which it is difficult to reconcile with an
exclusively territorial or personal theory of penal competence and which appear to be based in
some measure upon the principle that the United States is competent to prosecute offences
which interfere with the functioning of its public agencies and instrumentalities, irrespective
of the place of the offence or the nationality of the offender.
Am. Soc’y of Int’l L., Codification of International Law: Part II—Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 435, 544 (Supp. Research in Int’l L. 1935) (citing as an example an 1856
federal statute that made it unlawful to engage in perjury before an American diplomatic or consular
officer, including overseas).
253. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264; see also id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The
United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court established under Article III, and all of the trial
proceedings are governed by the Constitution. All would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”). To be sure, the majority in VerdugoUrquidez implied that the distinction in the applicability of constitutional rights turned in part on the
fact that the search, unlike a trial, “occurred solely in Mexico.” Id. at 264. It is hard to imagine,
however, that the Court would permit the federal government to circumvent all of the constitutional
trial-right protections against an alien defendant lacking allegiance to the United States if only it
established and used a court overseas. See supra Section II.B.3.a.
254. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
255. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
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aliens who have not demonstrated allegiance to the United States.256 That is
understandable, for the jury and judge protections of Article III, and the jury
right in the Sixth Amendment, “are not limited to citizens; they apply to citizens
and aliens alike.”257 Indeed, because Article III, like the Suspension Clause, is a
structural provision that preserves a particular role for the federal judicial
branch, its application is not limited to trials of U.S. persons, even in contexts in
which some “mere” rights-protective constitutional provisions arguably might
not apply to foreign nationals who have not developed ties to the nation.258
c. The Distinction Between Belligerent and Municipal Authorities. The story
is a bit more complicated with respect to the final historical source of the
“Constitution does not apply” argument. This third argument, which was prominent during at least the first century of the Constitution, turned not on geography alone, nor on the alienage or allegiance of the defendant, but instead on
whether the federal government was exercising a “belligerent” rather than a
“municipal” authority. If the government is acting in its municipal capacity,
according to this argument, it must comply with the Constitution. If, on the
other hand, it is exercising belligerent authorities, the constraints of the Constitution and other domestic laws are simply inapposite—they are displaced by the
international law of war, which acts as a kind of lex specialis so that exercise of
the belligerent powers is not entirely unconstrained.

256. Instead, as explained below, infra Section III.A, in both cases the Court held that Article III
does not prohibit the use of military courts to try offenses against the law of war, even when citizens are
the defendants. The Court in those cases also permitted enemy aliens without ties to the United States
the right to petition for habeas relief, even though the President had decreed that they be denied access
to the courts. See Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24–25. Accordingly, even scholars who
are generally dubious about the extension of constitutional rights to enemy aliens acknowledge that
Quirin and its progeny undermined that proposition. See, e.g., Kent, supra note 246, at 245 (“Quirin exploded the protection-allegiance framework and therefore disrupted the policy justifications for
excluding certain people from court access and entitlement to constitutional rights. . . . Quirin’s destruction of the allegiance-protection framework of justification therefore greatly helped to undermine the
centuries-old principle that constitutional protections were unavailable to noncitizens outside the United
States.”)
257. See Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 356, 361 (1918) (concluding that
the trial rights of Article III and the Sixth Amendment protected a German spy, bent on sabotage, who
was arrested as soon as he entered the United States).
258. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008). In Patton v. United States, the Court held
that the jury guarantees in Article III and the Sixth Amendment are individual rights that can be waived,
rather than structural imperatives. 281 U.S. 276, 293–98 (1930). The Patton Court’s analysis of Article
III has been sharply questioned. See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 67, at 104–08; see generally Stephen A.
Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III’s Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of
Motivated Reasoning, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 373 (2012). In any event, the requirement of an Article
III judge, like the conditions for suspension of the habeas writ at issue in Boumediene, is surely
structural in nature, designed not only to protect individual rights directly, but also to “safeguard[] the
role of the Judicial Branch in our tripartite system by barring congressional attempts to ‘transfer
jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.’”
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 850 (1986) (quoting Nat’l Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Co. 337 U.S. 582, 644 (1949) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (second alteration in original));
accord Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1944 (2015).
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Importantly, this theory of constitutional displacement was not limited to
actions taken against aliens, or outside the United States: It applied to the
exercise of belligerent powers even against disloyal citizens and their property—
those who “unit[ed] themselves to the cause”’ of the enemy, or who “aid or abet
and give comfort to enemies”259—and even against loyal citizens residing in (or
such citizens’ property found in) enemy territory.260 Not surprisingly, then,
arguments of this sort were often invoked to defend the military detention and
trial of citizens during the Civil War; in Milligan, for example, the government
defended the military commission prosecutions at issue, in part, on the ground
that “no limitations were put upon the war-making and war-conducting powers
of Congress and the President,” other than the Third Amendment’s limitation on
the compelled quartering of soldiers absent statutory authorization.261
This argument might sound deeply discordant to modern ears,262 but it was
very prominent during and after the Civil War,263 and the Supreme Court
endorsed it in at least two landmark decisions: The Prize Cases264 and Miller v.
United States,265 both of which held that the property-protective provisions of
the Constitution did not limit the exercise of such belligerent powers (such as a
blockade or confiscation).266 Indeed, the distinction was so well-established that
even the dissenting Justices in Miller acknowledged it. Justice Field summed up
the argument this way:
[I]t is evident that legislation founded upon the war powers of the government, and directed against the public enemies of the United States, is subject
to different considerations and limitations from those applicable to legislation

259. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 311–12 (1871).
260. See id. at 310–11.
261. See 71 U.S. 2, 20–21 (1866) (argument of the United States).
262. But see H. JEFFERSON POWELL, TARGETING AMERICANS: THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE U.S. DRONE
WAR 65–79 (2016) (invoking this doctrine in support of an argument that the Due Process Clause does
not apply to the President’s decision to kill a U.S. citizen who is thought to be part of enemy forces in
an armed conflict). A notorious Bush-era opinion of the Department of Justice also expressed this view:
“The strictures that bind the Executive in its role as a magistrate enforcing the civil laws have no place
in constraining the President in waging war.” Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, to William Haynes, II, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, Re: Military
Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States at 7 (Mar. 14, 2003),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2009/08/24/memo-combatantsoutsideunitedstates.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8LT-CPM9].
263. See generally Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839 (2010). The argument is, for instance, reflected in Articles 40 and 41 of the
Lieber Code. See Lieber Code, supra note 11, art. 40 (“There exists no law or body of authoritative
rules of action between hostile armies, except that branch of the law of nature and nations which is
called the law and usages of war on land.”); id. art. 41 (“All municipal law of the ground on which the
armies stand, or of the countries to which they belong, is silent and of no effect between armies in the
field.”); see also, e.g., WILLIAM WHITING, THE WAR POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF CONGRESS IN RELATION TO REBELLION, TREASON AND SLAVERY 47–59 (1st ed., 1863).
264. 67 U.S. 635 (1863).
265. 78 U.S. 268 (1871).
266. Id. at 304–13; Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 671–74.
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founded upon the municipal power of the government and directed against
criminals. Legislation in the former case is subject to no limitations, except
such as are imposed by the law of nations in the conduct of war. Legislation in
the latter case is subject to all the limitations prescribed by the Constitution
for the protection of the citizen against hasty and indiscriminate accusation,
and which insure to him, when accused, a speedy and public trial by a jury of
his peers.267

Although this argument has a much more compelling pedigree than the
argument predicated on allegiance, it, too, fails to justify the current use of
military commissions to try war-related offenses, for at least two reasons.
First, there was an internal, perhaps insoluble, tension lying at the root of the
doctrine, especially with respect to criminal trials. The difficult question in any
given case was to determine on which side of the divide the government was
acting: as a sovereign or as a belligerent. As a general matter, the Supreme
Court looked to whether the particular state action was predicated on punishing
the individual based upon his personal guilt (in which case it was said to be an
exercise of the sovereign, municipal power), or was instead being used as “an
instrument of coercion,” to impair the enemy’s ability to prosecute the war and
thereby bring the struggle to a successful resolution (in which case it was said to
be a “belligerent” action, at least if it was an incident of war traditionally
employed by belligerent states).268 So, for example, in Miller, the Court opined
that whereas the first four sections of the Second Confiscation Act269—
providing for the punishment of treason, inciting or engaging in rebellion or
insurrection, or giving aid and comfort thereto—were “undoubtedly” municipal
in nature (“aimed at individual offenders”) and thus subject to the constraints of
the Constitution, other sections of the Act providing for particular forms of
property confiscation were exercises of the “belligerent” power in support of the
Union Army, enacted (in the words of Section 5 of the Act) “to insure the
speedy termination of the present rebellion,” and thus were not subject to the
Constitution’s protections of property rights.270
When it comes to war-specific criminal trials, however, a prosecution might
well partake of both objectives—that is, the military might convene the trial
both to punish individual wrongdoing and also to weaken the enemy to enhance
the prospect of victory. This is most clearly so in the case of a trial for violation
of the law of war; but such dual objectives can also characterize, for example, a
statute punishing the provision of assistance to a national enemy, or to the
offenses in the current Military Commissions Act, all of which are designed to

267.
268.
269.
270.

Miller, 78 U.S. at 315 (Field, J., dissenting).
See id. at 304–07 (majority opinion).
Second Confiscation Act, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
78 U.S. at 308–10 (quoting Second Confiscation Act § 5, 12 Stat. at 590).
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apply exclusively in the context of armed conflict.271 The traditional dichotomy
between sovereign and belligerent powers did not offer a clear answer on how
such cases should be treated. Dicta of the Court in Miller, however, suggested
that such prosecutions would “undoubtedly” be “an exercise of the sovereign,
not the belligerent rights of the government.”272 If that was correct, then the
“belligerent power” justification for the inapplicability of the Constitution
would certainly not excuse noncompliance with Article III for the trials in
question (although perhaps that conclusion was not so clear during the Civil
War itself).
Second, and more significantly, whatever the strength of this argument might
have been in and just after the Civil War, modern Supreme Court developments
have effectively foreclosed it. In neither Quirin nor Yamashita, for example, did
the Court hint at any argument that Article III and the Sixth Amendment were
inapposite because the trials there were an exercise of the government’s belligerent power—a proposition that would have rendered much of the Court’s opinions in those cases superfluous and would have been a barrier to the Court’s
holdings that the enemies at issue had the right to petition for habeas.273 More
recently, and more definitively, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Justice O’Connor’s
controlling opinion held that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provided an alleged member of enemy forces the right to challenge the legality of
his military detention274—a holding that would be difficult, if not impossible, to
square with the notion that the Constitution does not constrain the exercise of
belligerent powers, a view that no member of the Hamdi Court endorsed.275
III. THE ANOMALOUS QUIRIN EXCEPTION FOR TRIAL OF OFFENSES AGAINST THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF WAR, AND THE “PRESERVATIONIST” ACCOUNT OF ARTICLE III
As Part II demonstrated, there are virtually no compelling textual, functional,
pragmatic, normative, or equitable arguments that would support trying warrelated domestic-law offenses in military tribunals. This explains why the
government’s singular focus in the al Bahlul litigation (and Judge Kavanaugh’s,
too) has been on purported historical justifications—in particular, on the notion
that Article III should not be read to prohibit wartime practices that were
well-established at the Founding.

271. See 10 U.S.C. § 950p(c) (2012) (“An offense specified in this subchapter is triable by military
commission under this chapter only if the offense is committed in the context of and associated with
hostilities.”); see also id. § 948a(9) (defining “hostilities” to mean “any conflict subject to the laws of
war”).
272. 78 U.S. at 308.
273. See Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1945).
274. 542 U.S. 507, 528–35 (2004) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 553 (Souter, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
275. Even Justice Thomas, in dissent, did not suggest that the Due Process Clause was inapplicable;
instead, he argued that Hamdi had received the process that was due under the circumstances. Id. at
589–98 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In offering such a “preservationist” argument, the government is not working
on a blank slate, for such a rationale was at the core of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Quirin, which established the fifth existing Article III exception for
criminal trials: for military trials of offenses against the international law of war.
A. QUIRIN’S HOLDING AND CHIEF JUSTICE STONE’S ERRORS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW

Quirin involved a constitutional challenge to the military trial of eight
individuals—including at least one U.S. citizen—paid and directed by the
German army to secretly come ashore in the United States, disguise themselves
as civilians (by burying their uniforms on the beach), and then go off into the
interior of the nation to destroy war industries and facilities.276 The saboteurs
were arrested by civil authorities,277 and in the ordinary course they would have
been tried in a federal court in the District of Columbia, presumably for
conspiring to sabotage federal facilities. President Roosevelt, however, ordered
them to be tried by a military commission in the Department of Justice
building,278 even though, as the Supreme Court would later note, “no circumstances justified transferring them from civil to military jurisdiction.”279 The
military tribunal convicted the individuals of the charges, and President Roosevelt approved the judgment.280 Before the verdict, the accused petitioned the
Supreme Court for relief, arguing that it was unconstitutional for the government to try them in a military court. On July 31, 1942, after expedited briefing
and two days of oral argument, the Court issued a short, unanimous per curiam
opinion, concluding that the accused were alleged to have committed “an
offense or offenses which the President is authorized to order tried before a
military commission,” and promising to later issue “a full opinion which
necessarily will require a considerable period of time for its preparation.”281
Just eight days later, the government executed six of the convicted individuals;
the other two received prison sentences.282
Three months later, the Court issued an opinion, written by Chief Justice
Stone, in which it held that it was constitutional for the federal government to
resort to a military commission, even where civilian courts were “open and
functioning normally,”283 to try persons who were part of, or directed by, the
German army, for at least one offense against the law of war, a “branch of

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See 317 U.S. at 20–21.
See id. at 21.
See Exec. Order No. 9,185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 780 (1950).
STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE ON THE SENTENCES OF EIGHT NAZI SABOTEURS LANDED BY
SUBMARINE ON THE LONG ISLAND AND FLORIDA SHORES ON JUNE 13 AND 17, 1942 (Aug. 8, 1942),
http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1942/1942-08-08a.html [https://perma.cc/SLE7-7ZPR].
281. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1942) (unnumbered footnote).
282. STATEMENT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, supra note 280.
283. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24.
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international law.”284
Before examining the reasoning of the Court’s opinion, it is important to
identify two arguments Chief Justice Stone did not rely upon in support of the
holding. First, the government proffered a textual argument: It reasoned that
because the charged offenses occurred within the “lines” of the U.S. armed
forces (which, according to the government, included the entire continental
United States), those offenses “ar[o]se in the land or naval forces,”285 and
therefore not only fell within the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury exception for
such cases, but were implicitly excluded from the Sixth Amendment’s right to a
trial before a petit jury, as well.286 As we will see, this was an argument that the
government had been invoking for some time—going back at least to the Civil
War—in justification of military trials. Stone rejected the argument. He explained that the “objective” of the Fifth Amendment’s grand jury exception
“was quite different”—namely, to allow for the court-martial trial of members
of the armed forces, regardless of whether they were charged with offenses
against the law of war.287 The Court thus did not accept the location-dependent
argument that Article III and the Sixth Amendment jury right were inapplicable
merely because the conduct (arguably) occurred within U.S. military lines.
Second, a fairly powerful functional argument was available to the Quirin
Court, but Stone did not rely upon it. During the Second World War, there was
no provision in the United States Code specifically authorizing the trial in
Article III courts for violations of the law of war. Civilian courts, in other
words, were effectively “unavailable” for such cases, unless the conduct in
question also constituted a domestic-law criminal offense. There was good
reason that the United States, like most other nations, had traditionally reserved
such cases for military tribunals. The precedents set in such proceedings—

284. Id. at 29; see also id. at 40 (“[W]e must conclude that § 2 of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments cannot be taken to have extended the right to demand a jury to trials by military
commission, or to have required that offenses against the law of war not triable by jury at common law
be tried only in the civil courts.”). The Court indicated that this law-of-war-offense exception is not
absolute: some violations of the law of war, wrote Stone, might be in a “class of offenses constitutionally triable only by a jury.” Id. at 29. Stone included this caveat at the insistence of Justice Black, who
wrote Stone an internal note declaring his reluctance to issue a categorical judgment: “I seriously
question whether Congress could constitutionally confer jurisdiction to try all such violations before
military tribunals. . . . [T]o subject every person in the United States to trial by military tribunals for
every violation of every rule of war which has been or may hereafter be adopted between nations
among themselves, might go far to destroy the protections declared by the Milligan case.” Memorandum of Justice Black to Chief Justice Stone, Oct. 2, 1942, HUGO L. BLACK PAPERS, Box 269 (Library of
Congress). The Court’s opinion did not offer any guidance about which law-of-war offenses must be
tried in an Article III court.
285. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
286. See Brief for the Respondent at 14–15, In re Burger, et al., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)
(Nos. 1-7), reprinted in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3, 393–94 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds. 1975).
287. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 43; see also infra notes 603–08 and accompanying text (explaining that in
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), and related cases, the Court decisively rejected the application of the
“arising in” exception apart from cases involving the trial of military personnel).
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regarding what wartime conduct violates the law of war and what does not—
exerts an important influence on the common-law development of the law of
war, which governs the future conduct of militaries. The armed forces, accordingly, have a substantial interest in the outcome of such trials because they help
to establish the rules for the military’s own future behavior in war, and that of
opposing forces. Further, military officers have familiarity with, and training in,
the law of war—which a lay judge and jury ordinarily would not; and the armed
forces are more familiar than civilians with the contexts in which these legal
questions arise and with the complexities that can attend the “fog of war.”
Members of the armed forces, therefore, might have a nuanced understanding of
precisely which forms of wartime conduct the law of war should proscribe—
constraints that will later limit their own actions in war. Thus, just as the
court-martial system establishes a code of conduct for the armed forces—one of
the principal justifications for that Article III exception288—so, too, trials of the
enemy for violations of the law of war effectively help to establish the rules of
the road for the U.S. military and for other armies around the globe. Arguably,
that might be a compelling enough reason to permit Congress to assign such
adjudications to the professional military.289
Regardless of whether this functional justification might have been sufficient
to establish a “law-of-war offenses” exception to Article III, Stone did not
mention it. Instead, he relied almost exclusively on an historical argument,
based upon purported understandings at the Framing concerning the trial of
enemy spies. Stone’s reasoning was as follows:
1. Relying principally on the Court’s then-existing jurisprudence regarding
“petty offenses,”290 Stone asserted that whereas the object of Article III’s

288. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text.
289. Hamilton suggested such an argument in The Federalist. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 504
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (trial by jury should not be afforded in civil cases
“where the question turns wholly on the laws of nations,” because juries “cannot be supposed
competent to investigations that require a thorough knowledge of the laws and usages of nations; and
they will sometimes be under the influence of impressions which will not suffer them to pay sufficient
regard to those considerations of public policy which ought to guide their inquiries,” with the attendant
“danger that the rights of other nations might be infringed by their decisions, so as to afford occasions
of reprisal and war”). This functional justification might have somewhat less salience today than it did
in 1942, not only because Congress has now provided for the trial of many law-of-war offenses in
Article III courts, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012) (making it unlawful for U.S. nationals to commit
violations of certain laws of war codified in treaties); id. § 2332f (making it unlawful to bomb places of
public use, including public transportation systems, in certain circumstances), but also because international acceptance of military justice has receded sharply since 1949. See, e.g., Charles H. B. Garraway,
Interoperability and the Atlantic Divide: A Bridge over Troubled Waters, 80 INT’L L. STUD. 337, 347–49
(2006) (explaining that an “inbuilt suspicion of military justice” has developed, “brought about by years
of misuse by some,” and that “the assumption that military officers will conduct their duties ‘without
partiality, favour or affection’ has been replaced almost by an assumption the other way”). Even so,
although international human rights law has increasingly cut back on the permissibility of using military trials
for other offenses, it continues to recognize the legitimacy of using military courts to try offenses of a strictly
military nature committed by military personnel. See Vladeck, supra note 125, at 997–99.
290. See supra Section II.A.1.a.
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jury trial right “was to preserve unimpaired trial by jury in all those cases
in which it had been recognized by the common law and in all cases of a
like nature as they might arise in the future,” the Framers did not intend “to
bring within the sweep of the guaranty those cases in which it was then
well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded as of right.”291
2. During the Revolutionary War, the Continental Army tried many individuals for spying behind enemy lines, without the protections of a civilian
jury;292 and in 1806, Congress codified a Revolutionary War resolution of
the Continental Congress that authorized courts-martial to try such spies.293
3. Spying behind enemy lines was (according to Stone) an offense against the
international law of war,294 and the reason spies had been tried by military
tribunals at the Founding was “not because they were aliens but only
because they had violated the law of war.”295

291. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 (citations omitted).
292. See id. at 42–44; see also id. at 31 n.9 (describing proceeding against Major John André for
spying behind enemy lines before a board of officers appointed by General Washington).
293. See id. at 41.
294. See id. at 31 (“The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or
an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging
war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed
not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to
trial and punishment by military tribunals.” (emphasis added)); id. at 44 (describing spying trials as
cases of “offenders against the law of war”). In a recent brief in al Bahlul, the government argued that
the Court in Quirin was not necessarily referring to international law. See U.S. al Bahlul III Brief, supra
note 23, at 44–45. In his opinion in the en banc proceeding, Judge Kavanaugh suggested likewise:
“There is no indication in the opinion or historical record,” he wrote, “that the Quirin Court actually
believed that spying was an international law of war offense.” al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757, 764 (D.C.
Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
There is no question, however, that Chief Justice Stone’s references to the “law of war” were to the
international law of nations. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28 (“Congress, in addition to making rules for the
government of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against
the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and
more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribunals.” (emphasis added)); id. at 29
(“[T]hese petitioners were charged with an offense against the law of war . . . . It is no objection that
Congress in providing for the trial of such offenses has not itself undertaken to codify that branch of
international law . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d at 817 (joint dissent of
Rogers, Tatel, and Pillard, JJ.) (demonstrating how “the Supreme Court’s analysis makes clear that it
viewed ‘spying and the kindred offense of sabotage’ as offenses against the international laws of war”).
In its brief and argument in Quirin, the federal government likewise explained that the law of war is a
subset of the law of nations. See Brief for Respondent at 29, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (Nos.
1-7), reprinted in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 286, at 430 (explaining the “common law of war” is
“a centuries-old body of largely unwritten rules and principles of international law”); Transcript of Oral
Argument, at 96, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (Nos. 1-7), reprinted in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note
286, at 591 (argument of Attorney General Biddle) (“The Law of War is the well established law of
nations existing for many hundreds of years . . . .”). When later writing of the case, Attorney General Biddle
explained that he relied upon the international law of war, a body of law about which both he and the Justices
had but a “dim idea” as oral argument approached. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 338 (1962).
295. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44.
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4. Ergo, reasoned Stone, the Founding-era practice (and the 1806 Congress’s
ratification of that practice) “must be regarded as a contemporary construction” of Article III and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments “as not foreclosing
trial by military tribunals, without a jury, of offenses against the law of war
committed by enemies not in or associated with our Armed Forces.”296
Stone then applied that holding about the Article III exception for trial of
law-of-war offenses to one of the charges on which the saboteurs had been
convicted: Specification 1 of the first charge, which stated that the accused,
being enemies of the United States and acting for . . . the German Reich, a
belligerent enemy nation, secretly and covertly passed, in civilian dress,
contrary to the law of war, through the military and naval lines and defenses
of the United States . . . and went behind such lines, contrary to the law of
war, in civilian dress . . . for the purpose of committing . . . hostile acts, and,
in particular, to destroy certain war industries, war utilities and war materials
within the United States.297

Stone reasoned (mistakenly) that such conduct, undertaken out of uniform and
behind enemy lines, “plainly alleges violation of the law of war.”298 And if such
conduct violates the law of war, it then follows, according to the Court’s
understanding of the Founding era, that the Constitution does not forbid trial of
such an offense in a military tribunal.299
Quirin’s holding and rationale are clear. What complicates matters, however,
is that the rationale only supports the holding by virtue of two errors about the
law of war in Stone’s argument.
First, Stone’s assumption that “unprivileged” belligerency automatically violates the law of war reflected a “fundamental confusion between acts punishable
under international law and acts with respect to which international law affords
no protection.”300 Second, Stone was therefore wrong to assume that either
spying behind enemy lines (the offense tried by courts-martial, on Washington’s

296. Id. at 41.
297. Id. at 36.
298. Id.
299. Id. Stone based this conclusion upon the fact that such conduct disqualifies individuals from
being entitled to the “privileges” that are afforded to “lawful belligerents.” He reasoned, mistakenly,
that such “unlawful belligerency” also violates the law of war. Id. at 33–38.
300. Richard R. Baxter, So-Called “Unprivileged Belligerency”: Spies, Guerillas, and Saboteurs, 28
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 323, 340 (1951); see also Marty Lederman, Unprivileged Does Not Mean
Prohibited, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2013, 2:05 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/1153/
unprivilegedunlawful [perma.cc/VB9C-RMVN]. For critiques of this aspect of Quirin, see, e.g., Baxter,
supra, at 339–40; Michael N. Schmitt, Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation in Hostilities by
Private Contractors or Civilian Employees, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 520 n.45 (2005); W. Hays Parks,
Special Forces’ Wear of Non-Standard Uniforms, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 493, 510 n.31 (2003); see also John
C. Dehn, The Hamdan Case and the Application of a Municipal Offence, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 63,
74–79 (2009) (explaining that the authorities Stone relied upon do not provide clear support for his
conclusion).
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orders, during the Revolutionary War), or the conduct alleged against the
saboteurs in Specification 1, violated the law of war. Such conduct might not be
privileged—that is, international law may permit states to punish it under their
domestic law—but international law itself does not prohibit the conduct.301
This leaves us with something of a puzzle in terms of how to understand
Quirin’s impact on the question of whether and when Article III admits of
exceptions for wartime military tribunals.
On the one hand, there is no question that the Court’s holding in Quirin was
limited to upholding the constitutionality of military trials for violations of the
international law of war.302 Indeed, Stone was careful to indicate strong doubts
that military tribunals could try individuals for war-related offenses that are not
violations of the law of war.303 That is, in effect, how Stone distinguished
Quirin from Milligan: Lambdin Milligan, he explained, was a “non-belligerent”—
“not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy”—and
therefore the law of war was “inapplicab[le]” to him (or so Stone thought) and,
for that reason, the military court lacked the constitutional authority to try
him.304 Stone also emphasized that the Court was not opining on whether it was
constitutional for the saboteurs’ military commission to adjudicate Charge II,
which alleged that they violated then-Article 81 of the Articles of War,305 a
provision still in effect today that proscribes “aiding the enemy.”306 The Court
also declined to opine on the fourth charge against the saboteurs, which alleged

301. See infra notes 347–58 and accompanying text. The government in Quirin did not argue that
spying behind enemy lines in war was a violation of the law of war. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at
38, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (Nos. 1–7), reprinted in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 286, at
439 (distinguishing the charge of spying in violation of Article 82 of the Articles of War from the
separate charge alleging that the saboteurs “violat[ed] the law of war”). To the contrary, the War
Department’s 1940 Law of War Manual specifically clarified that the spying condemned in Article 82
“involves no offense against international law” and that spies are “not . . . violators of the laws of war.”
U.S. WAR DEP’T, BASIC FIELD MANUAL 27-10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE 58 (1940).
302. See supra note 294. The Court reaffirmed this holding in other World War II cases. See In re
Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 7–8, 11, 14 (1946); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313–14 (1946); see
also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 786 (1950) (citing Quirin and Yamahshita for proposition
that military has jurisdiction to try “enemy belligerents, prisoners of war, or others charged with
violating the laws of war”).
303. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29.
304. Id. at 45.
305. Act of June 4, 1920, art. 81, 41 Stat. 759, 804 [hereinafter “Article 81”].
306. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 46 (“Since the first specification of Charge I sets forth a violation of the
law of war, we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to
construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications
under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles or whether if so construed they are
constitutional.”). Article 81 provided that
[w]hosoever relieves or attempts to relieve the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies,
money, or other thing, or knowingly harbors or protects or holds correspondence with or gives
intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other
punishment as a court-martial or military commission may direct.
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a conspiracy307—another offense that does not violate the international law of
war. Thus, although the Quirin Court did not issue any conclusive holding on
whether it would be constitutional to use military tribunals to try domestic-law
offenses related to war, its rationale strongly implied that such trials, in contrast
to trials for violations of the international law of war, would raise serious
constitutional concerns.
On the other hand, Stone was correct that courts-martial did try many
individuals for spying behind enemy lines during the Revolutionary War and
that Congress codified such military-court jurisdiction over spying in 1806—a
statute that has remained on the books to this day. Contrary to Stone’s assumption, however, such spying behind enemy lines is not a violation of the
international law of war.308 Therefore, if Stone’s chief assumption was correct—
namely, that Article III was not designed to cover cases “in which it was [at the
Framing] well understood that a jury trial could not be demanded as of
right”309—then what, exactly, does the Founding-era treatment of spying cases
in military tribunals demonstrate?
B. QUESTIONING QUIRIN’S PREMISE THAT ARTICLE III WAS DESIGNED TO PRESERVE THE
PRE-CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS QUO

Before examining what the relevant Revolutionary War precedents might
show, it is appropriate to ask a more fundamental question: Does it matter? In
other words, was Stone’s “preservationist” premise about Article III valid?
There is at least one important reason to think it might not be.
To be sure, in some contexts the Supreme Court has reasoned that a particular
constitutional provision, or feature, was not designed to have avulsive effects on
a well-established, pre-constitutional “backdrop,” or status quo—including with
respect to some questions about the meaning and application of Article III.310

The current version of the law, which is materially the same, is entitled “Aiding the Enemy.” See 10
U.S.C. § 904 (2012). It is noteworthy that the government did not use this statute to prosecute a number
of U.S. citizens who assisted one of the saboteurs in the United States. See United States v. Haupt, 136
F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943). Those defendants were, instead, tried and convicted of treason in an Article III
court, see id. at 663, perhaps reflecting some trepidation by the government about the constitutionality
of using military tribunals for the stand-alone domestic offense of “aiding the enemy.” See infra notes
787–89 and accompanying text.
307. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 23.
308. See infra notes 347–58.
309. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
310. See, e.g., Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 776–77
(2000) (reasoning that the history of British and pre-constitution qui tam actions, and their equivalent,
are “well nigh conclusive with respect to . . . whether qui tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of
the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process’”) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens
for a Better Env’t., 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)); cf. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 484 (2011) (“When a
suit is made of ‘the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in
1789,’ and is brought within the bounds of federal jurisdiction, the responsibility for deciding that suit
rests with Article III judges in Article III courts.” (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment))).
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Nevertheless, the Constitution was in many respects designed to fundamentally
alter the system of governance the colonies had experienced under British rule
and, to some extent, what they had originally experimented with during the first
dozen or so, pre-constitutional years of practice in the new nation.
Of most relevance here, the judicial tenure and emoluments protections of
Article III were designed to guarantee a degree of judicial independence from
the political branches—a sharp break from the control the crown had exerted
over the courts in the colonies.311 Likewise, a principal reason the Constitution
affords special solicitude to the right to a jury trial was to preclude recurrence of

One well-known, age-old debate within the Court—concerning whether the Constitution preserved
the states’ sovereign immunity—nicely illustrates the tension between viewing Article III as preservative of the pre-constitutional order and understanding Article III as having established novel structural
protections that diverged from then-common practices. In Chisholm v. Georgia, decided just after the
Constitution was ratified, several of the Justices in the majority relied upon the plain language of Article
III—which extends the federal judicial power to “controversies . . . between a state and citizens of
another state”—to conclude that the new Constitution had abandoned the form of sovereign immunity
that had prevailed in Britain, thereby permitting the citizens of one state to sue another in federal court.
2 U.S. 419, 466 (1793) (Cushing, J.) (“The point turns not upon the law or practice of England,
although perhaps it may be in some measure elucidated thereby, nor upon the law of any other country
whatever; but upon the Constitution established by the people of the United States; and particularly
upon the extent of powers given to the Federal Judicial in the second section of the third article of the
Constitution.”); see also id. at 454–58 (Wilson, J.); id. at 470–77 (Jay, C.J.). Justice Iredell, by contrast,
reasoned that
it is incumbent upon us to enquire, whether previous to the adoption of the Constitution . . . an
action of the nature like this before the Court could have been maintained against one of the
States in the Union upon the principles of the common law, which I have shown to be alone
applicable. If it could, I think it is now maintainable here: If it could not, I think, as the law
stands at present, it is not maintainable . . . .
Id. at 437 (Iredell, J., dissenting). A century later, the Court in Hans v. Louisiana sided with Iredell,
accusing the Chisholm majority of being unjustifiably “swayed by a close observance of the letter of the
Constitution, without regard to former experience and usage.” 134 U.S. 1, 12 (1890); see also Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 727 (1999) (recognizing a presumption that Article III does not authorize
proceedings or suits that were “‘anomalous and unheard of when the constitution was adopted’”
(quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 18)). But cf. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 138 (1996)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Constitution did not “draw the common law in its train”).
311. Recall the grievance in the Declaration of Independence that the King “has made Judges
dependent on his Will alone, for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their
salaries.” DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (1776). To be sure, Article III’s guarantee of judicial
independence was not entirely unprecedented. In 1760, Parliament enacted a statute providing that the
judges of the British superior courts could continue in their offices “during their good behaviour,” with
previously ascertained salaries secured during the continuance of their commissions. See 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *267–68 (discussing 1 Geo. III, c. 23 (1761)). The Crown did not,
however, apply the same rules to the judges in the colonies, who served at the pleasure of the King, thus
prompting the grievance in the Declaration. See generally Joseph H. Smith, An Independent Judiciary:
The Colonial Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104 (1976). Some of the early state constitutions
established judicial tenure during “good behavior” (although most gave state legislatures considerable
authority to remove judges). See id. at 1133–35. Salary protection, however, was less common. See id.;
Martha Andes Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 138–47 (1969).
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the resort to military justice that plagued the colonists under British rule.312
Accordingly, and in contrast to Quirin, the Supreme Court has often resisted the
view that Article III and the Sixth Amendment codified the pre-existing commonlaw right to a jury trial.
For example, the Court in Williams v. Florida reasoned that although the
Framers’ intent “is often an elusive quarry, the relevant constitutional history
casts considerable doubt on the easy assumption in our past decisions that if a
given feature existed in a jury at common law in 1789, then it was necessarily
preserved in the Constitution.”313 “[T]here is absolutely no indication in ‘the
intent of the Framers,’” wrote Justice White,
of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury. Nothing in this history suggests, then, that we do violence to
the letter of the Constitution by turning to other than purely historical
considerations to determine which features of the jury system, as it existed at
common law, were preserved in the Constitution. The relevant inquiry, as we
see it, must be the function that the particular feature performs and its relation
to the purposes of the jury trial.314

Accordingly, although the pre-constitutional common law appeared to guarantee
a twelve-member jury, the Court in Williams held that “the 12-man requirement
cannot be regarded as an indispensable component of the Sixth Amendment.”315
Conversely, the Court has sometimes held that the Sixth Amendment provides greater protections than did the pre-constitutional common-law jury right.
For example, in its decision last Term in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Court
acknowledged that at the pre-1789 common law, “jurors were forbidden to
impeach their verdict,”316 but the Court refused to limit the jury-trial right to
that pre-constitutional backdrop. Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion sketched
out a post-ratification “common-law development of the no-impeachment
rule,”317 which pointed the way to the Court’s holding that “the Sixth Amendment requires that the no-impeachment rule give way in order to permit the trial
court to consider the evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial
of the jury trial guarantee.”318 The Court based this holding not on the preconstitutional practice, but instead on “a central premise of the Sixth Amendment trial right”—namely, the need to “prevent[] a systemic loss of confidence

312. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24–30 (1957) (plurality opinion) (recounting the colonial
history inspiring the right to a jury trial).
313. 399 U.S. 78, 92–93 (1970).
314. Id. at 99–100.
315. Id. at 100.
316. 137 S. Ct. 855, 863 (2017).
317. Id. at 864.
318. Id. at 869.
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in jury verdicts.”319
Thus, to the extent the Continental Congress and General Washington adopted
certain common-law trial practices during their struggle against the British,
there might be good reason to doubt that the subsequent Constitution was
necessarily designed to lock those practices into place.320
Even so, that “preservationist” theory was the basis of the Court’s holding in
Quirin. Therefore, it is certainly understandable that the government invokes
pre-constitutional precedents as support for an additional Article III exception
involving military trials of war-related offenses that are not violations of the
international law of war. The question remains, however: What exactly do those
early precedents illustrate?
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE SPYING AND AIDING-THE-ENEMY RESOLUTIONS AND
TRIALS DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Constitution is designed to
preserve, rather than to modify, the federal government’s power to “carry[] on
war as it had been carried on during the Revolution,”321 what would that entail
with respect to military trials? If, as explained above, the Revolutionary War
trials of spies do not support the Court’s holding in Quirin that military
tribunals can try offenses against the international law of war, then what does
that practice—together with the court-martial proceeding against some individuals for providing aid to the British—demonstrate about the background norms
against which the Constitution was designed?
A. HISTORICAL CONTEXT CONCERNING THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRE-1781
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS

Before examining the Revolutionary War practices in question, it is important
to describe the legal backdrop against which the Continental Congress was
acting during the relevant pre-constitutional period (roughly speaking, from
1776 to 1780).
During that period, there was no federal law right to a jury trial, and no
federal judiciary, let alone a right to criminal trial of national offenses before
judges with the protections of tenure and emoluments. The state judicial sys319. Id. The Court thus rejected Justice Thomas’s view in dissent that the jury trial right “is limited
to the protections that existed at common law when the Amendment was ratified.” Id. at 872 (Thomas,
J., dissenting). See also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 527–28 (2000) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the Court has never embraced Justice Thomas’s claim that the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments codified the pre-constitutional common law); supra notes 142–46 and accompanying text
(explaining that the modern Court insists on jury trials for minor offenses that would not have been
tried by jury before 1789).
320. Indeed, the text of the Seventh Amendment, which expressly “preserve[s]” the right to a jury
for civil “Suits at common law,” demonstrates that when the Framers wanted to have the jury right track
pre-constitutional antecedents, they knew how to say so directly. See U.S. CONST. amend VII. Notably,
there is no such language of “preserv[ation]” in Article III or the Sixth Amendment.
321. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 312 (1871).
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tems, however—in which virtually all criminal trials occurred—were beginning
to secure such protections. Although the judges in state courts typically lacked
the robust forms of independence from executive and legislative pressures that
Article III would establish for the federal judiciary, the nascent state constitutions were gradually establishing tenure for “good behavior” and other indicia
of judicial independence.322 Those new constitutions, beginning with that in
Virginia less than a week before the Declaration of Independence, also began to
guarantee the right to trial by an impartial jury of one’s peers.323
The wartime military trials at issue, however, did not occur in state courts,
and the offenses were not established by state law. As we will see, those trials
were, instead, conducted by authority of resolutions of the Second Continental
Congress, for offenses defined by that national legislature. At first blush, this
might seem odd, as there was no general, national criminal code at the Founding. How is it, then, that the Second Continental Congress had the power to
establish courts-martial and other military tribunals, let alone to define substantive criminal law offenses, violations of which could be tried in those tribunals?
After all, as Alexander Hamilton remarked in 1780, one might well have
assumed that because the pre-1781 Continental Congress “had never any definitive powers granted them,” it “of course could exercise none—could do nothing
more than recommend.”324 Indeed, for the most part, especially with respect to
the establishment of criminal law, that was precisely what happened: the Second
Continental Congress merely recommended to the states that they should enact
certain laws.325
From its inception, however, the Second Continental Congress also passed
resolutions that were treated as binding law. The source of the congressional
authority to do so has never been definitely resolved; indeed, it was somewhat
obscure even at the time. The best, and most common, understanding was that

322. See supra note 311.
323. See, e.g., VA. CONST. of 1776, § 8 (“[I]n all capital or criminal prosecutions a man hath a
right . . . to a speedy trial by an impartial jury of twelve men of his vicinage, without whose unanimous
consent he cannot be found guilty.”); see also GA. CONST. of 1777, art. XL; MD. CONST. of 1776, art.
XIX (similar to the Virginia Constitution); MASS. CONST. of 1780, art. XII (“[N]o subject shall be
arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the
protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate; but by the judgment of his peers,
or the law of the land. . . . And the legislature shall not make any law, that shall subject any person to a
capital or infamous punishment, excepting for the government of the army and navy, without trial by
jury.”); N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII (“[T]he inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain confirmed
as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XLI (similar to
the Virginia Constitution); N.C. CONST. of 1776, art IX (same); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. IX (same).
324. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 400, 401 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
325. For example, in 1781, after a congressional committee found that “the scheme of criminal
justice in the several states does not sufficiently comprehend offenses against the law of nations,” the
Congress “Resolved, That it be recommended to the legislatures of the several states to provide
expeditious, exemplary and adequate punishment for offences against the law of nations.” 21 JOURNALS
OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1789, 1136–37 (Nov. 23, 1781) (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) [hereinafter “JOURNALS”].
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when the United States became an independent nation in 1776, it automatically
became “possessed of all the . . . powers . . . by the law of nations incident to
such” independence.326 In the pre-constitutional era, the states collectively
exercised most of those powers. But as to some issues, and on some occasions,
state law was inadequate to deal with the exigencies of the new nation. In those
cases, there was little option but for the Continental Congress to step in.327
Thus, as Justice Chase wrote in 1796, “[t]he powers of Congress originated
from necessity,” and “[t]heir extent depended on the exigencies and necessities
of public affairs.”328
Most prominently, as Justice Iredell explained in Penhallow v. Doane, the
Second Continental Congress exercised the “high powers” of “external sovereignty,” including declaring and prosecuting war against other nations, and
making treaties of commerce and alliance.329 The Congress exercised other
national authorities, as well. For example, it issued currency330 and established
a postal system.331 The Second Continental Congress also authorized, and
arranged for the sustenance of, the Continental Army, appointed its officers,
including its Commander in Chief,332 and, of most relevance here, beginning
one year before independence it established a set of rules to govern the Army,
and authorized courts-martial to prosecute violations of those rules.333
When the Second Continental Congress enacted these resolutions, it was with
the express or implied consent of the states, each of which had a single vote in
the Congress.334 Indeed, the Second Continental Congress rarely acted in any
major respect without the virtually unanimous approbation of the state delega-

326. JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Bank of North America (1785), in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 66 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
327. See id. (“Whenever an object occurs, to the direction of which no particular state is competent,
the management of it must, of necessity, belong to the United States in congress assembled.”).
328. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 199, 232 (1796) (Chase, J.); see also Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. 54, 91
(1795) (Iredell, J.) (“The powers of Congress at first were indeed little more than advisory; but, in
proportion as the danger increased, their powers were gradually enlarged, either by express grant, or by
implication arising from a kind of indefinite authority, suited to the unknown exigencies that might
arise.”).
329. 3 U.S. at 91; accord Ware, 3 U.S. at 232 (Chase, J.) (“I entertain this general idea, that the
several States retained all internal sovereignty; and that Congress properly possessed the great rights of
external sovereignty: Among others, the right to make treaties of commerce and alliance; as with
France on the 6th of February 1778.”).
330. See, e.g., 2 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 105–06 (June 25, 1775); 7 JOURNALS, supra note 325,
at 373 (May 20, 1777).
331. See 2 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 208–09 (July 26, 1775).
332. See id. at 91 (June 15, 1775) (appointing George Washington).
333. See id. at 111–12 (June 30, 1775).
334. See, e.g., Ware, 3 U.S. at 232 (Chase, J.) (“I see but one safe rule, namely, that all the powers
ACTUALLY exercised by Congress, before [1781] were rightfully exercised, on the presumption not to
be controverted, that they were so authorized by the people they represented, by an express, or implied
grant . . . .”); Penhallow, 3 U.S. at 92 (Iredell, J.) (“If Congress, previous to the articles of confederation, possessed any authority, it was an authority, as I have shown, derived from the people of each
Province in the first instance.”).
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tions, which “cheerfully submitted” to the resolutions of the national body.335
Accordingly, the question of whether congressional resolutions were inconsistent with state laws—and with state constitutional guarantees, in particular—
rarely arose.336
The vast majority of the Articles of War that the Second Continental Congress enacted were regulations of the Continental armed forces. There does not
appear to have been any controversy about consigning such persons to military
tribunals for adjudications of alleged offenses in the Articles of War. In two
discrete respects, however, the Second Continental Congress established prohibitions governing persons outside the armed forces—for spying and for aiding the
enemy—and authorized military tribunals (usually courts-martial) to try such
offenses.337 As to spying, the permissibility of military proceedings was virtually never challenged, for reasons I will explain shortly. By contrast, the
justification for military trials of persons who aided the enemy—a form of
treason, in a sense—was far more uncertain, especially in light of the fact that
the citizens subject to those rules were otherwise protected by the jury-trial
rights found in the new state constitutions.338
B. THE IDIOSYNCRATIC “OFFENSE” OF SPYING WITHIN ARMY ENCAMPMENTS

The Articles of War that the Second Continental Congress enacted in 1775
did not contain a prohibition on spying.339 Just seven weeks after independence,
however, on August 21, 1776, the Congress passed the following resolution:
Resolved, That all persons, not members of, nor owing allegiance to, any of
the United States of America, . . . who shall be found lurking as spies in or
about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or
any of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by
sentence of a court-martial, or such other punishment as such court-martial
shall direct.340

335. Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 324, at 401.
336. See Mark A. Graber, State Constitutions as National Constitutions, 69 ARK. L. REV. 371, 390
(2016) (“Most state declarations of independence and instructions on independence referred to the
powers of the Continental Congress, but those references suggest ambivalence, disagreement, and a
sense that under practical pressures, political actors did not fully think through, or think at all, about the
relevant issues of sovereignty [as between the Congress and the states].”); see also id. at 408
(explaining that the “free and independent states remained subject in some undefined way to national
edicts, ‘the directions of the honourable American Congress’” (quoting PA. CONST. of 1776, Preamble)).
337. See 2 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 116 (July 2, 1775).
338. See supra note 323 (citing some such constitutional provisions).
339. See 2 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 111 (June 30, 1775). Perhaps this was because the
pre-independence Congress had no obvious source of authority to regulate and punish British agents.
340. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 693 (Aug. 21, 1776). Congress further ordered that this
resolution “be printed at the end of the rules and articles of war.” Id.
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Two aspects of this early enactment are noteworthy, for reasons that will
become clear presently. First, the 1776 spying resolve did not regulate the
conduct of citizens of the states of the new nation, or any others who owed
allegiance to those states—even though the British army surely could (and did)
employ such persons as spies.341 Second, by requiring that the person be “found
lurking” as a spy “in or about” army fortifications or encampments, the resolution reflected a peculiar limitation of international law, namely, that a belligerent
party may not try or punish an enemy spy who successfully returns to his own
nation, or army lines, after obtaining intelligence, even if it later captures
him.342 Thus, if a British spy left the vicinity of the U.S. Army lines after
successfully obtaining intelligence by deceit, returned to his own encampment,
and was later captured by the Continental Army, the spying resolve would not
authorize a court-martial for spying.
As the Supreme Court in Quirin later explained, the Continental Army used
military tribunals to try a number of enemy agents captured as spies behind
Army lines, pursuant to the 1776 spying resolve, between 1778 and 1781.343
The lesson Chief Justice Stone drew from this practice was that there must have
been an understanding, during the Revolutionary War (and thus, in Stone’s
view, when the Constitution was ratified), that the jury right did not attach to
trials for violations of the law of war.344 That conclusion was, in turn, based on
Stone’s (mistaken) assumption that spying behind enemy lines was conduct that
violated the law of war.345
Stone’s assumption that the law of war prohibited spying behind enemy lines
might have been reasonable. After all, the 1776 spying resolve itself stated that
courts-martial could sentence spies to death “according to the law and usage of
nations.”346 What that clause of the 1776 spying resolution meant, however,
was not that spying itself violated the law of war, but simply that the law of
nations did not foreclose a state from punishing spies acting on behalf of the
opposing army—that is, that international law did not privilege such conduct
against criminal sanctions, in the way that the international law of war privi-

341. For example, when a court-martial convicted Robert Land of spying in 1779, General Washington rejected the verdict because Land, an inhabitant of Pennsylvania, was “not subject to Military
jurisdiction,” as he would have been if he had been a British subject. Letter from General George
Washington to Colonel Oliver Spencer (Apr. 9, 1779), in 14 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,
1745–1799 at 357 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1936) [hereinafter WASHINGTON, WRITINGS] (letter drafted by
Alexander Hamilton, see id. at 357 n.25). Washington directed Colonel Oliver Spencer to deliver Land
“to the civil authority of [Pennsylvania] furnishing such documents of his crimes as may be in your
possession, to enable the law to operate upon.” Id. at 357–58. Land was subsequently indicted for high
treason before the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, but was released on bail in September 1779. See
John M. Coleman, The Treason of Ralph Morden and Robert Land, 79 PA. MAG. OF HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 439, 444–45 (1955).
342. See infra notes 368–69 and accompanying text.
343. See 317 U.S. 1, 42–43 n.14 (1942) (citing cases).
344. See id.
345. See supra notes 294–95, 300 and accompanying text.
346. See 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 693 (Aug. 21, 1776).
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leges, or immunizes, other belligerent activities (for example, targeting enemy
forces, or confiscating enemy property).
State practice over many centuries belies the notion that international law
prohibits spying, even in the circumstances described in the 1776 resolve.
Spying is, and has always been, an openly acknowledged, common practice of
virtually all states, often vital to military success.347 This was the understanding
of the most esteemed law-of-war jurists at the time of the Founding, such as
Grotius and Vattel,348 and it has remained the consensus view to this day.349
Indeed, just three weeks after the Second Continental Congress passed the
1776 spying resolve, General Washington commissioned Nathan Hale to cross
into British lines on Long Island in disguise to obtain information about an
impending British attack on Long Island.350 Hale successfully obtained vital
intelligence, but the British captured him in Flushing Bay on September 21,
1776, while he was trying to return to the Confederate Army, and hanged him
the next day.351 Surely Washington did not think he was violating the law of war

347. See J. M. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 205 (1911) (“[E]very nation employs spies; were a
nation so quixotic as to refrain from doing so, it might as well sheath its sword for ever.”). Spaight cited
a “Soldier’s Pocket Book” of the time, in which Colonel Worseley instructed army officials that they
should not hesitate to use spies: “As a nation we are bred up to feel it a disgrace even to succeed by
falsehood; the word spy conveys something as repulsive as slave; we will keep hammering along with
the conviction that ‘honesty is the best policy,’ and that truth always wins in the long run. These pretty
little sentences do well for a child’s copy-book, but the man who acts upon them in war had better
sheathe his sword forever.” GARNET J. WOLSELEY, THE SOLDIER’S POCKET-BOOK FOR FIELD SERVICE 81 (2d
ed. 1871).
348. See 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE, ch. IV, para. xvii, cl. 3 1295 (Liberty
Fund, Inc., 2005) (“[S]o are Spies used, yet it is held lawful, by the general Consent of Nations, to send
such, as Moses did, and such was Joshua himself . . . .”); 3 EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS ch. X,
§ 179, 582 (Liberty Fund, Inc., 2012) (“The employment of spies is a kind of clandestine practice or
deceit in war,” and a belligerent party “may unquestionably take advantage of their exertions, without
any violation of justice or honour,” if they volunteer for the function.); see also H. W. HALLECK,
INTERNATIONAL LAW; OR, RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 406 (H.H.
Bancroft & Co., 1861) (“The employment of spies is considered a kind of clandestine practise, a deceit
in war, allowable by its rules.”); id. at 407 (citing additional publicists); Henry Wager Halleck, Military
Espionage, 5 AM. J. INT’L L. 590, 593 (1911) (written sometime during the Civil War) (“The
employment of spies is no offense against the laws of war, and it gives to the enemy no cause of
complaint.”); SPAIGHT, supra note 347, at 204 (“Spying is not criminal . . . .”).
349. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 300, at 342 (“[T]he law of nations has not ventured to require of
states that they . . . refrain from the use of secret agents or that these activities upon the part of their
military forces or civilian population be punished.”); id. at 329 (noting “a virtual unanimity of opinion
that . . . spies do not violate international law”); id. at 333 (“[E]spionage is regarded as a conventional
weapon of war, being neither treacherous nor productive of unnecessary suffering . . . .”); Geoffrey B.
Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 321, 330–38 (1996); see also
U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., JOINT SERVICE PUBLICATION 383, MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT § 4.9.3
(2004) [hereinafter “UK MANUAL”] (“The obtaining of intelligence about the enemy is an important
military activity. . . . [I]t is lawful to employ spies and secret agents . . . .”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL § 4.17, at 148 (Dec. 2016 ed.) [hereinafter 2016 DOD
LOW MANUAL] (“Belligerents may employ spies and saboteurs consistent with the law of war.”); id.
§ 4.17.4, at 152–53 (same).
350. See HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 348, at 407.
351. See id.
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by sending Hale on his perilous mission—indeed, it is hard to imagine that
anyone at the time thought Washington (or Hale) had violated the law of war,
even though everyone understood the inevitable, common fate of the disguised
spy caught behind enemy lines.
What apparently confused Chief Justice Stone, when he was writing the
Court’s opinion in Quirin, is the oddity that belligerent armies have regularly
punished this familiar form of military conduct—indeed, often punished it very
harshly, with death—despite that it was sanctioned by esteemed officers the
world over, including Washington. That practice, however, does not mean (and
did not mean during the Revolutionary War) that such spying violated the law
of war. Spies such as Hale, and Major John André of the British army, who
suffered the same fate at the hand of Washington’s army,352 are not condemned
by history as war criminals—they are, instead, lauded as brave, patriotic heroes.
As Oppenheim summarized the well-established rule of international law: “War
cannot be waged without all kinds of information about the forces and the
intentions of the enemy . . . . To obtain the necessary information, it has always
been considered lawful to employ spies . . . .”353
War espionage is thus something of an anomalous, almost inexplicable, case
under international law. As a general matter, the law of armed conflict either
condemns, and outlaws, a particular form of state belligerent conduct (for
example, targeting civilians, or torturing prisoners), or affirmatively privileges
it, in the sense that the affected state may not prosecute another state’s soldiers
for engaging in the conduct (for example, targeting enemy forces or confiscating certain enemy property).354 Spying, however, falls in a rare legal gap: In
certain circumstances, international law neither prohibits nor privileges espionage, so that although the conduct does not violate international law, the injured
state may prosecute the spy under its own domestic law.355
For instance, if the spy is a civilian—not a part of state enemy forces to begin
with—then he is not entitled to the combatant’s privilege, and thus may be
prosecuted under domestic law. Moreover, even when the individual is part of

352. See infra notes 480–81 and accompanying text.
353. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE 422 (H. Lauerpacht, ed., 8th ed. 1952).
354. See Lieber Code, supra note 11, art. 57 (“So soon as a man is armed by a sovereign government
and takes the soldier’s oath of fidelity he is a belligerent; his killing, wounding, or other warlike acts are
not individual crimes or offenses.”); Ohlin, supra note 11, at 342–43; see also Letter from Daniel
Webster, Department of State, to John G. Crittenden, Attorney General (Mar. 15, 1841), reprinted in
THE DIPLOMATIC AND OFFICIAL PAPERS OF DANIEL WEBSTER, WHILE SECRETARY OF STATE 134–35 (1848)
(“An individual forming part of a public force, and acting under the authority of his Government, is not
to be held answerable, as a private trespasser or malefactor, is a principle of public law sanctioned by
the usages of all civilized nations.”).
355. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 353, at 422 (“Although a belligerent acts lawfully in employing
spies and traitors, the other belligerent, who punishes them, likewise acts lawfully.”). Spying is not the
only tool of warfare that falls in this gap. For example, international law also permits a state to use
civilian personnel to engage in belligerent activities, but those persons, unlike their counterparts in the
armed forces, are potentially subject to being tried under the domestic law of the opposing state if they
are caught. See Ohlin, supra note 11, at 373.
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enemy armed forces, and thus is ordinarily immune from prosecution for his
belligerent activities against enemy forces, he loses his immunity by engaging
in espionage under discrete circumstances. In particular, international law does
not prohibit a state from punishing a person for wartime spying if: (i) acting
clandestinely, or in disguise, and (ii) “in the zone of operations of a belligerent,”
(iii) he obtains or endeavors to obtain information with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party, and (iv) is captured before he has rejoined the
armed forces to which he belongs.356
The 1776 resolve of the Continental Congress reflected this international law
category of non-privileged espionage—espionage that is not unlawful under the
international law of war, but that was (and is) regularly punished by belligerent
states pursuant to their domestic law when undertaken in the service of the enemy, as it was by both the British and Confederate armies. Although such
spying did not (and to this day does not) violate international law, the opposing
army’s execution of spies captured under the circumstances described above
was—in the words of the board of inquiry that advised General Washington in
the famous case of Major John André—“agreeable to the law and usage of nations.”357
Chief Justice Stone, writing in Quirin, thus was beset by the common and
“fundamental confusion between acts punishable under international law and
acts with respect to which international law affords no protection.”358 If the
Quirin Court was wrong about the characteristic that distinguished the spying
prosecutions in the Revolutionary War, however, it begs the question that Stone
set out to answer: What (if anything) does the 1776 spying resolution, and
Washington’s subsequent practice of trying spies in military tribunals, tell us
about the Founding era’s understanding of the circumstances in which the right
to jury was inapposite?
The likely answer is that such a practice respecting spies tells us virtually
nothing, other than perhaps that such spying was not considered blameworthy at
all, and that such “trials” therefore were not designed to adjudicate moral
culpability for a “crime.”
It probably did not occur to anyone during the Revolutionary War that enemy
spies were entitled to a jury trial—in any event, I have not come across any
such claim. It is uncertain, however, exactly why that was the case. Several
characteristics of the spying “offense” and its common treatment in war, in
some combination, likely foreclosed any objection.

356. See Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land Annex arts. 29, 31,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter “Hague Annex”]; see also Protocols Additional
to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 art. 46(1), (4), Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter “Geneva API”]; UK MANUAL, supra note 349, §§ 4.9, 4.9.1; 2016 DOD LOW MANUAL,
supra note 349, §§ 4.17, 4.17.2.1, 4.17.5.1, at 149, 150, 154–55.
357. PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS HELD BY ORDER OF HIS EXCELLENCY GEN.
WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPECTING MAJOR
JOHN ANDRÉ, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE BRITISH ARMY 13 (Francis Baily, 1780).
358. Baxter, supra note 300, at 340.
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For starters, the state court systems in which the jury right was guaranteed
were not available to try such offenses committed by British nationals. If a
captured spy was a citizen of one of the new states, that state’s judiciary could
prosecute that individual for treasonous conduct.359 But state laws did not
address the conduct of British forces or agents. Nor was any federal trial court
available, either: The Second Continental Congress likely did not have the
authority to establish such a tribunal, let alone to prescribe a system of jury
trials within it.360 Therefore, as a practical matter, trial of British spies had to be
convened in a military court or not at all.
Second, and relatedly, there was a widespread assumption at the time that
such enemy aliens, without any allegiance to the states, were not entitled to the
protections of the laws of those states at all.361 If that was so, then of course it
would not have occurred to many people that enemy aliens might be entitled to
a civilian jury trial.362
Third, another common view at the time was that municipal laws, including
constitutional protections, generally did not apply to the commander of an army
when exercising certain belligerent rights against enemy forces during war.363
Fourth, and most importantly, notwithstanding that the 1776 spying resolve
referred to “sentences” for and “punishments” of captured spies, it is probably
more accurate to view the courts-martial proceedings against spies during this
era not so much as criminal proceedings designed to punish individuals for
359. See supra note 341 (discussing case of Robert Land); infra notes 388–89 (discussing state
treason statutes).
360. Concededly, although this helps to explain why the Second Continental Congress decided to
prescribe courts-martials for spies, it does not necessarily offer a sufficient explanation for why the
Congress did not think a jury trial was required. The Congress could, for example, have recommended
that the states establish laws against spying, just as it encouraged the states to enact treason laws. See
infra note 387 and accompanying text. That it did not do so is likely attributable to the further
considerations discussed below.
361. As I explain supra Section II.B.3.b, such a categorical view is no longer widely accepted.
362. Even if this was the common view, it would not be a complete answer to the spying riddle,
because on at least one occasion the Second Continental Congress authorized a court-martial to try
citizens of the States as spies. In 1781, two inhabitants of the states, Lawrence Marr, Jr. and John
Moody conspired to steal the secret journals of the Continental Congress and convey such valuable
information to the British. Their ostensible co-conspirator was a man named Thomas Addison, a clerk
formerly employed by the Congress’s Secretary, Charles Thompson. It appears that Addison, however,
had arranged to entrap Marr and Moody in Philadelphia, where they were arrested. See JAMES MOODY,
NARRATIVE OF THE EXERTIONS AND SUFFERINGS OF LIEUT. JAMES MOODY, IN CAUSE OF GOVERNMENT SINCE THE
YEAR 1776, at 46–55 (1865). The Congress’s Board of War reported to Congress that there did not
appear to be any military authority to try the two citizen spies. See 21 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at
1109 (Nov. 7, 1781). The Congress thus proceeded to resolve that General Courts Martial could try and,
with Washington’s approval, sentence such spies who were “apprehended in the place where Congress
shall sit,” without regard to their citizenship. Id. A board of officers, with the Marquis de Lafayette
presiding, concluded that Marr and Moody were guilty, and the Board of War approved the judgment.
Moody was hanged on November 13. Marr was “respited” and became a military prisoner. See
CONTINENTAL J. & WKLY. ADVERTISER, Nov. 29, 1781, at 3 (report from Fish-Kill, N.Y., of Nov. 22, 1781).
Marr and Moody might have been the only citizens of the United States tried as spies during the war.
363. See supra Section II.B.3.c (discussing this common, pre-Twentieth Century view, and why it
does not resolve the Article III question).
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wrongdoing, but instead as preventive measures, established to ensure that the
enemy did not obtain the military intelligence that the spy was endeavoring to
steal. Such an understanding would explain why the general historical practice,
before 1776, allowed for the execution of spies without any trial at all, as
reflected in the contemporaneous case of Nathan Hale.364 Neither domestic nor
international law condemned that practice of summary justice.365
Viewing the execution of spies as preventive rather than punitive is also the
best explanation for the otherwise unexplained condition, well-established in
international law, that if a spy from another belligerent’s forces successfully
returns to his own camp, the state from which he obtained intelligence can no
longer subject him to trial or penalty, despite that the state has suffered actual
harm because the enemy has obtained the intelligence. If the affected state later
captures the spy, he must be “treated as a prisoner of war, and incurs no
responsibility for his previous acts of espionage.”366 The spy can only be
prosecuted, in other words, if he is captured in flagrante delicto.367 This would
be almost inexplicable if the prosecution of spies were understood as a punitive
measure in response to blameworthy conduct—as if the spy’s culpability disappeared to the extent he was successful in harming the targeted state.
This odd limitation, which is not found elsewhere in the law of war, suggests
that the principal justification for allowing states to summarily execute spies is

364. See supra notes 350–51 and accompanying text.
365. Thus, by prescribing the trial of spies by court-martial, the 1776 spying resolution actually
represented a striking advance in the humanitarian protections afforded spies caught behind enemy
lines, giving them certain procedural rights where they previously had none. International law no longer
allows summary execution: Article 30 of the Hague Annex established that “[a] spy taken in the act
cannot be punished without previous trial.” Hague Annex, supra note 356, art. 30; accord Geneva API,
supra note 356, art. 75 (establishing fundamental trial guarantees); UK MANUAL, supra note 349, § 4.9;
2016 DOD LOW MANUAL, supra note 349, § 4.19.4, at 162.
366. Hague Annex, supra note 356, art. 31; accord Geneva API, supra note 356, art. 46(4) (“A
member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who is not a resident of territory occupied by an
adverse Party and who has engaged in espionage in that territory shall not lose his right to the status of
prisoner of war and may not be treated as a spy unless he is captured before he has rejoined the armed
forces to which he belongs.” (emphasis added)); see also Lieber Code, supra note 11, art. 104
(explaining that “[a] successful spy or war-traitor, safely returned to his own army, and afterward
captured as an enemy, is not subject to punishment for his acts as a spy or war-traitor”); In re Martin, 45
Barb. 142, 148 (N.Y. 1865) (directing release of alleged spy who had “returned within the lines of the
confederate forces, or had otherwise escaped,” because “no case in modern history or in reports of cases
decided in the courts, where any person has been held or tried as a spy who was not taken before he had
returned from the territory held by his enemy”); Halleck, Military Espionage, supra note 348, at
593–94 (recounting the case of Spencer Kellogg, a member of the Union Navy who had spied within
rebel lines by pretending to be a Union deserter, and who the Confederate Army later captured after he
had returned to Union lines: “Our government demanded that he should receive the treatment of
prisoner of war, as he could not be punished as a spy.”); W.D. Porter, Letter to the Editor, The Execution
of Spencer Kellogg, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1863 (“The execution is an outrage on the usages of war”
because Kellogg “was not captured in the capacity of a spy . . . .”).
367. See, e.g., In re Rieger, Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] crim., May
5, 1948, Bull. Crim., No. 158 (Fr.) (holding German officer who had traveled in France in civilian
disguise to obtain intelligence during Second World War, and who was transferred to the German army
in Denmark in 1944, could not be tried after his capture in 1946).
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not that they are blameworthy and thus deserving of punishment, or because
international law condemns such surreptitious conduct (it doesn’t), but instead
simply to empower states to prevent such persons from conveying secret,
valuable information to their principals: In the event of a prosecution and
sentence, “all possibility of the spy’s information reaching the enemy is destroyed.”368 Accordingly, spying behind enemy lines is the rare situation in
which international law permits an army to kill a captured enemy to incapacitate
him, without formal legal proceedings, just as enemy forces can be targeted in
the field.369 It is, in other words, a discrete exception to the general rule (which
only became clearly established later in the development of the law of war) that
persons hors de combat, including prisoners, may not be harmed because they
are already incapacitated and therefore do not present a threat to the opposing
state.370

368. Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 356, 363 (1918).
369. See Edmund M. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Non-Military Persons Under the
Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 113 (1920) (quoting from an unpublished memorandum of Colonel
Eugene Wambaugh, Chief of the Judge Advocate General’s Division of Constitutional and International
Law during the First World War: “[T]hough through a military tribunal a spy can be sentenced to death,
the sentence is really not punitive but is simply part of a system meant to protect the troops against
danger. Just as a sharpshooter outside the lines is to be shot, though certainly he is no criminal, so the
spy within the lines is to be shot as merely a matter of protection . . . . Neither the sharpshooter nor
the spy is a criminal. Each of them is killed.”). As I explain below, although Wambaugh’s insight that
the trial of spies is not “punitive” was likely correct, his analogy of the spy to the sharpshooter,
although superficially attractive, does not hold up. Unlike the spy, if the sharpshooter is captured he
cannot be executed or otherwise punished, but can only be detained, which is also an effective means of
“protect[ing] the troops against danger.” See infra note 370.
370. See, e.g., Lieber Code, supra note 11, art. 56 (“A prisoner of war is subject to no punishment
for being a public enemy, nor is any revenge wreaked upon him by the intentional infliction of any
suffering, or disgrace, by cruel imprisonment, want of food, by mutilation, death, or any other
barbarity.”); id. art. 71 (“Whoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already wholly
disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages soldiers to do so, shall suffer death, if
duly convicted . . . .”).
This understanding of the rationale for executing spies does, however, raise yet another unresolved
puzzle about the logic of the law of war’s treatment of spying: If the purpose of the domestic law
against spying is to prevent information from being shared with the enemy, why does international law
permit a state to sanction or “punish” the spy—even to execute him—rather than simply permitting the
state to detain him, given that international law recognizes the legitimacy of the spying activity? Vattel
thought that spies must be condemned to die “since we have scarcely any other means of guarding
against the mischief they may do us.” VATTEL, supra note 348, § 179, at 582. That is obviously
mistaken, however: There is another means of preventing the information from getting through to the
enemy, namely, by detaining the spy as one detains other prisoners of war. Indeed, that is exactly how
the law treated—and continues to treat—an enemy agent captured in uniform while trying to obtain
intelligence behind military lines, if that agent, although concealed, did not employ any false pretenses
in order to obtain the intelligence. In such a case, international law would prohibit a trial or
execution—which likely explains why the 1776 spying resolve did not authorize a court-martial in that
situation. Such uniformed personnel could be detained, but not executed, even though they were
attempting to secure the same intelligence. See, e.g., Hague Annex, supra note 356, art. 29 (“[S]oldiers
not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army, for the
purpose of obtaining information, are not considered spies.”); Geneva API, supra note 356, art. 46(2)
(“A member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict who, on behalf of that Party and in territory
controlled by an adverse Party, gathers or attempts to gather information shall not be considered as
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If this is, indeed, a more accurate characterization of the “offense” of spying
behind enemy lines, and the courts-martial proceedings against spies thus were
not fundamentally punitive at all—and thus not akin to a typical criminal trial
for ordinary domestic-law offenses—that, too, could explain why the issue of
the right to trial by jury escaped attention during the Revolutionary War. Spying
in war, in other words—unlike, say, torture or targeting civilians—was not
blameworthy and thus was not treated as a crime, even though the spy might be
executed in some cases.
This understanding of the function of executing spies also suggests two other
reasons why the Founding generation might never have entertained the notion
of civilian jury trials of enemy war spies. First, in most of the wars familiar to
those in the mid-Eighteenth Century, if an army captured a spy within its
encampment, it would likely be impractical and onerous for that army to
transport the individual to be tried by civilian authorities, back home in a land
far from the army lines.371 Noteworthy, in this respect, is the Supreme Court’s
recognition that “[f]rom a time prior to the adoption of the Constitution the
extraordinary circumstances present in an area of actual fighting have been
considered sufficient to permit punishment of some civilians in that area by
military courts under military rules.”372
Second, such a wartime trial of a spy before a civilian jury could result in the
public revelation of the very intelligence that the defendant received or was
attempting to obtain, thereby undermining the law’s preventive rationale. That
engaging in espionage if, while so acting, he is in the uniform of his armed forces.”); OPPENHEIM, supra
note 353, § 160, at 423; Halleck, Military Espionage, supra note 348, at 591 (“[A]n enemy who comes
within our lines, without disguise or false pretenses, and seeks information, no matter how secretly, is
no spy. If captured he must be treated as a prisoner of war; he may be confined with rigor, as a
dangerous person, and his exchange refused; but he cannot be hung as a spy.”). Yet if the same agent is
captured out of uniform, international law would permit his punishment (and, at one time, his
execution).
There is no well-accepted explanation for this paradox in the law of spying. One possibility is that
although international law recognizes the legitimacy of spying, it also wishes to discourage states from
engaging in such conduct in a manner that will result in extensive losses of valuable intelligence. If so,
perhaps it is fair to see the curious distinctions in the law of spying—in particular, the prospect of
execution or other criminal penalty under domestic law, rather than simply detention—as designed to
encourage the use of uniformed agents, who are easier to detect and capture before they share
intelligence with the opposing party. Another possibility is that belligerent parties felt it was too risky to
detain captured spies, because those spies might share the intelligence they obtained with fellow
captives, who might then convey that information to the enemy army when they were released (such as
in a prisoner exchange).
371. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778–79 (1950) (“To grant the writ to these prisoners
might mean that our army must transport them across the seas for hearing. This would require
allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. . . . It would be difficult to
devise more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to
reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention
from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39
(1942) (noting that military tribunals have “usually [been] called upon to function under conditions
precluding resort to . . . procedures” such as trial by a jury of the vicinage where the crime was
committed).
372. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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presumably would not be as acute a concern in a military proceeding, in which
there are no civilian jurors and less of a risk of revelation.
In sum, it is likely that the Second Continental Congress prescribed courtsmartials for the trials of wartime spies not because spying violated the international law of war (as the Court wrongly assumed in Quirin),373 or, more
broadly, because spying was a war-related domestic-law offense (as Judge
Kavanaugh suggested in al Bahlul).374 Rather, the 1776 resolution authorized
the trial of spies by courts-marital, rather than in jury trials, due to a combination of disparate factors, the most important of which is that spies did not act
wrongfully—and therefore their trial and sentence were not a form of punishment. Understood as such, the court-martialing of such spies during the Revolutionary War does not, or should not, serve as a precedent for the military trial of
other domestic-law offenses.
C. AIDING THE ENEMY—THE “QUASI-TREASON” RESOLVES

A second set of resolutions that the Second Continental Congress enacted,
also authorizing courts-martial for the adjudication of domestic-law offenses,
raises a very different set of questions. On at least two occasions between 1776
and 1778, the Congress authorized the Army to use courts-martial to try
ordinary civilian citizens—persons who were not part of the armed forces on
either side of the conflict—for providing certain types of assistance to the
British enemy.375 These were, in effect, what we might call “quasi-treason”
laws. General Washington and the Continental Army invoked these resolutions
much less frequently than they used the 1776 spying resolve; on rare occasions,
however, they used the quasi-treason resolves as the basis for court-martial
trials of civilians, including one case in which a civilian, entitled to the
jury-right protections of the New York Constitution, was tried by court-martial
even though an ordinary state court was available to try him.376
At the nation’s birth, it was not common to find such general, treason-like
offenses enumerated within “articles of war,” which were dedicated exclusively
to the regulation of the conduct of the armed forces—the typical and uncontroversial subjects of court-martial proceedings.377 The Massachusetts Articles of War,
for example—which the Provisional Congress of Massachusetts Bay adopted in
April 1775—included three provisions authorizing general courts-martial to
punish persons “belonging to the Massachusetts Army” for providing certain
forms of aid to the enemy,378 yet those Articles did not include any analogous

373. See supra notes 294–95, 300 and accompanying text.
374. See al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (opinion of Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
375. See infra Sections IV.C.3, IV.C.4.
376. See infra Section IV.C.5.
377. See supra Section II.A.2.a (discussing the long-established Article III exception for trials of
service members).
378. MASSACHUSETTS ARTICLES OF WAR (1775), arts. 25–27, reprinted in WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note
120, at 950.
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provisions regulating persons who were not part of the state army. Similarly,
Article XXVIII of the first Articles of War promulgated by the Continental
Congress, on June 30, 1775, provided that “[w]hosoever belonging to the
continental army, shall be convicted of holding correspondence with, or of
giving intelligence to, the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer such
punishment as by a general court-martial shall be ordered.”379
These provisions effectively dealt with the most troubling cases of betrayal:
those involving members of the Continental Army itself. They hardly resolved
the entire problem, however, because there were many Tory sympathizers
among the colonial population at large, and many such civilian persons endeavored to aid the British cause—providing what we might today call “material
support” to the enemy. Of particular notoriety was the Mayor of New York,

379. 2 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 116 (June 30, 1775). In November of 1775, the Continental
Congress enacted an amendment to those Articles, providing that such persons could be sentenced to
death: “All persons convicted of holding a treacherous correspondence with, or giving intelligence to
the enemy, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as a general court-martial shall think proper.” 3
JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 331 (Nov. 7, 1775). Some later observers suggested that the use of the
term “all persons” reflected a congressional intent to extend the war-treason prohibition in the 1775
Articles to persons outside the Army. See, e.g., WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 102. There is no
evidence, however, that the November 1775 amendment was ever applied to persons outside the
military; and, as I explain in the text, just a few months later the Congress plainly acted upon the
understanding that it had not yet dealt with the problem of assistance to the British from nonmilitary
personnel. It would also be surprising if the pre-independence Congress believed it had the authority to
impose criminal regulations on the conduct of private residents of the colonies.
The better view of the November 1775 amendment is simply that it authorized the penalty of death
for those members of the Continental Army in cases where they violated the existing Article XXVIII.
Without such an amendment, Article LI prohibited a court-martial from imposing the death sentence
upon traitorous Army officers. This legal gap had created some consternation in the case of Dr.
Benjamin Church, the director general of the Army hospital at Cambridge, who had been discovered in
correspondence with the enemy. At a October 1775 conference between a Committee of Congress,
General Washington, and Representatives of the New England Colonies—a meeting that was convened
to discuss, inter alia, needed changes in the Articles of War—the conferees noted that the existing
“Articles for the Government of the Army point[ed] out a very inadequate Punishment” for Church.
Minutes of Oct. 22, 1775, THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN A COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS, WASHINGTON, AND
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES, 18–24 OCTOBER 1775, National Archives, FOUNDERS
ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-22-02-0142 [https://perma.cc/5YX7-CM
TX]; see also Minutes of Oct. 4, 1775, Council of War, National Archives, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-02-02-0083 [https://perma.cc/W8HU-YDD3]
(“After examining the Regulations of the Continental Army & particularly the Articles 28 & 51 . . . [i]t
was determined” that a “very inadequate Punishment” was available for “the Enormity of [Church’s]
Crime.”). Washington had himself reached the same conclusion earlier that month, and had recommended that Congress amend Article XVIII to permit a more serious sentence. Letter from General
George Washington to John Hancock, the President of Congress (Oct. 5, 1775), in 4 WASHINGTON,
WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 9, 11 (“suggesting to [Congress’s] Consideration, whether an Alteration of
the 28th Article of War may not be necessary” in light of the Church case). The October 1775 conferees
accordingly proposed the amendment to the Articles authorizing a court-martial to impose the penalty
of death in such a case. Minutes of Oct. 22, 1775, THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN A COMMITTEE OF CONGRESS,
WASHINGTON, AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEW ENGLAND COLONIES, supra. Just over two weeks later, in
November 1775, the Congress enacted that de facto amendment, designed not to create a new offense
or to extend that offense to a new set of potential offenders, but merely to increase the possible
sentences available for violations of Article XVIII.
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David Matthews, who was alleged to have been a key player in a seditious
mutiny plot. The New York civil authorities did not then have the power to deal
with such cases.380 At this time, however, it was far from clear that the
Continental Congress could do anything about this problem, either, because
such civilians were, after all, British subjects, and the question of whether they
owed fealty to the revolutionary cause, and thus could be punished for betraying
the new authority, was very much still open.
Accordingly, on June 5, 1776, the Continental Congress appointed an esteemed five-person committee—consisting of John Adams, Thomas Jefferson,
Edward Rutledge, James Wilson, and Robert Livingston—“to consider what is
proper to be done with persons giving intelligence to the enemy, or supplying
them with provisions.”381
1. The June 1776 Loyalty Resolve and Recommendation
On Monday, June 17, 1776, the five-man committee submitted its initial
report to the Congress.382 One week later, the Congress, having considered the
committee’s report, declared that “all persons abiding within any of the United
Colonies, and deriving protection from the laws of the same, owe allegiance to
the said laws, and are members of such colony; and that all persons passing
through, visiting, or make a temporary stay in any of the said colonies, being
entitled to the protection of the laws during the time of such passage, visitation
or temporary stay, owe, during the same time, allegiance thereto.”383 The
Congress also declared that if and when any such persons “owing allegiance to
any of the United Colonies” were to “levy war against any of the said colonies . . . or be adherent to the king of Great Britain,” or give “aid and comfort”
to the King, such persons would be “guilty of treason against such colony.”384
John Adams noted the significance of this resolve: It was perhaps the first “clear
attribution of all the rights of absolute sovereignty which had belonged only to
George the Third, to the new and self-constituted authority of the American
people.”385 It effectively eliminated the notion of neutrality for those residing in
the colonies and “subjected their action to rigid supervision” by the new
authority.386 It was, in other words, an effective declaration of independence,
promulgated two-and-a-half weeks before July 4, 1776.
Notably, however, the Continental Congress did not itself establish an offense
of treason, nor a means of prosecuting it—let alone prescribe military adjudica-

380. See Curtis P. Nettels, A Link in the Chain of Events Leading to American Independence, 3 WM.
& MARY Q. 36, 40–43 (1946).
381. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 417 (June 5, 1776).
382. Id. at 458 (June 17, 1776). Unfortunately, it appears that no copy of this report of the
“Committee on Spies” has been preserved.
383. Id. at 475 (June 24, 1776).
384. Id.
385. 1 JOHN ADAMS, WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 225 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1856).
386. Id.
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tion without juries. Instead, the most it could do was “recommend[] to the
legislatures of the several United Colonies, to pass laws for punishing, in such
manner as to them shall seem fit, such persons before described, as shall be
proveably attainted of open deed, by people of their condition, of any of the
treasons before described.”387 Over the course of the next few months the vast
majority of the new states did just that: They enacted treason statutes, as the
Congress had recommended.388
2. The September 1776 Articles of War
On June 14, 1776, Congress resolved that the five-person committee consisting of Adams, Jefferson, Livingston, Rutledge, and Wilson—which it now
denominated the “Committee on Spies”—“be directed to revise the rules and
articles of war, and to make such additions and alterations as they may judge
proper, and lay the same before Congress for their consideration.”389 On August
7, 1776, the Committee submitted its report,390 in the form of a draft of the new
articles.391 Eleven weeks after the Declaration of Independence, on September
20, 1776, Congress approved the new nation’s first Articles of War, largely
tracking the Committee’s draft.392
As with the 1775 Articles, the new Articles were designed, at least primarily,
to govern the military establishment. Two of the articles, however, both prohibiting aid to the enemy, were susceptible to a broader reading. Section XIII,
Article 18 provided that “[w]hosoever shall relieve the enemy with money,
victuals, or ammunition, or shall knowingly harbour or protect an enemy, shall
suffer death, or such other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted.”393 Article 19, in turn, provided that “[w]hosoever shall be convicted
of holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to the enemy, either
directly or indirectly, shall suffer death, or such punishment as by a general
court-martial shall be inflicted.”394

387. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 475. See BRADLEY CHAPIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF TREASON:
REVOLUTIONARY AND EARLY NATIONAL ORIGINS 36 (1964) (“Though these resolves could not establish a
basis for the trial of [Loyalist New York City Mayor David Mathews], they did put the moral force of
the Union behind whatever action New York chose to take against him. The state officials first had
hoped that Washington would try the mayor, but since the resolves did not authorize the military trial of
civilians, he took no action.”).
388. See Willard Hurst, Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226, 248–49 n.35 (1944)
(collecting state treason enactments).
389. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 442 (June 14, 1776).
390. Id. at 636 (Aug. 7, 1776).
391. See id. at 807 n.2 (Sept. 20, 1776); PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, No. 27, folio 5, et
seq., https://www.fold3.com/image/246/357686 [https://perma.cc/DT39-THGF].
392. 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 788.
393. Id. at 799.
394. Id. These two articles were copied verbatim from the draft that the Committee on Spies had
submitted. See Report of the Committee on Spies at 20–21, PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, No.
27, folios 28–29, https://www.fold3.com/image/246/357706 [https://perma.cc/NG5V-28RA], https://www.
fold3.com/image/246/357707 [https://perma.cc/QW37-K7L3].
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Because each of these two articles used the unqualified term “whosoever”—
in contrast to narrower terms used in other articles, such as “whatsoever officer
or soldier,”395 or “whosoever, belonging to the forces of the United States,”396
and in contrast with Article XXVIII of the 1775 Articles, which had prohibited
correspondence with the enemy by “[w]hosoever belonging to the continental
army”397—some writers and military prosecutors would later argue that these
two articles in Section XIII applied to all persons, or at least to all citizens of
the United States and others owing allegiance to the nation. This more capacious reading of the September 1776 Articles appeared, for instance, in William
Winthrop’s influential treatise on military law, first published late in the Nineteenth Century.398 Winthrop wrote that “[i]t is a reasonable argument that, in
abandoning the words of limitation first employed [i.e., in the 1775 Articles], it
was intended by Congress that these statutes should not be restricted in their
application to members of the army.”399
Although that might have been a “reasonable” reading, it was not the only
one available. Alternatively, the Continental Congress might have employed the
unqualified term “whosoever” to indicate that Articles 18 and 19 encompassed
not only officers and soldiers in the Army, but also nonmilitary personnel
accompanying the Army, such as commissaries, “suttlers,” and “retainers”—that
is, contractors who were also regulated by earlier-listed Articles.400 Those latter
categories of individuals were not encompassed by the language of the 1775
Articles (“whosoever belonging to the continental army”),401 and therefore the
decision to disdain the qualifying language might have been a deliberate effort
to close that gap—without any intent to reach the civilian population at large. At
least three factors support this latter, narrower reading.
First, the 1776 Articles were adopted directly from the 1774 British Articles
of War that were in place during the Revolutionary War;402 and the language of
395. See, e.g., Sec. XIII, art. 12, 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 798 (emphasis added).
396. See Sec. XIII, art. 17, id. at 799 (emphasis added).
397. See supra note 379 and accompanying text.
398. 1 WILLIAM WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW 123–26 (1886); see also WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120,
at 102–04.
399. 1 WINTHROP, supra note 398, at 124; see also, e.g., Morgan, supra note 369, at 99 (“The
inference is irresistible that Congress used this unrestricted language, ‘whosoever,’ advisedly, and
therefore made manifest its intent to have it apply to civilians.”); infra note 590 and accompanying text
(discussing 1863 argument of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt).
400. See, e.g., Sec. IV, art. 6, 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 792 (commissaries); Sec. VIII, art. 1, id.
at 794 (suttlers); Sec. XII, art. 1, id. at 796 (commissaries and store-keepers).
401. See supra note 379.
402. John Adams, chairman of the congressional committee tasked to develop the new articles, wrote:
There was extant one system of articles of war which had carried two empires to the head of
mankind, the Roman and the British; for the British articles of war were only a literal
translation of the Roman. It would be in vain for us to seek in our own inventions, or the
records of warlike nations, for a more complete system of military discipline. It was an
observation founded in undoubted facts, that the prosperity of nations had been in proportion
to the discipline of their forces by sea and land; I was therefore, for reporting the British articles of war, totidem verbis. Jefferson, in those days, never failed to agree with me, in
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Articles 18 and 19, in particular, was adopted verbatim (but for changes in
punctuation and capitalization) from Articles 18 and 19 of Section XIV of the
British Articles.403 It is noteworthy that, according to the canonical authority on
the British articles, the word “whosoever” in these two articles “includes all
who are amenable to the Arts. of War and to mil. orders and regs”—not anyone
and everyone.404
Second, there is no record evidence, apart from the absence of qualifying
words in the text (for example, “belonging to the continental army”), that the
Congress actually intended to take the extraordinary, anomalous step of applying the Articles of War to cover treasonous activities of civilians unconnected to
the armed forces. Nor does it appear that General Washington ever used Articles
18 and 19 to subject ordinary civilians to court-martial proceedings.405 To the
contrary, there is some evidence that it did not occur to Washington that those
articles applied to cases of aid from Tory sympathizers: In July 1777, Washington wrote to a congressional committee that had been established “to make a
diligent enquiry into the state of the army.”406 In that letter, Washington noted
that “[a] doubt has arisen” whether the August 1776 spying resolution407 could
be used to authorize the court-martial of an individual owing allegiance to the
United States who provided cattle to the enemy, recruited for the British, and

everything of a political nature, and he very cordially concurred in this. The British articles of war were, accordingly reported, and defended in Congress by me assisted by
some others, and finally carried.
3 JOHN ADAMS, WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 68–69 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1856).
403. See GEORGE B. DAVIS, A TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TOGETHER WITH
THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF COURTS-MARTIAL AND OTHER MILITARY TRIBUNALS 581, 593 (1st ed.
1898). The language in the 1774 Articles was the same as in the 1765 British Articles, see WINTHROP 2d
ed., supra note 120, at 931, 940, which, in turn, derived from Article VIII of the 1688 Articles of War of
James II, see id. at 920, 921; see also CODE OF ARTICLES OF KING GUSTAVUS ADOLPHUS OF SWEDEN:
ARTICLES AND MILITARY LAWS TO BE OBSERVED IN THE WARRES arts. 70, 71, 76, 77 (1621), reprinted as
translated in WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 903, 911 (prescribing the penalty of death for
“[w]hoever” or “[w]hosoever” provided certain forms of aid to the enemy, without specifying the
adjudicating court).
404. WILLIAM HOUGH, THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL, ALSO THE LEGAL EXPOSITION AND MILITARY
EXPLANATION OF THE MUNITY ACT, AND ARTICLES OF WAR 326 (2d ed. 1825).
405. Winthrop would later assert that Washington’s army convened one such court-martial proceeding. In May 1777, General Philip Schuyler reported to Congress that a court-martial had convicted one
John Brown, alias John Lee, of violating Article 19 by, inter alia, “holding a traiterous correspondence
with the enemy, in offering himself as a pilot to General Howe, to conduct the British army from
Brunswick to Philadelphia; and also in promising to discover to the enemy to what place the continental
stores, from Philadelphia, were removed.” 7 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 374 (May 21, 1777).
Winthrop viewed this as a “contemporaneous construction” of Article 19 to apply to civilians.
WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 102; accord Morgan, supra note 369, at 101. Perhaps. Winthrop
offered no evidence, however, that Brown was a civilian. The description of the court-martial in the
Journals of the Continental Congress does not indicate that Brown was a civilian, nor is there any
indication that Brown objected to the denial of a jury trial, something a civilian presumably would have
done. The Brown case, therefore, is an equivocal precedent, at best, as we do not know whether Brown
was in or affiliated with the military.
406. 8 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 546 (July 11, 1777).
407. See supra Section IV.B.
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was appointed as an officer in the enemy army.408 If there had been even an
inkling in Washington’s mind that Articles 18 and 19 of the September 1776
Articles of War might reach such civilian-provided, disloyal aid, surely he
would not have bothered to stretch to imagine how the spying provision might
be awkwardly construed to apply to such a case.
Finally, and perhaps most revealingly, as explained below, the actions of the
Continental Congress itself over the next eighteen months belied the notion that
Articles 18 and 19 already regulated efforts by Tory sympathizers outside the
military to provide aid to the British.
3. The October and December 1777 Resolutions for the Vicinity of
Philadelphia
Following the British victory at the Battle of Brandywine on September 11,
1777, the American Army was forced to retreat toward the capital, Philadelphia,
which thus became vulnerable to British attack. The British captured the city on
September 26 and occupied it for the next nine months, until France’s entry into
the war required the British to repair to defend Manhattan in June 1778.409
Naturally, in this state of affairs beginning in late September 1777, the Pennsylvania authorities were no longer operative and, in particular, were effectively
powerless to prevent the many Tory sympathizers in the area from aiding the
British occupying army. It thus fell to the Continental Congress to consider
whether anything at the national level could be done to prevent civilians in and
around Philadelphia from providing critical assistance to the British.
The papers of the Second Continental Congress include an undated proposed
resolve, drafted by James Wilson, that would have acknowledged the “very
familiar Situation of Pennsylvania, where the common enemy employ against
us Spies and Traitors,” and in which many such men “should be arrested and
punished, [but] for which no Provision probably has been made.”410 Wilson’s
resolve would not have provided for any substantive treatment of those spies
and traitors at the hands of the national government or the military; instead, it
would merely have
recommended to the Inhabitants of the City of Philadelphia & each County in
Pennsylvania to choose, as speedily as possible, Commissioners of Inspection
for watching over their Liberties from and for procuring to them every Design

408. Letter from General George Washington to Philip Livingston, Elbridge Gerry, and George
Clymer (July 19, 1777), in 8 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 439, 444–45.
409. See STEPHEN R. TAAFFE, THE PHILADELPHIA CAMPAIGN, 1777-1778 (2003).
410. The index to the Journals includes the following entry: “Wilson, James. Motion re spies in
Philadelphia. Undated. 2 p. M247, r43, i38, vA, p. 135.” Wilson’s “motion” can be found at https://www.
fold3.com/image/452394 [https://perma.cc/P7QC-KYM7]. I am grateful to Thanh Nguyen for tracking
down the Wilson resolve, and to Erin Kidwell for deciphering most of Wilson’s handwriting.
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of Security that can be procured in this Time of internal and intense Danger
in Co-operation with the other Powers of the State.411

The Wilson resolve would also have recommended such measures “to the
Inhabitants in other Parts of Pennsylvania who may find themselves in such a
Situation as to render it proper and necessary.”412
On October 8, 1777, the Second Continental Congress passed a version of
Wilson’s draft recommendation. Referring to Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and
Delaware, the resolve read:
[W]hereas, it has been represented to Congress, that many evil disposed
persons, enemies to these United States, make a practice of passing to and
from the enemy’s quarters, propagating false intelligence, thereby to dispirit
the people and aid the cause of our enemies,
Resolved, That it be recommended to all magistrates and officers, civil and
military, and to all the good people of these states, to be vigilant in apprehending, securing and bringing to condign punishment all such offenders, in order
that a speedy and effectual stop may be put to such a pernicious practice.413

Notably, however, the congressional resolve then proceeded to go further
than Wilson’s draft. “[I]t is of essential consequence to the general welfare,”
stated the resolve, “that the most effectual measures should be forthwith pursued for cutting off all communication of supplies, or intelligence to the
enemy’s army now in, and near the city of Philadelphia.”414 Congress further
found “by the experience of all states, that, in times of invasion, the process of
the municipal law is too feeble and dilatory to bring to a condign and exemplary
punishment persons guilty of such traitorous practices.”415 Accordingly, the
Congress decided that, in this discrete situation, where the local powers were
inadequate to address the problem, there was a need for action by the U.S.
Army:
Resolved, That any person, being an inhabitant of any of these states, who
shall act as a guide or pilot by land or water for the enemy, or shall give or
send intelligence to them, or in any manner furnish them with supplies of
provisions, money, cloathing, arms, forage, fuel, or any kind of stores, be
considered and treated as an enemy and traitor to these United States; and that
General Washington be empowered to order such person taken within thirty
miles of any city, town or place in the states of Pensylvania, Jersey and
Delaware, which is, or may be in the possession of any of the enemy’s forces,

411.
412.
413.
414.
415.

Id.
Id.
9 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 784–85 (Oct. 8, 1777).
Id. at 784.
Id. (emphasis added).
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to be tried by a court martial, and such courts martial are hereby authorized to
sentence any such persons convicted before them of any of the offences
aforesaid, to suffer death or such other punishment as to them shall seem
meet.416

At least three things are noteworthy about this resolve, which was, in effect,
the new nation’s first treason law. For one thing, unlike the earlier resolves, it
clearly applied to ordinary civilians: “any person, being an inhabitant of any of
these states.” It also, however, included two significant limitations. First, it was
geographically limited to those areas in which the ordinary municipal processes—
the treason laws of Pennsylvania and surrounding states—were presumed to be
inadequate to the task (where the “law is too feeble and dilatory”). Courtsmartial were authorized to try disloyal individuals only if such persons were
“taken within thirty miles of any city, town or place in the states of Pensylvania,
Jersey and Delaware, which is, or may be in the possession of any of the
enemy’s forces.”417 Second, the Congress also imposed a temporal constraint:
“This resolve to remain in force until the first day of January next, unless sooner
revoked by Congress.”418 At the end of 1777, the Congress extended this
court-martial authority for just over three more months, to April 10, 1778.419
In other words, the Second Continental Congress endeavored to tailor this
extraordinary power of court-martialing civilians to the scope of the particular
exigency that justified such a deviation from the norm—and no further. It is
evident, then, that the Congress was not of the view that Articles 18 and 19 of
Section XIII of the 1776 Articles of War had already established a broader
authority for the court-martialing of disloyal civilians. The much more carefully
circumscribed October 1777 resolve would have been unnecessary if, as some
would later assume,420 the Articles of War had already made treason broadly
triable by military tribunal.
In early 1778, courts-martial tried several civilians for attempting to bring
provisions to the British in Philadelphia, in violation of the 1777 congressional
resolve. Some of the accused were acquitted.421 Others were convicted and
suffered a range of sentences, including execution. General Washington approved, rejected, or modified each sentence.422
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 1068 (Dec. 30, 1777).
420. See WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 102–04; see also infra notes 398–99 and accompanying text.
421. See, e.g., General Orders (Mar. 1, 1778), in 11 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 11
(noting Washington’s approval of the acquittals of Philip Bocker, Joseph De Haven, and Michael
Milanberger).
422. See, e.g., id. at 11–12 (reflecting Washington’s approval of a sentence against Jacob Cross of
“two hundred lashes on his bare back well laid on” for having stolen calves and brought them into
Philadelphia; and Washington’s approval of the execution of Joseph Worrell for having acted as a guide
to the enemy); General Orders (Mar. 25, 1778), in id. at 142–43 (reflecting Washington’s approval of a
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It is clear, however, that Washington well understood just how deviant, and
disfavored, this practice was. In a letter to Brigadier General John Lacey, Jr.,
dated March 2, 1778, Washington addressed the question of the “great numbers
of people taken going into Philadelphia.”423 While acknowledging that he had
punished many such disloyal persons, including some severely, he also explained that “[i]f the State would take them in hand and deal properly with them
it would be more agreeable to me than to inflict Military punishment upon
them.”424 Therefore, he instructed Lacey, “[i]f you think that the State will
receive those persons you have taken [going into Philadelphia], I am willing
that they should be given up to them, either to be punished as Criminals or kept
to exchange for those inhabitants lately taken away from their families.”425
Even more important and remarkable was Washington’s reaction to the
court-martial of Samuel Carter, a New Jersey inhabitant, just a few days before
the Philadelphia-focused congressional resolve expired. Washington had received the proceedings of that court-martial from Colonel Israel Shreve: Carter,
along with William Seeds, had been charged with having deserted to the British
army. On April 6, 1778, Washington wrote Colonel Shreve, disapproving the
verdict because the court-martial had been improperly appointed, and instructing Shreve to re-try Seeds in a properly constituted court-martial. When it came
to Carter, however, Washington directed Shreve to deliver him “to the Civil
Authority,” because “[b]y the Resolve of Congress we are not empowered to try
sentence of one hundred lashes and detention at hard labor for the remainder of the war against Abel
Jeans, convicted of, inter alia, supplying the enemy with money; and Washington’s order of a sentence
of one month’s work “on fatigue” for five Pennsylvania inhabitants convicted of supplying the enemy
with provisions); General Orders (Apr. 3, 1778), in id. at 202 (noting the court-martial conviction of
William Morgan, and sentence of hard labor during the war, for attempting to carry a horse into
Philadelphia); General Orders (Apr. 13, 1778), in id. at 253–54 (reflecting Washington’s approval of
court-martial sentences against Philip Culp and John Bloom of employment “in some publick work for
the use of the Continent while the British Army continues in this State,” for having attempted to carry
flour into Philadelphia; and Washington’s approval of a similar sentence against John Evans for
“attempting to send Provisions into Philadelphia”).
423. Letter from General George Washington to Brigadier General John Lacey, Jr. (Mar. 2, 1778), in
id. at 14.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 14–15. A few weeks later, in a letter dated April 11, 1778, General Washington discussed
with Lacey the court-martial proceedings Lacey had reported against “sundry inhabitants for supplying
the Enemy with provision . . . .” Letter from George Washington to Brigadier General John Lacey, Jr.
(Apr. 11, 1778), in id., at 243–44. Washington explained to Lacey that those would be the last such
trials, because the congressional resolve had expired the day before, on April 10; from that point
forward, Washington instructed, Lacey could not apprehend, let alone court-martial, such British
abettors: “If they are found going into Philadelphia with provision, you may take that and their Horses
from them.” Id. at 244.
One odd and unexplained later event should be noted. The General Orders of the Army of August 8,
1778, include a report of a general court-martial on August 4, 1778, several months after the
Philadelphia “quasi-treason” resolve had expired: Anthony Matica, a New York inhabitant, was tried for
“supplying the Enemy with Fuel,” and was acquitted. 12 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 299
(Aug. 8, 1778). The General Orders do not specify the authority for the Matica court-martial, or
whether the acquittal was based on the absence of authority or on the merits. See id. at 299–301. Nor do
they suggest that Washington was asked to approve the proceedings. See id.
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persons, inhabitants of the States, if taken more than thirty Miles from the Head
Quarters of the Army.”426
Three days later, Shreve responded by explaining that “Virtuas Inhabitants
and Militia officers Seemed very much Dissatisfied, on account of Carter[’]s
being Delivered up to the Civil Law,” especially because Carter’s brothers were
in the British service and other of his relatives were also notoriously hostile to
the revolution.427 Besides, Shreve added, Carter “was taken in arms within Less
than Twenty-five miles of your Excy[’]s Head Quarters,” which would have
qualified him for a court-martial under the terms of the congressional resolve.428
“[U]pon the whole,” wrote Shreve, obviously hoping that he could persuade
Washington to leave well enough alone, “I thought Best to have him tried [by a
new court-martial] and Send the pr[o]ceedings for your Excy Consideration.”429
Washington stood his ground, even on the assumption that Carter was
captured within thirty miles of Washington’s headquarters: “I cannot confirm
the Sentence against Carter,” he explained to Shreve, “until I have consulted
[New Jersey] Govr. Livingston upon the matter. Introducing martial law into

426. Letter from General George Washington to Colonel Israel Shreve (Apr. 6, 1778), in 11
WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 222. A similar correspondence took place the next month.
Brigadier General William Smallwood sent Washington the proceedings and sentence of a court-martial
against a Delaware mariner named Joseph Judson, also known as “Jetson.” According to Smallwood,
Jetson “for some time past has been not less dreaded, than fam’d for his Infamous Practices of Piloting
the Enemy in the Night and Aiding them in . . . Support of the Common Cause.” Letter from Brigadier
General William Smallwood to General George Washington (May 17, 1778), National Archives,
FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/03-15-02-0146 [https://perma.cc/
TQU3-FM25]. Washington regretfully responded, in a letter penned on the Commander in Chief’s
behalf by Alexander Hamilton, that he could not approve the sentence because of various irregularities.
See Letter from General George Washington to Brigadier General William Smallwood (May 19, 1778),
in 11 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 420 (“The character you give of Jetson makes him so
atrocious, that I regret his trial and sentence are not more clear and regular. There could be no more
proper object for an example, if it could be made with propriety, than the circumstances you mention
designate this man to be.”). Among other problems, Washington noted, where the evidence in the
proceedings did describe a crime, the Army had “no law, subjecting him to the jurisdiction of a court
Martial; but he must be referred to the civil power, to be tried for treason.” Id. Washington referenced
the 1777 congressional resolution, but explained that “the operation of this law is limited to persons
taken within thirty Miles of Head Quarters; which prevents its application to the present case.” Id. at
421. (Washington might also have mentioned, but did not, that the resolve had expired in April.)
Washington did, however, enclose for Smallwood’s consideration a copy of a February 1778 resolution
“for the trial and punishment of Kidnappers,” discussed in greater detail below. Id. “[I]f proper
evidence can be adduced in support of [a kidnapping charge against Judson],” Washington suggested,
and if the offense occurred after the February resolution was approved, “you may have him tried on that
charge, which will effectually procure him his deserts; otherwise he must of necessity be turned over to
the civil power of the State, to which he belongs, which it is to be hoped will at least take proper
precaution to prevent his doing further mischief.” Id.
427. Letter from Colonel Israel Shreve to General George Washington (Apr. 9, 1778), in 14 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, at 443 (D. Hoth ed., 2004); see also Letter from Colonel Israel Shreve
to General George Washington (Apr. 10, 1778), in id. at 471 (repeating these pleas, and explaining that
he had court-martialed Carter “to Satisfy” those who were “so much Dissatisfied at his being Delivered
over to the Cevel Law”).
428. Letter from Colonel Israel Shreve to General George Washington (Apr. 9, 1778), in id. at 443.
429. Id.
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this State [Pennsylvania], was intended to remedy the weakness of the Civil; but
in the State of New Jersey where there is a law framed expressly for the purpose
of trying inhabitants taking Arms on the side of the Enemy, I think such persons
should be delivered to the Civil power. When I have the Governor’s determination upon this matter, you shall hear from me.”430
Recall that the Congress had expressly referenced New Jersey in the plain
terms of the 1777 congressional resolve, along with Pennsylvania and Delaware. Yet even armed with this apparent statutory authority, Washington nevertheless refused to approve the Carter court-martial unless and until he was
certain that the civil authorities in New Jersey, like those in Pennsylvania, were
incapable of dealing with traitors in the ordinary course of criminal proceedings. Washington promptly wrote to New Jersey governor William Livingston,
explaining that he “knew [New Jersey] had Laws fully competent to the
punishment of offenders of such a nature.”431 Washington acknowledged that
the congressional resolve from 1777, by its terms, gave him the power to try all
persons assisting the enemy and taken within thirty miles of the Army Headquarters; nevertheless, he explained, he “imagine[d] this Resolve was passed with an
intent to operate principally in Pennsylvania, where . . . the Civil Authority is
extremely weak.”432 Washington confessed to Livingston that he was “not fully
satisfied of the legality of trying an inhabitant of any State by Military Law,
when the Civil authority of that State has made provision for the punishment of
persons taking Arms with the Enemy.”433
After the 1777 resolution finally expired in April 1778, and the British
abandoned Philadelphia for New York in June 1778, the Pennsylvania authorities once again began trying disloyal residents for treason under state law, where
scores of defendants received jury trials and were protected by robust legal
requirements.434
4. The February 1778 Kidnapping Resolve
In February of 1778, the Continental Congress took up the matter of a new,
distinct form of treasonous activity by “inhabitants” of the new states: the
practice of kidnapping loyal residents and conveying them to the British. Based
upon a report of the Board of War, Congress found that:

430. Letter from General George Washington to Colonel Israel Shreve (Apr. 14, 1778), in 11
WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 258.
431. Letter from General George Washington to Governor William Livingston (Apr. 15, 1778), in id.
at 262.
432. Id. at 263.
433. Id. at 262. Washington asked Livingston for his view on the question. Livingston replied to
Washington on April 27. See Letter from William Livingston to General George Washington, in 14 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 427, at 665. Unfortunately, any passage referencing Carter is
not included in the surviving extract. Therefore it is not certain what became of Carter, except that there
does not appear to be any record of Washington approving his execution.
434. See CHAPIN, supra note 387, at 56–59, 67–70, 77.
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a few deluded inhabitants of these states, prompted thereto by arts of the
enemy, have associated together, for the purpose of seizing and secretly
conveying to places in possession of the British forces, such of the loyal
citizens, officers, and soldiers of these states, as may fall into their power; and
being assisted by parties furnished by the enemy, have, in several instances,
carried their nefarious designs into execution; and such practices being contrary to their allegiance as subjects, and repugnant to the rules of war.435

Congress therefore resolved as follows:
That whatever inhabitants of these states shall kill or seize, or take any loyal
citizen or citizens thereof, and convey him, her, or them, to any place within
the power of the enemy, or shall enter into any combination for such purpose,
or attempt to carry the same into execution, or hath assisted or shall assist
therein; or shall, by giving intelligence, acting as a guide, or in any other
manner whatever, aid the enemy in the perpetration thereof, he shall suffer
death by the judgment of a court martial, as a traitor, assassin, and spy, if the
offence be committed within seventy miles of the head quarters of the grand
or other armies of these states, where a general officer commands.436

This resolution, passed while the 1777 resolve was still in effect, was
obviously much narrower in scope substantively than its predecessor, as it only
reached a discrete form of aid to the enemy. In other respects, however, it did
not—at least not on its face—include the sorts of limitations found in the 1777
Philadelphia resolution. For example, it did not have an expiration date. Nor did
it contain express geographical limits.437 Most importantly, perhaps, Congress
435. 10 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 204 (Feb. 27, 1778).
436. Id. at 204–05. This was the rare resolution in the Second Continental Congress on which a vote
was called. All of the state delegations voted in favor except those from Connecticut, which opposed
the resolution 2–1, and New Jersey, which was split 1–1. Id. at 205.
437. Unfortunately, neither the Board of War Report, 1 REPORTS OF THE BOARD OF WAR AND ORDNANCE
533–34 (Feb. 26, 1778), PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, https://www.fold3.com/image/1/382834
[http://perma.cc/SCXP-9Z67], nor the congressional resolution itself (which tracked the Report almost
verbatim), specified which states were included in the resolution’s vague reference to “these states.”
(The Board Report capitalized “States,” which might have been a reference to all of them.) Perhaps the
Congress’s intent was to refer to states in New England: Reportedly, Representative William Ellery of
Rhode Island, aware that the kidnapping practice “render[ed] a residence on the sea-board terrifying to
the most resolute” in his state, “urged the subject with all his powers on the attention of congress, and
aided by several of the most distinguished members of that body,” successfully argued for the
resolution. JOHN SANDERSON, ROBERT WALN, & HENRY DILWORTH GILPIN, 9 BIOGRAPHY OF THE SIGNERS TO
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 261–62 (1824). Two days after the February 27 resolution, Ellery
wrote to Rhode Island Governor Nicholas Cooke that “[s]ome of the citizens of this state having been
lately kidnapped and carried into Philadelphia, Congress have resolved that all offenders taken within
70 miles of the main army, or any detachment or post, under the Command of a General, shall be tried
by a court martial, and suffer the pains of Death.” Letter from William Ellery to the Governor of Rhode
Island (Mar. 1, 1778), in 3 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 103 (Edmund C. Burnett,
reprint ed., 1963). Although Ellery’s description in this letter includes a geographical condition not
found in the congressional resolve, it appears to confirm that the resolve was prompted by the British
kidnapping of Rhode Island residents.
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did not offer any justification for why it authorized court-martial proceedings for
kidnapping civilians. In stark contrast to the 1777 resolve, this resolution did
not suggest that the laws of the states—for example, prohibitions on kidnapping
and treason—were inadequate to deal with the problem.
Not surprisingly, the Army used the more circumscribed February 1778
resolution far less frequently than it invoked the 1777 resolve. Indeed, I have
been unable to find any record of any court-martial convictions pursuant to the
1778 resolution.
Notably, however, in one case where the 1778 resolution was at issue,
General Washington appeared to adopt the view that the new resolve, like its
1777 predecessor, could be applied only where state legal authorities were not
(in the words of his April 1778 letter to Governor Livingston) “fully competent
to the punishment of offenders of such a nature.”438 In May 1780, Washington
wrote to Brigadier General William Maxwell,439 in response to Maxwell’s
inquiry about what to do with a group of prisoners that Colonel Elias Dayton
had apprehended.440 It appears that at least some of those prisoners must have
conveyed Continental Army soldiers to the enemy, for Washington wrote the
following:
I would have you inquire minutely whether any laws of the State, at present in
force, provide for the punishment of persons taken for seducing soldiers to
desert or conveying them to the enemy. If there are none such, I think you
may safely bring the person you have in Custody, to trial as a spy found near
your Camp.441

From all that appears, then, Washington treated both the 1777 and 1778
resolutions as authorizing courts-martial for treasonous activity where the civil
courts were not open and capable of handling such cases—in effect, an exception of necessity. But where the civilian courts were available, he was—at the
very least—deeply uneasy about the legitimacy of using military courts, even in
cases that might have been covered by the plain language (even if not the
underlying rationale) of the congressional resolutions.

438. Letter from General George Washington to Governor William Livingston (Apr. 15, 1778), in 11
WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 262.
439. Letter from General George Washington to Brigadier General William Maxwell (May 19,
1780), in 18 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 388.
440. Letter from Brigadier General William Maxwell to General George Washington (May 17,
1780), in National Archives, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/9901-02-01773 [https://perma.cc/M89B-HFZA].
441. 18 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 389 (emphasis added). Washington’s reference to
a possible trial for spying strikes a false note, because it is hard to see how the conduct in question
described the offense of spying. Presumably Washington used that term because the February 1778
resolve itself provided, rather imprecisely, that the kidnappers in question “shall suffer death by the
judgment of a court martial, as a traitor, assassin, and spy.” 10 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 204 (Feb.
27, 1778).
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This otherwise consistent narrative is, however, complicated by one conspicuous counterexample that occurred after all of the events recounted above—
namely, Washington’s order of a court-martial trial of Joshua Hett Smith, an
alleged accomplice to the treasonous plot of Benedict Arnold.
5. The Court-Martial of Joshua Hett Smith
On August 3, 1780, Washington appointed Major General Benedict Arnold to
command of the important Army garrison near West Point, New York, along the
western bank of the Hudson River.442 Arnold had distinguished himself with
valor and bravery in several important battles, including the Battle of Saratoga
in 1777, in which he suffered a serious leg injury. Washington implored Arnold
to use his post at West Point to obtain as much intelligence about British
movements as he could.443 Little did Washington know, however, Arnold had
grown disillusioned with the Army after its defeat at Charleston, and dubious
that the revolution would succeed. Moreover, Arnold was deeply resentful of
what he viewed as false and malicious allegations that he had acted corruptly as
military governor of Philadelphia after the British left that city. Arnold was also
deeply in debt. For a combination of these reasons (and others), he resolved to
betray the new nation by initiating a traitorous arrangement with Henry Clinton,
the British Commander in Chief.444 As Alexander Hamilton would write later
that year, “the ingratitude [Arnold] had experienced from his country, concurring, with other causes, had intirely changed his principles, that he now only
sought to restore himself to the favour of his king, by some signal proof of his
repentance.”445
Clinton, who had already captured New York City, set his designs upon West
Point: If he could secure the post and garrison there, and set up a series of posts
between West Point and New York City, he might effectively cut off the major
route by which the Continental Army was supplied with goods—and thereby
bring General Washington’s army to its knees, and end the rebellion for good.
Arnold had already begun a correspondence with Clinton, and with his chief of
intelligence, Major John André, in the course of which he had betrayed Washington’s plan to establish command on the Hudson River.446 This rendered West
Point an even more attractive target for Clinton’s machinations. And when
Washington fortuitously appointed Arnold to take command there, all the pieces
for Clinton’s plot appeared to be falling into place. Clinton agreed to give
Arnold a hefty reward if Arnold would surrender West Point and guarantee the
presence of at least three thousand American troops who might be killed or

442.
443.
444.
445.

See NATHANIEL PHILBRICK, VALIANT AMBITION 275 (2016).
See id. at 278.
See generally id. at 230–41.
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens (Oct. 11, 1780), in 2 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 460 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961).
446. PHILBRICK, supra note 442, at 243–45.
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captured there.447
As the plan approached its final stages, it became increasingly difficult for
Arnold and Major André to reliably communicate with one another about the
details of their plot. Accordingly, late in September of 1780, André, recently
appointed as Clinton’s Adjutant General, determined to meet with Arnold
personally.448 He therefore secreted himself on a British sloop of war, the HMS
Vulture, anchored on the Hudson near Haverstraw, New York.449 Meanwhile,
Arnold importuned a 31-year-old New York attorney by the name of Joshua
Hett Smith, who lived near Haverstraw, to help him with what he described as a
critical and sensitive intelligence matter in the service of the American cause:
Arnold directed Smith to guide an individual from the Vulture to meet
with Arnold in the dead of night on September 21, 1780.450 Whether Smith
knew of Arnold’s treachery, or that the individual he was asked to transport was
a British officer in cahoots with Arnold to sacrifice West Point to the British,
remains unknown. Smith would later insist that he presumed Arnold was a loyal
officer and hero, endeavoring to obtain secret intelligence from sources who
were themselves betraying the British cause.451
On the evening of September 21, on the Vulture, André introduced himself to
Smith under a pseudonym, John Anderson; he did not tell Smith the nature of
his business with Major General Arnold.452 Smith rowed “Anderson” ashore,
where the British officer met with Arnold in a grove of fir trees on the western
shore of the Hudson for about three hours, discussing the details of their plan.
By this point, it was too late for Smith to row André back to the ship
undetected, for dawn was approaching. Arnold and André therefore decided that
they would continue their conversation at Smith’s house—which happened to
be within the U.S. Army lines—and that Smith would return André to the
Vulture the next night. The American Army at King’s Ferry, however, had begun
firing on the Vulture, and so the British ship set off down the Hudson, out
toward sea. This meant that André would have to find another way back to the
British lines in Manhattan—by land.453
In the light of day the next morning, Friday, September 22, Smith noticed that
“Anderson” was sporting a British uniform. (André probably had worn it so that
if he were captured, he could simply claim to have been openly doing business
as a British officer, rather than being a spy in disguise, something that would

447. See id. at 279–80.
448. Clinton and André reportedly desired the face-to-face meeting to ensure that Arnold was not a
double-agent and that he had genuinely decided to betray the revolutionary cause. See Herbert Haines,
The Execution of Major André, 5 ENGLISH HISTORICAL REV. 31, 31–33 (1890).
449. See PHILBRICK, supra note 442, at 285–89.
450. See id. at 285–86; see also RICHARD J. KOKE, ACCOMPLICE IN TREASON: JOSHUA HETT SMITH AND
THE ARNOLD CONSPIRACY 71, 78–80 (1973).
451. See JOSHUA HETT SMITH, AN AUTHENTIC NARRATIVE OF THE CAUSES WHICH LED TO THE DEATH OF
MAJOR ANDRÉ, ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF HIS MAJESTY’S FORCES IN NORTH AMERICA 13–17 (Duykinck, 1809).
452. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 83–84.
453. See id. at 87–92; SMITH, supra note 451, at 21–23; PHILBRICK, supra note 442, at 288–94.
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almost certainly result in his execution.454) Benedict Arnold explained to Smith
that Anderson was a New York citizen who had borrowed the uniform from a
British friend—and Smith apparently believed that unlikely story (or so he
would later insist).455 Before heading out that evening, Arnold asked Smith to
provide “Anderson” with a coat and hat, so that he might pass undetected on the
journey back to New York. Smith did as he was instructed.456 Arnold then sent
the travelers off with papers in which he instructed any guards to allow “Mr.
John Anderson” to pass, as he was on “public business” at the direction of
Major General Arnold.457 Smith accompanied André much of the night, until
they parted ways near the bridge across the Croton River on Saturday, September 23.458
Later that day, three New York militiamen interdicted André and they discovered, in his boots, documents revealing his plot with the traitor Arnold, including a plan of the fortifications of West Point and a copy of the minutes of a
council of war held by General Washington a few weeks earlier.459 Two days
later, on Monday, September 25, Arnold got wind of André’s arrest, and he fled
his post at West Point less than half an hour before he was to have breakfast
with General Washington.460 Washington and his companions received notice of
the attempted treason several hours later. Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Hamilton gave chase on horseback, but was unable to catch Arnold, who made it to
British lines and thereby secured his freedom, a subsequent appointment as a
British brigadier—and eternal ignominy.461
During his flight, Arnold wrote a letter to Washington, his commander and
mentor, in which he tried to defend his actions and asked Washington to show
mercy to Arnold’s wife. At the end of the letter, in a further effort to protect
those who had unwittingly aided him, Arnold added that his assistants, as well
as Joshua Hett Smith, were “totally Ignorant of any transactions of mine.”462
Far from absolving Smith of any wrongdoing, this reference in Arnold’s letter
prompted Washington and his allies to suspect Smith, for they had dined with
the young attorney just the night before, at which time Smith had offhandedly
mentioned that Arnold had been at his house two days earlier.463 Putting the
pieces together, Washington ordered Smith arrested that evening, Monday,
454. See HALLECK, supra note 348, at 591 (discussing how the offense of spying could not be applied
to a scout who was not in disguise).
455. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 87.
456. See SMITH, supra note 451, at 23.
457. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 89; PHILBRICK, supra note 442, at 294–95.
458. See SMITH, supra note 451, at 24–30; KOKE, supra note 450, at 93–99; PHILBRICK, supra note
442, at 296–300.
459. See PHILBRICK, supra note 442, at 300–02.
460. See id. at 308–10.
461. See id. at 310–14.
462. Letter from Benedict Arnold to George Washington (Sept. 25, 1780), Founders Online,
National Archives, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-03372 [https://perma.
cc/PNM7-ZNNP].
463. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 103–04.
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September 25.464 Washington was understandably desperate to obtain further
information about the nefarious plot, and Smith was not only a suspect, but a
possible source for such crucial intelligence.
Smith was roused from his bed and arrested that evening. The next morning,
September 26, Smith found himself confronted by a five-man interrogation
team: General Washington, Lieutenant Colonels Alexander Hamilton and Robert Harrison, Brigadier General Henry Knox, and the Marquis de Lafayette.465
Smith, professing ignorance of any wrongdoing, demanded to know why he was
detained. According to Smith’s later description of the confrontation, Washington responded that Smith was charged with “the blackest treason,” that the
General had the authority to hang him immediately as a traitor, and that nothing
could prevent this sordid fate other than a “candid confession” of his accomplices in the “horrid and nefarious designs” he had mediated in the preceding
days.466 Smith insisted that he was not guilty of anything—that he had merely
acted in accordance with Benedict Arnold’s orders, thinking them to be part of a
loyal, and thus benign, design.467
Washington and his retinue continued to pressure Smith to confess, threatening him with summary execution “on yonder tree” if he failed to do so.468 Smith
responded “that as a citizen I did not conceive myself amenable to military
jurisdiction.”469 He also insisted (or so he claimed when he wrote of the
incident many decades later) that the 1778 congressional “aiding the enemy”
resolution, pursuant to which Washington was purporting to act, was merely a
“recommendatory resolve,” and that it could not be used to contravene the
right to a jury trial to which Smith was entitled under the New York
Constitution470—a constitution Smith himself had helped draft three years
earlier.471
Smith would later write that Washington was “irritated” by Smith’s retort,
and returned him to confinement.472 (If Washington offered any response on the
merits, no evidence of it survives.) A bit later, Hamilton—apparently playing
the role of “good cop”—personally intervened with Smith, “compassionately”
urging him to confess “for the sake of [his] family,” and to spare his own life.473
Smith did not budge on his story, however; he would not confess to knowing of
Arnold’s treasonous design.474 Washington then re-entered the room, and report-

464. See id. at 104–06.
465. See SMITH, supra note 451, at 30–31.
466. Id. at 32.
467. See id.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 33.
470. Id.
471. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 32.
472. SMITH, supra note 451, at 33.
473. Id.
474. Smith would later write that he had persuaded Hamilton of his sincerity, in part because
Hamilton was familiar with Smith’s longstanding support for the revolution. Id. at 34. Hamilton
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edly said to Hamilton: “I am not yet satisfied; take him into the back room; we
must know something more about this business.”475 At that point, Smith was
left to wait for a couple of hours, before being remanded to the custody of other
officers.476 Smith speculated that the “main object” of Washington’s decision to
detain and try him “was to obtain the knowledge of General Arnold’s confederates in the army, as well as in Congress.”477 This interrogation and threat of
military trial was, in other words, a shakedown, if Smith’s own account is
accurate.
Washington wrote to New York Governor George Clinton that day, as well as
to the Continental Congress, informing them of the plot between Arnold and
André. Washington told Congress that he found Smith “to have had a considerable share in this business”478; and he likewise informed Governor Clinton that
Smith—a New York citizen—was in custody and “has confessed facts sufficient
to establish his guilt.”479
Washington directed that both André and Smith be detained and tried at Army
headquarters in Tappan, New York. In Major André’s case, Washington convened a “Board of General Officers.” On September 29, after considering the
evidence, the Board unanimously recommended to Washington that André
“ought to be considered as a Spy from the enemy and that agreeable to the law
and usage of nations, . . . he ought to suffer death.”480 Washington agreed.
André was hanged as a spy on October 2, 1780, just nine days after his arrest.481

testified at the court-martial proceedings, however, that he was wary of Smith’s true inclinations
because, early in the war, Smith had exhibited “appearances of an intemperate zeal for the cause of
America”—an “excessive warmth.” HENRY B. DAWSON, RECORD OF THE TRIAL OF JOSHUA HETT SMITH,
ESQ., FOR ALLEGED COMPLICITY IN THE TREASON OF BENEDICT ARNOLD 30 (Bradstreet Press, 1866).
475. SMITH, supra note 451, at 34.
476. See id. at 37–38.
477. Id. at 38–39.
478. Letter from General George Washington to the President of Congress, (Sept. 26, 1780), in 20
WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at 91–93.
479. Letter from General George Washington to Governor George Clinton, (Sept, 26, 1780), in id. at
93–94.
480. PROCEEDINGS OF A BOARD OF GENERAL OFFICERS HELD BY ORDER OF HIS EXCELLENCY GEN.
WASHINGTON, COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPECTING MAJOR
JOHN ANDRÉ, ADJUTANT GENERAL OF THE BRITISH ARMY 13 (Francis Baily, 1780); KOKE, supra note 450, at
136.
481. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 148–52. It is uncertain whether André’s proceedings were
authorized by the 1776 congressional spying resolution, see supra note 340 and accompanying text, for
at least two reasons. For one thing, Washington did not use a court-martial, as the resolve prescribed.
Nor is it is clear that André’s case came within the terms of the resolution: he was apprehended on a
road outside Tarrytown, New York, rather than (as the resolution required) “found lurking . . . in or
about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States.” See David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine,
and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 777 n.288 (2008). Moreover, although it was
probably permissible for the Army to execute André for having tried to bribe an officer to betray his
loyalty, André almost certainly did not engage in a form of prohibited spying that justified the
ignominious penalty of death by hanging. See HALLECK, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 348, at 408–99.
André did not cross enemy lines in disguise to steal information, see supra note 356 and accompanying
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Meanwhile, on September 30, Lieutenant Colonel Harrison directed the
Army’s Judge Advocate General, John Lawrence, to prosecute Joshua Hett
Smith before a court-martial on four charges.482 The first two charges alleged,
in effect, that Smith had abetted André’s spying, and the third charge alleged
that Smith himself had spied by “procuring intelligence for the enemy.”483 The
fourth charge—the one of primary importance here—was evidently predicated
on the February 1778 kidnapping resolve: it alleged that Smith had aided and
abetted Benedict Arnold in a plot to permit the enemy to “take, kill, and seize”
the loyal soldiers and citizens in the garrison at West Point.484
The sitting court-martial, consisting of thirteen officers, was ordinarily in the
business of trying run-of-the-mill cases involving wrongdoing (e.g., embezzlement, desertion, ungentlemanly behavior) by Army personnel.485 The Smith
proceeding was a very different sort of trial, however, for it was the rare case in
which a civilian was in the dock.
The proceedings commenced on September 30. Lawrence first asked the
members to consider whether they had jurisdiction to consider the four charges.486
With respect to the three spying charges, Lawrence cited the congressional
spying resolve of August 21, 1776.487 The panel decided that it lacked jurisdiction over those three charges, presumably because the congressional resolution,
by its terms, did not apply to persons, such as Smith, who were “members of,”
or owed allegiance to, “any of the United States of America.”488 As to the fourth
charge, however, the panel decided that it had jurisdiction pursuant to the
congressional resolution of February 27, 1778, which authorized court-martial
proceedings against inhabitants of “these states” who assisted the enemy—“by
giving intelligence, acting as a guide, or in any other manner”—in an effort to
“kill or seize, or take any loyal citizen or citizens.”489 The loyal citizens in
question, according to the charge, were the soldiers at West Point who Clinton
was plotting to kill or capture, with Arnold’s (and, allegedly, Smith’s)
assistance.490
Smith, who was representing himself because Washington had denied his
request for the privilege of counsel, argued that the panel lacked the power even
to consider this fourth charge, because he was not a proper subject for trial by a

text (describing this condition of the offense of spying); rather, he came ashore to meet with Arnold,
with Arnold’s permission, while wearing his British uniform.
482. See DAWSON, supra note 474, at 1–2.
483. Id.
484. Id. at 2.
485. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 136.
486. See DAWSON, supra note 474, at 3–4.
487. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
488. See DAWSON, supra note 474, at 4; see also supra note 340 and accompanying text. The panel
might have also dismissed the third charge for lack of proffered evidence that Smith himself had
engaged in any spying activity.
489. DAWSON, supra note 474, at 4.
490. See id. at 2–5.
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military tribunal. Smith contended—as Washington himself had done491—that
Congress presumably passed the 1778 aiding-the-enemy resolution to account
for cases in states in which there were no courts adequate to try such civilians
early in the war.492 Smith noted, however, that New York now had a constitution, which not only established a court system, but also guaranteed a trial by
jury493—which was the norm the state itself honored in its many treason trials
in civilian court.494 Smith told the military panel that if the congressional
resolution were construed to cover a case in such a state, he “could not conceive
how a mere resolve of Congress could abrogate a fundamental article in any of
the civil constitutions of the United States.”495 To do so, he insisted, would
make the military “paramount to the civil authority,” and would be inconsistent
with “one of the principal reasons assigned by Congress for their separation
from Great-Britain, in the declaration of independence,” namely, the denial of
trial by jury.496 The panel overruled Smith’s constitutional objection, and the
case proceeded to trial on the single charge of aiding Arnold in “combination”
with the enemy to kill or seize the loyal soldiers at West Point.497
At the end of the trial, Smith once again interjected a jurisdictional objection
as part of his closing on October 24, arguing that the military trial had denied
him the jury right, “the great bulwark of individual freedom.”498 “It must appear
strange to the world,” he inveighed, “that Congress should violate those rights

491. See supra notes 438–41 and accompanying text.
492. See SMITH, supra note 451, at 73.
493. See NEW YORK CONST. art. XLI (1777):
And this convention doth further ordain, determine, and declare, in the name and by the
authority of the good people of this State, that trial by jury, in all cases in which it hath
heretofore been used in the colony of New York, shall be established and remain inviolate
forever.
That state constitution also established a modest form of judicial independence, providing that the
judges of the state supreme court, and the first judge of the county court in every county, would hold
their offices “during good behavior or until they shall have respectively attained the age of sixty years,”
id. art. XXIV, and further providing that such judges could not simultaneously hold any other executive
office, id. art. XXV.
494. In 1777, the Provincial Congress of New York itself had authorized courts-martial to try traitors
while the legislature was drafting the state constitution. Those court-martial resolves were time-limited,
however, in effect to last only until the state had established a working government with civil courts.
See CHAPIN, supra note 387, at 50–51, 64. Some state officers continued a drumbeat of pressure to
convene such trials in civil courts as soon as possible, lest “whilst we are strugling for the Sacred Name
of Liberty we are establishing the fatal Tendency to Despotism.” Id. at 64. Thus, when the mechanisms
of the state constitution were finally in place and the special resolves expired, the state convention “put
an emphatic period to the court-martial trial of traitors.” Id. at 65. That practice lasted only a few
months. Id. at 51–53. By the time Smith was accused of his treasonous activities three years later, New
York had instituted a robust practice of civil treason trials; the state secured over 800 convictions
between February 1780 and December 1783. Id. at 76–77.
495. SMITH, supra note 451, at 73.
496. Id. at 73–74.
497. Id. at 72.
498. Id. at 114.
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of citizenship, for which their country was drenched in blood.”499 Smith
chalked up the irregularity of his case to General Washington’s intense anger
when he learned of Arnold’s betrayal: “This flagrant injustice will mark the
savage ferocity with which their general sought my life, (not sufficiently glutted
with that of the accomplished André,) and ought to be a warning to posterity
how they invest tyrants with any sort of power, that they can with impunity
abuse.”500
Following deliberations, the panel announced its verdict: It did not accept
Smith’s jurisdictional argument, but it ruled in his favor nonetheless. Although
the panel concluded that Smith had, in fact, abetted Arnold’s scheme with Major
André, it also found that the evidence was insufficient to prove that Smith was
privy to, or had knowledge of, Arnold’s “criminal, traitorous or base designs.”
Accordingly, the court-martial found Smith not guilty of the charge under the
February 1778 resolution.501
Remarkably, Smith was not present for the verdict, nor was he informed of it
for many months afterward, as he languished in detention.502 The prospect of
Smith going unpunished for his involvement in Arnold’s scheme did not sit well
with General Washington. After the court-martial verdict, Washington informed
New York Governor George Clinton that Smith would be released shortly
“unless the Civil authority should interpose to demand him.”503 Governor
Clinton, after reviewing the trial record, concluded that it would be “dangerous
to the safety of this State that [Smith] should be permitted to go at large,” and
therefore ordered that Smith be transferred to state custody, to await possible
trial under New York law.504 Smith’s detention in New York lasted for months,
as state authorities endeavored (at first unsuccessfully) to persuade a grand jury
to indict Smith for treason.505 Finally, on May 21, 1781, Smith escaped from the
jail and became a fugitive, eventually ending up in exile in England.506
****
In sum, the common practice of many inhabitants of the new nation to offer
intelligence, provisions, and other assistance to the British cause confronted the
499. Id. at 115–16. Apparently Smith also argued that the 1778 resolution should be interpreted only
to apply to the State of Pennsylvania while the British occupied Philadelphia, much like the 1777
resolution was geographically limited to areas where civil courts could not act. Id. at 115. This
“constitutional avoidance” argument, however, was less compelling than Smith’s straightforward
constitutional argument: As explained above, supra note 437 and accompanying text, the language of
the 1778 resolution did not contain the words of geographical distinction that characterized the
Congress’s 1777 resolve involving Philadelphia and its environs.
500. SMITH, supra note 451, at 116 (emphasis in original).
501. See DAWSON, supra note 474, at 106.
502. See KOKE, supra note 450, at 179–80.
503. Letter from General George Washington to Governor George Clinton, or in His Absence
Lieutenant Governor Van Cortlandt (Oct. 29, 1780), in 20 WASHINGTON, WRITINGS, supra note 341, at
262.
504. KOKE, supra note 450, at 185.
505. See id. at 188–91.
506. See id. chs. 16–20.
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Second Continental Congress and General Washington with an acute and
continuing problem. In cases where members of the armed forces were the
culprits, Congress authorized court-martial proceedings, and the Army regularly
tried its own members for their betrayal in such military tribunals, just as it did
for many other offenses (and just as it does to this day). With respect to
prosecution of civilians for such treasonous conduct, however, the Congress and
the Commander in Chief generally chose to rely upon application of state law,
and municipal criminal trials by jury, to deal with the problem—and such
state-law prosecutions before civilian juries were the norm.507 The Congress
made a minor exception, however, for cases in the vicinity of Philadelphia
during the few months in which the British army occupied that city, because in
that discrete time and place the municipal law was “too feeble and dilatory to
bring to a condign and exemplary punishment persons guilty of such traitorous
practices.”508 It was, in other words, an exception defined by necessity. And
even in that case, General Washington did not approve courts-martial within the
literal terms of the resolve in cases where civil authorities were sufficient to the
task. Indeed, Washington’s deference to the civil justice system was so pronounced that when he resigned his commission as Commander in Chief in
December 1783, Congress commended him for “conduct[ing] the great military
contest with wisdom and fortitude invariably regarding the rights of the civil
power through all disasters and changes.”509
The February 1778 kidnapping resolve, however—and Washington’s decision
to try Joshua Hett Smith by court-martial pursuant to that resolution in 1780—
stands as an aberrant deviation from this basic narrative, even if no one was
ever convicted pursuant to that resolve. Congress did not explain why it
approved the resolution, and there is no record of any justification Washington
might have entertained or offered for committing Smith to a court-martial, even
after Smith reminded Washington of his right to a jury trial under New York
law. Washington must have known that Smith’s constitutional argument was
formidable—after all, it tracked Washington’s own views about military trials of
civilians in cases where municipal courts were open and effective. Although it is
impossible to say for certain, it appears likely that Washington invoked the 1778
resolve, and the prospect of Smith’s summary execution after a military proceeding, as a way of coercing Smith to disclose further information about the plot.510
Revelation of Arnold’s treachery had blindsided Washington, and the General
was not only furious about his comrade’s betrayal, but also desperate to quickly
uncover the scope and details of what he must have assumed was an ongoing

507. See, e.g., supra note 494 (describing the practice in New York).
508. 9 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 784.
509. ANSWER OF THE UNITED STATES IN CONGRESS, ASSEMBLED TO HIS EXCELLENCY GEORGE WASHINGTON,
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UPON HIS RESIGNING HIS COMMISSION, Dec. 23, 1783 (emphasis added), National
Archives, FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-12224
[https://perma.cc/XW2X-QHC9].
510. See supra notes 465–77 and accompanying text.
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plan to cripple the Continental Army and bring the revolution to an end.
Whatever the undisclosed reason, Washington’s failure even to proffer any
justification for the court-martial, in the face of a serious constitutional objection, is telling.
V. THE EARLY CONGRESSES, THE 1806 ARTICLES OF WAR, AND THE WAR OF 1812
In the recent en banc al Bahlul decision, Judge Kavanaugh’s opinion on
behalf of himself and Judges Brown and Griffith emphasized not only the
resolutions and Articles of War the Continental Congress enacted during the
Revolutionary War, but also the fact that, after the Constitution was ratified,
the First Congress adopted the very same Articles of War, and that in 1806,
Congress updated the Articles “and, in doing so, was careful to preserve the
offenses of spying and aiding the enemy as crimes triable by military tribunal.”511 This post-ratification continuity, according to Judge Kavanaugh, demonstrates an understanding of the early Congresses that the Article III exception
for war-related offenses is not limited to violations of the international law of
war.512 A careful assessment of the early post-1789 history, however, does not
support this reading.
The 1789 ratification of Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution guaranteed
the right to a jury, and to an independent judge, for the “[t]he Trial of all
[federal] Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment.”513 Shortly thereafter, the
Sixth Amendment reconfirmed the right to a jury trial.514 What is more, Section
3 of Article III established even more robust protections for allegations of
treason—defined as “levying War against [the United States], or in adhering to
[its] Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.”515 It provides that “[n]o Person
shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the
same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.”516 The First Congress enacted
a federal treason statute conforming to these constitutional requirements in
1790.517
Just after the Constitution was ratified, Secretary of War Knox wrote to
President George Washington “[t]hat the change in the Government of the
United States will require that the articles of war be revised and adapted to the

511. al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh J., concurring).
512. Id.
513. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
514. See supra note 67.
515. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
516. Id. Section 3 also provides that “no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.” Id. cl. 2.
517. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 1, 1 Stat. 112, 112 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (1994));
see also id. § 24, 1 Stat. at 117 (not codified) (providing that a treason conviction shall not work
corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate). Indeed, the federal law went further: it also gave the
accused a right to the names and addresses of prospective jurors and witnesses at least three days prior
to trial, and the right to challenge up to 35 jurors peremptorily. Id. §§ 29, 30, 1 Stat. at 118–19 (not
codified).
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constitution.”518 It would be another seventeen years, however, before Congress
got around to promulgating a new set of Articles to replace those that governed
the Army during the Revolutionary War.519
In the meantime, as a stopgap, the First Congress passed a law simply
providing that the “troops [in the service of the United States] shall be governed
by the rules and articles of war which have been established by the United
States in Congress assembled [that is, the pre-constitutional Articles from the
Revolutionary War], or by such rules and articles of war, as may hereafter by
law be established.”520 A few months later, Congress specified a bit more
precisely that “the commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers, privates
and [military] musicians . . . shall be governed by the rules and articles of war,
which have been established by the United States in Congress assembled, as far
as the same may be applicable to the constitution of the United States, or by
such rules and articles [of war], as may hereafter by law be established.”521
Congress passed a similar law after ratification of the Bill of Rights,522 and
thereafter applied the longstanding rules and articles to newly enlisted officers
and privates.523
In effect, then, the Articles of War of 1776, and the appended rules, remained
in effect for the first seventeen years of the Constitution, at least insofar as they
were “applicable to the constitution of the United States.”524 The post-1789 law,
therefore, included the spying resolution of August 1776,525 as well as Articles
18 and 19 of the September 1776 Articles of War, which authorized trial by
court-martial for certain forms of aid to the enemy: relieving the enemy with
money, victuals, or ammunition; knowingly harbouring or protecting an enemy;
and holding correspondence with, or giving intelligence to, the enemy, either
directly or indirectly.526 As explained in Part IV, the spying-behind-the-lines
offense applied only to persons who were not members of, nor owed allegiance
to, any of the states, and who were captured before returning to camp “in or
about the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States”;527
and the better reading of Articles 18 and 19 was that they regulated only persons
within, or serving with, the U.S. military, but did not apply to ordinary civil518. Secretary Henry Knox, A Statement of the Troops in the Service of the United States, in
1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED
STATES 5, 6 (Lowrie & Clarke eds. 1832).
519. See infra notes 530–38 and accompanying text.
520. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, § 4, 1 Stat. 95, 96.
521. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 13, 1 Stat. 119, 121 (emphasis added); see also Act of July 1,
1797, ch. 7, § 8, 1 Stat. 523, 525 (providing that “the [commissioned] officers, non-commissioned
officers, seamen, and marines, belonging to the navy” shall be governed by the 1775 naval rules insofar
as they “may be applicable to the constitution and laws of the United States”).
522. Act of Mar. 3, 1795, ch. 44, § 14, 1 Stat. 430, 432.
523. E.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 31, § 3, 1 Stat. 725, 725.
524. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10, § 13, 1 Stat. 121.
525. See supra Section IV.B.
526. See supra Section IV.C.2.
527. See supra Section IV.B.
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ians.528 Congress’s early post-constitutional laws, if anything, only confirmed
these circumscribed readings of the venerable rules and articles.529
Finally, in 1805, Representative Joseph Bradley Varnum, like Secretary Knox
before him, urged Congress to adapt the articles of war “to the provisions under
the present Government,” because “our circumstances had materially changed”
since 1776.530 After sparse debate, Congress enacted a new set of Articles of
War, which President Jefferson signed on April 10, 1806.531 The new articles
did not significantly differ from the 1776 articles that had remained in effect
from 1789 to 1806.532 In particular, Congress continued in force the three
provisions with which we are most concerned, without material change:
1. The new Article 56 (previously Article 18) provided that “[w]hosoever shall
relieve the enemy with money, victuals, or ammunition, or shall knowingly
harbor or protect an enemy, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as
shall be ordered by the sentence of a court martial.”533
2. Article 57 (previously Article 19) provided that “[w]hosoever shall be
convicted of holding correspondence with or giving intelligence to the
enemy either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court martial.”534
3. The spying provision, denominated “Section 2” of the 1806 Act, provided
“[t]hat in time of war, all persons not citizens of, or owing allegiance to the
United States of America, who shall be found lurking as spies, in or about
the fortifications or encampments of the armies of the United States, or any
of them, shall suffer death, according to the law and usage of nations, by
sentence of a general court martial.”535
Congress did not in any way signal that Articles 56 and 57 would permit
courts-martial of persons unconnected to the armed forces. To the contrary, the
section of the statute containing those quasi-treason provisions specified that
“the following shall be the rules and articles by which the armies of the United
States shall be governed.”536 And that specification made perfect sense, not only
because the 1776 Articles on which these articles were directly based did not
apply to ordinary civilians,537 but also because all, or almost all, of the conduct

528. See supra Section IV.C.2.
529. For example, Congress specified that the articles and rules were to govern “commissioned
officers, non-commissioned officers, privates and [military] musicians.” Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 10,
§ 13, 1 Stat. 119, 121.
530. 15 ANNALS OF CONG. 264 (1805) (statement of Rep. Varnum).
531. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, 2 Stat. 359.
532. See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original Practice I,
72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 22 & n.160 (1958).
533. Act of Apr. 10, 1806, ch. 20, § 1, 2 Stat. 359, 366.
534. Id.
535. Id. § 2, 2 Stat. at 371.
536. Id. § 1, 2 Stat. at 360 (emphasis added).
537. See supra notes 400–08 and accompanying text.

1630

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:1529

they described would amount to treason, and the notion that treason could be
adjudicated by a military tribunal would surely trigger serious constitutional
questions in light of the Treason Clause of Article III.538
This reading was confirmed by the first major contemporary treatise on U.S.
military law. In 1813, General Isaac Maltby, who would serve as Brigadier
General throughout most of the War of 1812, published A Treatise on Courts
Martial and Military Law. Maltby devoted a long section of this volume to the
question at hand. He insisted that, with the principal exception of foreign spies
caught behind army lines, “[o]f course, no private citizen, or person in civil life,
is amenable” to courts-martial.539 Maltby noted with surprise, however, that
General Zebulon Pike, commanding officer of the Army at West Lake Champlain, had recently published a military order, dated January 5, 1813, staking out
the contrary view.540 Pike’s order insisted that members of the community who
held correspondence with, or gave intelligence to, the enemy, could be courtmartialed pursuant to Article 56 of the Articles of 1806.541 Such an order, wrote
Maltby, had previously “never been known in a free country.”542 To be sure,
such citizens, “so lost to a sense of their duty,” could be tried for their
crimes—but by a civil, not a military, tribunal.543 Pike had misconstrued the
1806 Articles, wrote Maltby, which were not styled “for the government
of the citizens of the United States,” but rather “for the government of the
armies of the United States.”544 The narrower statutory interpretation, Maltby
insisted, was sufficient to settle the matter, without even adverting to the
constitutional right to a trial by jury, which loomed in the background.545 If
Pike’s contrary view were to take hold, Maltby warned, a “complete military
despotism” would prevail.546 Maltby was consoled, however, by the thought
that Pike’s doctrine “[could not] be supported, nor the practice of it carried into
effect, so long as due diligence [was] exercised by a free people.”547

538. A century later, one prominent commentator expressed amazement that “it does not appear that
the constitutionality of . . . unrestricted application [of the enemy aid articles] to civilians was ever
discussed or even considered by Congress.” Morgan, supra note 369, at 105. The absence of any
constitutional discussion, or concern, is entirely understandable, however, once one realizes that
Congress probably did not intend the Articles in question to reach ordinary aid to the enemy by
civilians. Professor Morgan’s all-too-common mistake was to assume it was “clear beyond dispute that
the [Articles in question] and all [their] predecessors, beginning with November, 1775, were intended to
be operative against civilians.” Id. at 100. As we have seen, that was not the case.
539. ISAAC MALTBY, A TREATISE ON COURTS MARTIAL AND MILITARY LAW 37 (Boston, Thomas B. Wait
& Co. 1813).
540. Id. Pike was killed in the battle of York (Toronto) in 1813; he had earlier been an explorer, and
Pikes Peak in Colorado bears his name. See JARED ORSI, CITIZEN EXPLORER: THE LIFE OF ZEBULON PIKE
168, 271 (2013).
541. MALTBY, supra note 539, at 37–39.
542. Id. at 37.
543. Id. at 38.
544. Id. at 39.
545. Id. at 39–40.
546. Id. at 40.
547. Id.
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Practice during the War of 1812 confirmed that Maltby, not Pike, had the
better of the argument. Whereas there is plenty of evidence of civilians being
tried in Article III courts for treason by virtue of alleged provisions of aid and
comfort to the enemy,548 there is no record of any civilians being tried by
courts-martial during the war under Articles 56 and 57. And, in at least two
cases, New York courts held that civilians providing aid to the enemy were not
subject to military adjudication.549 Four decades later, in Milligan, the Supreme
Court cited one of these cases with obvious approval, as demonstrating that the
military trials of citizens “not in the military service” were “uniformly condemned as illegal.”550
The leading such case involved a claim for assault and battery and false
imprisonment against an Army officer (Smith), for detaining and failing to
release a U.S. citizen (Shaw) who had been arrested by other Army officers.551
Smith’s principal defense was that the detention was lawful because he had
reason to believe that Shaw might have been subject to a court-martial, given
that the other officers had charged him with a variety of offenses, including that
he had furnished the enemy with necessaries, and that he was a British spy.552
The state appellate court, however, held that a court-martial would not have
jurisdiction over any of the charges against Shaw. “He might be amenable to the
civil authority,” the court held, but the military had “a want of jurisdiction.”553

548. See, e.g., United States v. Pryor, 27 Fed. Cas. 628 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814); United States v. Hodges,
26 Fed. Cas. 332 (C.C.D. Md. 1815); United States v. Lee, 26 Fed. Cas. 907 (C.C.D.C. 1814);
NATHANIEL WEYL, TREASON: THE STORY OF DISLOYALTY AND BETRAYAL IN AMERICAN HISTORY ch. 9 (1950).
549. Those cases are discussed in greater detail in Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The President’s Power to
Detain “Enemy Combatants”: Modern Lessons from Mr. Madison’s Forgotten War, 98 NW. U. L. REV.
1567, 1580–85 (2004).
550. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 128–29 (1866).
551. Smith v. Shaw, 12 Johns. 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1815).
552. Id. at 258–60.
553. Id. at 265. Indeed, it does not appear from the reported case that Smith even argued that a
court-martial could try Shaw for providing aid to the enemy: Smith’s counsel did not invoke Article 56
of the Articles of War, even though that article would have been directly on point if it had been
understood to apply to civilians. See id. at 259–61 (reporting arguments on behalf of Smith).
The other significant New York case involved Samuel Stacy, who was arrested by the military on July
1, 1813, on suspicion of having provided intelligence to the British that facilitated the May 29 attack on
the vulnerable base at Sackets Harbor, near Ontario. See In re Stacy, 10 Johns. 328 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1813). Stacy filed for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking relief from military detention. When served with
the writ, one officer stated that “Stacy had been guilty of treasonable practices, in carrying provisions
and giving information to the enemy, and that he believed a court-martial was the proper tribunal to try
the said Stacy, though he was a citizen, or words of like import.” Id. at 330. Chancellor Kent, on the
appellate court, opined not only that the charge of treason was pretextual, and not sufficiently “founded
upon oath” with “specification of the matters of which it might consist,” but also that the treason charge
was “without any colour of authority in any military tribunal to try a citizen for that crime.” Id. at 333.
Stacy was released from military custody shortly thereafter because, as a citizen, he was not subject to
trial by court-martial. See Letter from John Armstrong, Secretary of War, to Senator Joseph Anderson,
Chairman of the Military Committee of the U.S. Senate (July 26, 1813), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS:
DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE, OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES—MILITARY AFFAIRS 384
(Lowrie & Clarke eds., 1832). Once again, the failure of the military officers to rely upon, or even to
invoke, Article 57, is telling.
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In another case that is also revealing of the Executive’s understanding of the
quasi-treason articles, Elijah Clark, a U.S. citizen, spied on U.S. Army camps
and conveyed information to the British about Army conditions.554 A courtmartial convicted Clark of spying.555 President Madison overturned the verdict
because the spying provision of the law, by its terms, did not apply to U.S.
citizens.556 Notably, Madison did not suggest to the commanding officer that the
court-martial should charge Clark with a violation of Article 57, for providing
intelligence to the British; instead, he was “pleased to direct, that unless [Clark]
should be arraigned by the civil court for treason, or a minor crime, under the
laws of the state of New York, he must be discharged.”557
This wartime practice, and the pre-1812 history that informed it, support
Isaac Maltby’s understanding of the narrow scope of the “whosoever” Articles
that have been part of the federal code since 1776. It is also consistent with the
general presumption during this period, reflected in formal opinions of the
Attorney General, that the right to a jury trial is “the great palladium of our
most sacred rights,” and that therefore statutes should not be construed to have
authorized military trials, and thus to have abrogated that “high constitutional
privilege by implication.”558 There is almost nothing in this period to suggest
the Congresses or Presidents of the era believed that those early Articles of War,
including the 1806 codification, permitted military trials against persons unaffiliated with the armed forces, with the exception of enemy spies who were not
U.S. citizens and who were captured under very specific circumstances. Nor is
there evidence of any political branch understanding, in those first decades after

554. See HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE, LAW MISCELLANIES 409–10 (1814).
555. Id.
556. See “Opinion of the President,” in Letter from Secretary of War William Eustis to General A.
Hall (Oct. 20, 1812), in id. at 410–11.
557. Id. (emphasis added). A leading post-war constitutional law treatise, going beyond Madison’s
statutory understanding, took the view that such a military trial of a U.S. civilian spy for the enemy
would be unconstitutional. See WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 209–10 (1825).
One other notorious military trial in the War of 1812 should also be noted, although it is a precedent
of little or no value to the question at hand. After victory in the Battle of New Orleans in 1814, General
Andrew Jackson continued to impose martial law in New Orleans, fearing that the British might return.
This prompted a letter of complaint in the Louisiana Courier, written by state Senator Louis Louaillier,
politely arguing that Jackson had gone too far and that civil order should be restored in the city. See
H.R. DOC. NO. 69, 27th Cong., 3d Sess. at 5–7 (1843). Jackson arrested Louaillier and brought him up
before a court-martial, where one of the charges (the only one the panel agreed to hear) was that
Louaillier’s publication of the letter violated the 56th and 57th articles of the Rules and Articles of War.
Id. at 8 (concerning Charge No. 5). Louaillier objected that those articles did not govern civilians such
as himself. Id. at 4. Although the court-martial overruled that objection, id. at 5, 10, the merits of the
allegation were facially preposterous, and on the second day of the proceedings the court-martial found
Louaillier not guilty, id. at 12.
558. Cadets at West Point, 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 276, 276–77 (1819) (William Wirt); see also id. at 279
(“[T]he sacred respect in which Congress have ever regarded the right of trial by jury . . . will justify us
in assuming it as their sense, that this right is never to be taken away by implication . . . .”); Offences
on Vessels with Letters-of-Marque, 1 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 177, 177 (1814) (“The jurisdiction of the military
tribunals is not to be stretched by implication.”).
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the Constitution’s ratification, that Article III would permit military trials over
all or most domestic-law offenses related to war.
VI. SPYING, TREASONOUS CONDUCT, AND MILITARY TRIALS IN LATER
AMERICAN WARS
As we have seen, during the Revolutionary War, and up through and beyond
the War of 1812, there was a general understanding that, apart from the
idiosyncratic exception of alien spies apprehended within Army encampments,
and a rare situation in 1777–1778 where civilian courts were unavailable around
Philadelphia, courts-martial were not available to try persons other than those
within or employed by the armed forces.559 The “quasi-treason” Articles of War
were generally understood not to confer such authority, and Article III and the
Sixth Amendment would have presented significant barriers had Congress
deigned to authorize such military trials.
Even so, the 1778 kidnapping resolve and the 1780 Joshua Hett Smith trial
complicated this otherwise unbroken narrative. Moreover, as I will show in this
Part, those anomalies, along with the spying law itself, became the source of
one of the principal arguments invoked in some of the nation’s major wars—the
Civil War and the two World Wars—for the proposition that military tribunals
can try certain war-related domestic law offenses.
As far as I have been able to determine, the first inkling of such an
argument—other than in General Pike’s unimplemented military order of
1813560—appeared in an 1846 treatise on American military laws, written by
Army Lieutenant John O’Brien. O’Brien acknowledged that the 56th and 57th
Articles of War “relate to offences closely allied to treason,”561 and thus that
they were “cognizable either by the civil or by the military courts.”562 Yet he
further assumed that Congress’s use of the term “whosoever” in both articles
rendered those provisions applicable to those “in civil life,” as well as to those
within the military—a “deviation from the general rule” that courts-martial are
reserved for trial of persons within the armed forces.563 O’Brien surmised,
unpersuasively, that the justifications for such a deviation included “the necessity of a prompt and immediate example” and “the difficulty, if not impossibil-

559. See also Steiner’s Case—Civil Responsibility of the Army, 6 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 413, 425 (1854)
(“A court martial is a lawful tribunal, existing by the same authority that any other court exists by, and
the law military is a branch of law as valid as any other, and it differs from the general law of the land
in authority only in this, that it applies to officers and soldiers of the army, but not to other members of
the body politic, and that it is limited to breaches of military duty.” (emphasis added)).
560. See supra notes 540–42 and accompanying text.
561. JOHN O’BRIEN, A TREATISE ON AMERICAN MILITARY LAWS, AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS MARTIAL
146 (1846).
562. Id. at 148.
563. Id. at 147.
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ity, of bringing the offenders before a civil tribunal.”564 O’Brien did not contend
with Isaac Maltby’s persuasive counterargument that the Articles were more
limited in scope; he did not attempt to explain why the Continental Congress
and General Washington failed to rely on such provisions during the War of
Independence to deal with civilians providing aid to the British, nor why those
articles similarly went unused for such purposes during the War of 1812; and
O’Brien did not engage with the serious constitutional questions that his reading
presented.
A. THE CIVIL WAR

At the outset of the Civil War, the Confederacy enacted its own Articles of
War, adopted virtually verbatim from the 1806 Articles—including, importantly,
the two quasi-treason provisions (Articles 56 and 57),565 and the spying provision (Section 2).566 In September 1862, the Confederate Army’s Judge Advocate, James O. Fuqua, was asked whether Articles 56 and 57 applied to civilians
unconnected to the Confederate military forces.567 Fuqua adopted Maltby’s
reading—the traditional understanding—rather than O’Brien’s: He opined that
the quasi-treason Articles applied only to persons “belonging to the armies of
the Confederate States,” notwithstanding use of the word “whosoever,” and that
military courts in general (with one minor exception not relevant here) had no
jurisdiction to try civilians.568 Fuqua acknowledged his initial assumption that
such a reading of the Articles would be “untenable.” Upon study of the
question, however, he concluded that the government had clearly “left the
punishment of this class of traitors exclusively to the slow and uncertain process
of the civil tribunals,” even though that might be “inconvenien[t] and even
danger[ous].”569 Thereafter, the Confederate Congress rarely, if ever, authorized
the military trial of civilians. As Professor Currie wrote, even “in the waning
days of the war,” when that legislature made it unlawful to assert false claims
against the government, to conspire to overthrow the Confederacy, or to give
military information to the enemy, it “provided for courts-martial only of
members of the armed forces; civilian defendants were to be tried in the

564. Id. at 147–48. For example, common civilian court practice pursuant to treason laws in the
states before the Constitution, and under the federal treason statute thereafter, belied O’Brien’s
assumption that civil trials would be “difficult[], if not impossib[le].” Id.
565. See ARTICLES OF WAR, FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES 14
(Charleston, 1861).
566. Id. at 24.
567. See Letter from James O. Fuqua, Judge-Advocate and Provost-Marshal-General, to Brig. Gen.
Daniel Ruggles (Sept. 22, 1862), in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 122, Ser. 2, vol. 4, at 894, 894–95.
568. Id. at 895–96.
569. Id. at 896–97. The following year, the Confederate Acting Attorney General concluded likewise. See Jurisdiction of Courts Martial (Nov. 18, 1863), in THE OPINIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE
ATTORNEYS GENERAL 1861–1865, at 352 (Rembert W. Patrick ed., 1950) (“Does the 57 Article of War
apply to any but persons belonging to the Army of the Confederate States? . . . I may answer at once in
the negative.”).
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ordinary civil courts.”570
Things were very different, however, on the Union side of the conflict.
1. Joseph Holt’s Reading of the Quasi-Treason Articles in the Smithson
Court-Martial
In a treatise published at the outset of the Civil War, Captain Stephen Vincent
Benét (grandfather of the poet and novelist) followed O’Brien’s lead, construing
Articles 56 and 57 of the 1806 Articles to apply to persons unconnected to the
military.571 More importantly, the Union Army itself adopted this revisionist
reading of the quasi-treason Articles, and began to prosecute persons unconnected to the Union armed forces in courts-martial for treasonous activity,
pursuant to Articles 56 and 57.572
In at least one such case, the Army Judge Advocate General, Joseph Holt—
the principal architect of the system of military commissions in the Civil War
and the man who would later prosecute the Lincoln assassination conspirators—
was compelled to explain why Article 57 applied, and why a court-martial
proceeding against a civilian for treasonous activities would be constitutional.573
In December 1861, the Navy came upon a quantity of contraband correspondence on the schooner Lucretia, near Alexandria, Virginia. The haul included
two encoded letters written by one “Charles R. Cables” to an unidentified rebel
colonel. The letters warned of an alleged plot by Lincoln and his cabinet to fund
two Union loyalists from Tennessee—Senator Andrew Johnson and Clerk of the
House Emerson Etheridge—to burn bridges and mills in Tennessee. The military soon determined that the letters were written by William T. Smithson, a
banker in Washington, D.C. Secretary of State Seward ordered Smithson’s
arrest on January 8, 1862, and civil authorities held Smithson until the War
Department ordered him to be transferred to military custody on February 15. In
May 1862, Smithson was discharged after taking an oath of allegiance.
570. David P. Currie, Through the Looking-Glass: The Confederate Constitution in Congress,
1861–1865, 90 VA. L. REV. 1257, 1339 (2004).
571. STEPHEN V. BENÉT, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW AND THE PRACTICE OF COURTS-MARTIAL 30–31
(1862). Benét’s sole basis for this reading was the statutory term “whosoever.”
572. See WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 103 & nn.27–28. In one case early in the war, for
instance, a court-martial convicted Ulysses C. Vannosdoff of ostensible violations of Articles 56 and 57
for enlisting in the rebel army and inducing others to do the same. The court-martial sentenced
Vannosdoff to confinement at hard labor during the war and confiscation of his property. See Records of
the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 1792–2010 (National Archives Record Group 153);
Court Martial Case Files, 12/1800–10/1894; Case of Ulyssses C. Vannosdoff—Citizen (Headquarters,
W. Dep’t, Sept. 20, 1861) [National Archives Identifier 1805311; Local Identifier II-473]. Notably, that
same court-martial, on the same day, convicted another Missouri civilian, Isaac Wilcox, for “[t]reason
against the Government of the United States,” based upon similar facts, and without express reference
to Articles 56 and 57. See Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Army), 1792–2010
(National Archives Record Group 153); Court Martial Case Files, 12/1800–10/1894; Case of Isaac
Wilcox—Citizen, Missouri (Headquarters, W. Dep’t, Sept. 20, 1861) [National Archives Identifier
1813076; Local Identifier KK-817].
573. See generally Case of William T. Smithson, OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 122, Ser. II, vol. 2, at
1354–57.
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One year later, the military discovered that Smithson was heavily engaged in
the purchase and sale of Southern securities and currency, and was acting as a
business agent for Confederate authorities. In May 1863, the military arrested
Smithson once again.574 Joseph Holt wrote to Secretary of War Stanton, urging
that because Smithson’s conduct amounted to treason, he should be held
without access to the writ of habeas corpus (which Lincoln had suspended, with
recent congressional ratification), and his property confiscated.575 In July, Smithson’s brother-in-law importuned President Lincoln to have Smithson turned
over to the civil court, as appeared to be contemplated by Sections 2 and 3 of
the 1863 Habeas Act;576 and on August 1, Lincoln agreed that Secretary Stanton
should “[p]lease consider the case & dispose of it according to law.”577 Lincoln’s notation was given to one of Stanton’s clerks, but apparently Stanton
never responded, and Smithson remained in military detention in the Capitol
Prison.
In September, a number of District residents, vouching for Smithson’s character, wrote to the President, once more seeking Smithson’s transfer to civilian
court.578 They explained that a civilian grand jury had indicted Smithson for
treason based upon his conduct related to his trading in Confederate securities,
presumably pursuant to an updated treason statute that Congress enacted the
previous year.579 A motion had been made to the criminal court judge to issue
an order directing Smithson’s transfer, but after learning from Stanton that the
military refused to surrender Smithson to civil authorities, the judge decided
that “he would not bring his Court in conflict with the military authorities.”580
The supplicants pleaded with Lincoln to have Smithson released or transferred
to civil court for trial.581
The War Department never did transfer Smithson to the civilian justice
system, however; instead, Stanton and Holt decided to try him by court-martial,
based upon the two letters he allegedly wrote to a Confederate officer back in
1861. In November 1863, two charges were brought against Smithson before a
574. See Letter from Edwin M. Stanton to Charles A. May (May 20, 1863), in OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 122, Ser. II, vol. 5, at 664, 664.
575. Letter from Joseph Holt to Edwin M. Stanton (May 25, 1863), in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note
122, Ser. II, vol. 5, at 699, 700.
576. An Act Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, ch.
81, §§ 2, 3, 13 Stat. 755, 755–56 (1863); see also Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination,
supra note 45 (discussing the 1863 Habeas Act).
577. Endorsement Concerning William T. Smithson (Aug. 1, 1863), in 6 COLLECTED WORKS OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 361 (Basler ed., 1953).
578. Petition of Charles Wilson and Others to Abraham Lincoln (Sept. 1863), in PAPERS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN, http://lincolnpapers2.dataformat.com/images/1863/09/221776.pdf [https://perma.cc/M3KXA3XN] [hereinafter Wilson Petition].
579. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, § 1, 12 Stat. 589, 589–90. The indictment can be found as an
exhibit to the court-martial record in Trial of William T. Smithson, National Archives, RECORDS OF THE
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL (ARMY), 1792–2010, Court Martial Case Files, Record Group
153, Box 976, MM1125 [hereafter Smithson Trial Case File].
580. Wilson Petition, supra note 578, at 2–3.
581. Id. at 3–4.
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court-martial under Article of War 57, alleging that he had held correspondence
with, and had given intelligence to, the enemy, by virtue of sending those two
letters.582
In defense, Smithson’s counsel argued both that the evidence was insufficient
to show that he wrote the pseudonymous letters, and that the evidence was, in
any event, inadequate to show a correspondence with the enemy, or a sharing of
intelligence, because the letters had never reached their audience (having been
interdicted by the Navy).583 Smithson’s principal defense, however, was a
detailed, lawyerly argument that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction over his
case, and that he should instead be tried in the nearby civil court in the District,
“where the municipal law is daily administered” and where both civilians and
military personnel were regularly being “tried and punished.” Smithson’s counsel argued both that Article 57 did not apply to persons unaffiliated with the
military,584 and that if it did apply it would violate the constitutional right to a
jury trial found in Article III and the Sixth Amendment—the “great palladium
of our most sacred rights.”585
Judge Advocate General Holt successfully defended the court-martial’s statutory and constitutional jurisdiction: The court-martial turned aside Smithson’s
jurisdictional plea, proceeded to find him guilty of all charges, and sentenced
him to a term of five years in the penitentiary in Albany, New York.586 During
his argument to the court-martial, however, Holt acknowledged that the jurisdictional question was ultimately for President Lincoln to resolve in his review of
the judgment: “[I]t cannot be doubted anything of weight that may have been
urged on the question of jurisdiction under the Constitution will receive the
most conscientious and careful consideration.”587 Accordingly, in his report to
the President and to Secretary Stanton, Holt offered an elaborate, formal
defense of the court-martial’s jurisdiction over nonmilitary personnel for traitorous assistance to the enemy, allegedly in violation of Article 57.588
Part of Holt’s argument was based upon a straightforward and unabashed
disdain of civilian proceedings precisely because of their more robust, and less
summary, procedural protections: “Without the authority to visit upon this class
582. General Orders No. 371, War Dep’t, Adjutant General’s Office (Nov. 18, 1863), in 2 GENERAL
ORDERS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT 634, 634–37 (N.Y. 1864).
583. The account in this paragraph is derived from the handwritten “Statement of Defense,” in the
Smithson Trial Case File, supra note 579.
584. He specifically argued that the Continental Congress’s original change in the Article from
“whosoever, belonging to the forces of the United States” to a simpler “whosoever,” in September
1776, see supra notes 395–398 and accompanying text, was best read to ensure that the Article covered
suttlers and retainers to the armed forces. See supra notes 400–01 and accompanying text.
585. Smithson’s counsel borrowed that formulation from Attorney General Wirt’s 1819 opinion, see
supra note 558.
586. General Orders No. 371, in 2 GENERAL ORDERS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, supra note 582, at 637.
587. Holt made this statement in his closing argument, which can be found in the Smithson Trial
Case File, supra note 579.
588. Report of the Judge Advocate General, Case of William T. Smithson, 5 OPS. J.A.G. RECORDS 287
(Nov. 13, 1863).
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of offenses summary and severe punishments,” Holt wrote:
the War making power would be greatly enfeebled if not absolutely paralyzed.
Proceedings in the ordinary criminal courts, by indictment and jury trial,
would have no terror for such traitors, through whose machinations indeed,
the military power of the Country might be overthrown, before the machinery
of such courts could be even set in motion. . . . If [enemy abettors among the
demoralized and disloyal classes outside of the Army] cannot be promptly and
unsparingly punished, there can be no successful prosecution of hostilities.589

Holt’s primary argument, however, was decidedly historical, and dependent
upon a particular narrative about what had occurred before and shortly after the
Revolutionary War. His argument is worth setting out at length, as it resonates
so closely with the “preservationist” account on which the government is
presently relying in support of military commission trials of domestic-law
offenses:
The history of the 57th article of War, will go far to show the conviction which
has obtained from the foundation of the government, of the necessity of
summarily and severely punishing by military courts, this class of offenders,
and the acquiescence in such proceedings as in harmony with the constitution.
At the outset of the revolution,—as is learned from the correspondence of that
period—so strong a popular prejudice existed against the military, that the
establishment of a military code,—now known as the articles of War—was an
extremely difficult and almost odious task. . . . The article of War, now known
as the 57th but which was the 28th of the code adopted by Congress on the 30th
of June 1775, was restricted to persons “belonging to the Continental army.”
This restriction was probably the fruit of the prejudice referred to. It was soon
discovered however that thus restricted, the article would be in effect a
brutum fulmen, since the offenders against whom its penalties were directed,
were not within, but without the military service. Accordingly in November
following, the same Congress threw off this restriction and enacted that “all
persons convicted of holding a treacherous correspondence with or giving
intelligence to the enemy shall suffer death, or such other punishment as a
general Court Martial shall think proper—” This article of War, thus enlarged,
was in force on the ratification of the Federal Constitution, and on the
adoption of the amendment, which is claimed in the defense to be invaded by
this trial. It continued to be the law of the service until 1806, when it was
substantially reaffirmed by Congress, and adopted as it now exists, the word
“whosoever” having been substituted for “all persons.” The feature of the
article now assailed thus appears to be older than the constitution, to have
been in force when that instrument came into existence, and to have been
re-adopted, a few years thereafter by a Congress, in which were in all
probability, many who must be ranked among the founders of the republic,
and who were doubtless intimately acquainted with the spirit and import of
589. Id. at 292 (emphasis added).
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this and other provisions of the constitution. This action may well be accepted
as virtually a contemporaneous exposition of this clause of the fundamental
law, which, added to the usage in the service that has constantly prevailed,
must be regarded as precluding the government from opening a question thus
long closed. The power now contested, has been exercised without doubt as to
its constitutionality, through all the wars in which the republic has been
engaged, and involved as we are, in civil commotions, and grappling with a
gigantic rebellion, whose emissaries are found every where in our midst, and
hanging about our military camps, such a power could not be surrendered
without a culpable disregard of the highest considerations connected with the
public safety.590

Importantly, Holt was using this historical account to argue two things: not only
that the quasi-treason provisions of the Articles of War were applicable to
civilians unconnected to the Union armed forces, but also that there was no
constitutional problem with that reading, because Congress endorsed it without
hesitation shortly after the Constitution was ratified, and because it “has been
exercised without doubt as to its constitutionality, through all the wars in which
the republic has been engaged.” Yet Holt’s account was deeply problematic on
both statutory and constitutional grounds.
To begin with, Holt’s historical account of the Articles of War was shot
through with historical errors:
1. As explained earlier, the Continental Congress did not enact the November
1775 amendment in order to expand the substantive coverage of the restriction in the 28th article of the June 1775 Articles.591
2. The term “whosoever” was first added not (as Holt argued) in 1806, but in
Section XIII, Articles 18 and 19 of the September 1776 Articles of War—
and it, too, was not designed to broaden the scope of those prohibitions to
persons unconnected to (that is, not enrolled in or employed by) the
military.592
3. The 1806 Congress did not “substantially reaffirm[]” or “readopt[]” Holt’s
reading of the Articles to cover civilians—because that was not the general
understanding of the provisions before 1806.593
4. Nor was Holt’s reading of Article 57 “exercised without doubt as to its
constitutionality through all the wars in which the republic has been
engaged”—to the contrary, that reading was repudiated in the War of 1812,
and it was only in the Civil War itself that the military, at Holt’s own
command, began to act in reliance upon the broader reading.594

590.
591.
592.
593.
594.

Id. at 294–95 (emphasis added).
See supra note 379.
See supra notes 396–11 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 530–38 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 548–57 and accompanying text.
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Even if there had been merit to Holt’s statutory history, however, Holt
realized that his reading of Article 57 would raise serious constitutional questions, because it would appear to suggest that Congress could ignore the
protections of Article III and the Sixth Amendment not only as to cases of
treason, which Article III specifically addresses, but also, perhaps, as to any and
all domestic-law offenses that had an effect on the Army’s war efforts. As the
passage above demonstrates, Holt’s principal defense of his reading was that the
constitutional question was settled by an implicit “contemporaneous exposition”
of the Constitution—an “exposition” that took the form of the early enactment
and (allegedly) common use against civilians of the quasi-treason Articles
themselves. Even so, Holt’s historical account, even if it had been accurate, did
not contend with the plain constitutional text, nor did it offer any limiting
principles.
Accordingly, Holt went further: Citing O’Brien and Benét (neither of whom
had considered the constitutional question), Holt offered the following structural argument, predicated on the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment
(“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces . . . .”)595:
In a period of hostilities, relieving the enemy, with money, victuals or
ammunition, or knowingly harboring and protecting him, or holding a correspondence with or giving intelligence to such enemy, is a crime which may be
said within the meaning of the constitution, to “arise in the land or naval
forces,” since it directly connects itself with the operation and safety of these
forces, whose overthrow and destruction it seeks. This is especially true when,
as in case of the prisoner, the correspondence is held or intelligence given
from the midst of our military camps, whose shelter he was enjoying, and
with whose plans and preparations for movements, he had every opportunity
of acquainting himself. This view of the constitutionality of these articles of
War (56 ⫹ 57) has uniformly prevailed. Benet (31) and O’Brien treat as clear
the right to try by military courts certain classes of persons not belonging to
the army. The latter author, at page 147, remarks with much force on the
necessity of such a power as resulting from the nature of the offenses and the
urgency with which the public safety demands their prompt and immediate
punishment.596

It is not surprising that Holt placed such reliance on the Grand Jury Clause, in
light of a then-recent Supreme Court precedent. Just five years earlier, in Dynes,
the Court had held, in effect, that because the Grand Jury Clause exempted
members of the armed forces from the right to a grand jury, they were also
exempt from the jury trial right of Article III and the Sixth Amendment (and,

595. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
596. 5 OPS. J.A.G. RECORDS at 293.
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implicitly, the Article III guarantee of an independent judge), and thus could be
subject to courts-martial.597 The Dynes Court’s reasoning was vulnerable from
the start—after all, Article III preceded ratification of the Fifth Amendment, and
there is no evidence that the latter provision of the Bill of Rights was designed
to expunge judge and jury rights established by the earlier guarantee—and it did
not stand the test of time.598 Even so, it made sense for Holt, in 1863, to rely
upon Dynes and the Grand Jury Clause as support for his argument concerning
abrogation of the right to a trial by jury for a civilian such as Smithson, too.599
But even if Holt had been correct that cases “arising in the land or naval
forces” were exempt from the judge and jury guarantees of Article III, there
remained the question of whether and how the military commission cases in
question, involving civilians’ aid to the Confederacy, did “arise in” the military
forces, even when not committed by military personnel or by persons accompanying the forces. Holt made two distinct arguments on this score. The narrower,
and easier, case, he suggested (“[t]his is especially true”) is when the individual
acts from within the military encampment itself, such as when a spy is caught
red-handed in the Army camp, or (Holt’s example) when a prisoner attempts to
send forth, to his comrades, intelligence to which he has been privy. In such
cases, perhaps it makes some sense to say that the offense literally “arises
in”—that is, among—the military forces, although the Supreme Court would
later effectively reject that reasoning as a basis for military tribunals.600 Such
cases, however—in which the accused’s actions occurred within actual Army
encampments—were few and far between, and thus did not cover the vast
majority of the cases Holt and his colleagues were prosecuting in military
tribunals.
Holt therefore constructed a much broader theory of “arises in.” He argued
that conduct “arises in” the land forces if it “directly connects itself with the
operation and safety of th[e] forces, whose overthrow and destruction it seeks.”
On this view, any aid to the enemy that is likely to undermine the Union Army’s
war effort would “arise in” the armed forces and would, for that reason, permit
military adjudication, even when (as in Smithson’s case) the conduct could also
be tried in an Article III court.
This “effects-on-the-military test” could not possibly be right, even apart
from the point, later established, that the Grand Jury Clause is not a source of
congressional power to establish military tribunals.601 It would mean, for
597. See supra notes 175–86 and accompanying text.
598. See supra note 67.
599. Holt himself, on behalf of the government, relied almost exclusively on Dynes in his brief to
the Supreme Court in the famous Vallandigham case later in 1863. See Brief for the Petitioner on
Application for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Ex parte Vallandigham, December Term 1863. In its decision in
that case, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to review the military commission proceedings,
and therefore did not reach the merits of the constitutional question. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S.
243, 251 (1864).
600. See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 n.5 (1955).
601. See id.
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example, that virtually any act of treason could be tried in military court. Just
one month before Holt wrote, a New York court rejected this reasoning.602 And
many years later, the Supreme Court effectively undermined Holt’s “arising in”
argument, holding in Reid v. Covert that Congress does not have the authority to
subject children and other dependents of servicemen to courts-marital, even
when they commit an offense while accompanying service members abroad at
government expense and receiving other benefits from the government.603 The
government argued in Reid—shades of Holt’s argument in the Civil War—that
it was “implicit in the Federal Constitution,” and “consistent with the guarantee
of a jury trial for cases not arising in the land or naval forces,” to assume that
Congress “is given certain authority to determine what persons not actually in
the army or navy were to be subject to court-martial because of their connection
with the military.”604 Justice Black’s plurality opinion, however, explained that
the Fifth Amendment exception for “cases arising in the land or naval forces,”
together with the correlative power of Congress to provide for the “Government
and Regulation” of the armed services,605 “does not encompass persons who
cannot fairly be said to be ‘in’ the military service.”606 Justice Black insisted
that the “latitudinarian interpretation” pressed by the government would “be at
war with the well-established purpose of the Founders to keep the military
strictly within its proper sphere, subordinate to civil authority”607:
The Constitution does not say that Congress can regulate ‘the land and naval
Forces and all other persons whose regulation might have some relationship
to maintenance of the land and naval Forces.’ There is no indication that the
Founders contemplated setting up a rival system of military courts to compete with civilian courts for jurisdiction over civilians who might have some
contact or relationship with the armed forces. Courts-martial were not to have
concurrent jurisdiction with courts of law over non-military America.608

602. See Jones v. Seward, 40 Barb. 563, 571–72 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1863) (explaining that if someone
beyond military lines gives vital intelligence to the enemy, “[t]his man is, indeed, emphatically a traitor;
he is guilty of high treason against the United States of America; but he is to be tried by a civil tribunal,
according to the course and practice of the established law, on a presentment or indictment of a grand
jury. His case has not arisen in the land or naval forces, or in the militia when in actual service in time
of war or public danger. . . . Although it indeed affects the operations of a certain portion of the land
forces, it is not a military but a civil offense.” (emphasis added)).
603. See 354 U.S. 1, 22–23 (1957) (plurality opinion).
604. Supplemental Brief for Appellant and Petitioner on Rehearing at 79, Reid v. Covert and
Kinsella v. Krueger, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Nos. 701, 713) (emphasis added).
605. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
606. Reid, 354 U.S. at 22 (plurality opinion).
607. Id. at 30.
608. Id.; see also, e.g., O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 267 (1969) (“[C]ourts-martial have no
jurisdiction to try those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no matter how intimate the
connection between their offense and the concerns of military discipline.”); McElroy v. United States ex
rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284 (1960) (holding that Congress cannot prescribe military jurisdiction
over civilian employees of the military for peacetime offenses).
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Accordingly, Holt’s strongest argument was not his reading of the Fifth
Amendment’s “arising in” clause, but instead his contention, discussed above,
that there was a distinct wartime exception to the jury right—an argument
predicated not on constitutional text, but upon Holt’s (misguided) understanding
of the early history of the quasi-treason Articles. It is hardly surprising that Holt
tendered that argument in Smithson’s case, because that court-martial proceeding itself involved one of those very Articles—Article 57.609
Holt’s preservationist reasoning also served an objective far beyond Smithson’s case, however—namely, to justify the Department of War’s extensive
Civil War practice of trying non-service members in military commissions
(rather than courts-martial), tribunals that were (at least at first) not authorized
by the Articles or any other statute.
2. The “Necessity” Argument for Military Commissions
By the time Holt wrote in the Smithson case in late 1863, he and other
officers within the War Department had established an extraordinary, vast
system of military commissions, which the Army used to prosecute a wide
range of charges against persons who were unconnected to the Union forces, in
addition to cases of spying and providing aid to the enemy, which were
prescribed by the Articles of War and thus generally prosecuted in courtsmartial.610 The commissions proceedings began in the border states of Missouri
and Kentucky, primarily against organized “guerrilla” groups and other marauders who were engaged in efforts to undermine the Union cause by sabotage,
including the destruction of railroads, bridges, and telegraph lines.611 The cases
quickly expanded, however, to other jurisdictions, including the District of
Columbia and some northern states, and to a “stunningly wide array of conduct.”612 Some cases involved ordinary crimes such as horse-stealing, robbery,
murder, and rape—often with only a very attenuated or nonexistent connection

609. As for Smithson himself, Secretary Stanton and then President Lincoln approved his conviction
and five-year sentence, without mentioning the jurisdictional dispute. General Orders No. 371, in 2
GENERAL ORDERS OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, supra note 582, at 637. A few months later, Lincoln wrote to
Stanton that the Smithson case was “troublesome” because “[h]is wife and children are quartered
mostly on our friends, and exciting a great deal of sympathy, which will soon tell against us.” See Letter
from Abraham Lincoln to Edwin M. Stanton (Mar. 18, 1864), in 7 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM
LINCOLN 254, 257 (Basler ed., 1953). The President asked what Stanton thought of sending Smithson to
the South, “holding the sentence over him to be re-inforced if he returns during the war.” It was not
until November 1864, however, that Lincoln had Smithson conditionally released, subject to renewed
imprisonment if he misbehaved. See Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Edwin M. Stanton (Nov. 21,
1864), in 8 COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 119, 119 (Basler ed. 1953); see also Letter from
Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War, to Abraham Lincoln (Nov. 21, 1864) (reporting that the Adjutant
General was instructed to issue orders conforming to Lincoln’s wishes).
610. See generally MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
chs. 2, 8 (1991); JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 263–73
(2012).
611. See NEELY, supra note 610, at 41–44, 168–72.
612. See WITT, supra note 610, at 268.
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to the war—while others involved a wide array of activities that the military
viewed as harmful to the Union war effort, such as obstructing the recruitment
of forces and discouraging enlistment, trading with the enemy, traveling into the
South without a pass, permitting rebels to lurk in a neighborhood without
reporting them, corrupt business dealings with the military, corresponding with
a child in the Confederate Army, public condemnation of the draft, and simply
expressing sympathy for the Confederacy or criticizing the Union war effort.
The Union lawyers who defended these tribunals did not settle upon a single
justification for their constitutionality. They invoked several different theories
over time, in various combinations, including, for example, the Grand Jury
Clause argument that Holt had raised in the Smithson case;613 the assertion that
the conduct in question (or much of it, anyway) violated the law of war;614 and
a variant on the argument, described earlier, that the Constitution does not
govern the exercise of belligerent activities in wartime, but is instead displaced
by the law of war.615 Each of those arguments was problematic, and none
withstood the test of time, at least not with respect to the mine run of military
commissions cases that the Union Army prosecuted.616
For purposes of this Article, two of the arguments are especially pertinent by
virtue of their relationship to the Founding-era practice involving spies and
individuals who aided the British.
First, the most common and prominent explanation the War Department
offered to justify its military commissions was one of exigency—namely, that
military tribunals were necessary because the defendants could not be tried in
ordinary civilian courts. Holt, for example, writing at the close of the war,
insisted that the commissions “originat[ed] in the necessities of the rebellion,”
and were employed “in regions where other courts had ceased to exist, and in
cases of which the local criminal courts could not legally take cognizance, or
which, by reason of intrinsic defects of machinery, they were incompetent to
pass upon.”617
This argument thus resembled, in form, the argument the Continental Congress and General Washington offered to justify the use of military courts in the
Philadelphia area in 1777–1778: military tribunals were necessary because they
were the only game in town.618 The difficulty with the analogy to 1777
Philadelphia, however, is that the civilian courts had not actually “ceased to
exist,” literally or in effect, in most of the areas where President Lincoln and his
generals declared martial law and began to regularly use military commissions

613. See supra notes 595–99 and accompanying text.
614. See WITT, supra note 610, at 267–73.
615. See supra Section II.B.3.c.
616. I discuss these rationales at greater length in Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45.
617. Letter from Joseph Holt to Edwin Stanton, Secretary of War (Nov. 13, 1865), in 5 OFFICIAL
RECORDS, supra note 122, Series III, vol. 5, at 490, 493.
618. See supra Section IV.C.3.
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in the Civil War; nor were the civil courts unable to “take cognizance” over
most of the dangerous conduct that was adjudicated in military commissions. As
I discuss elsewhere,619 the real reason the War Department turned to military
commissions was not so much necessity, but rather that it was eager to impose
penalties that were much swifter, harsher, and less constrained than in the
ordinary course of trials in Article III (and state) courts. Lincoln’s generals
endeavored to avoid civilian courts, in other words, for the very reasons that the
Constitution guarantees access to such courts and disfavors military justice.
In the Milligan case, the Supreme Court effectively rejected the War Department’s relatively unbounded notion of exigency, the logic of which would
permit resort to military courts whenever the political branches determine that
the dispensation of justice in civilian courts is insufficiently “severe.” Congress
can only authorize military tribunals, reasoned the Court majority, in cases
where the civil courts are “effectually closed” and the civil administration of the
laws “depose[d].”620 The historical example of Philadelphia in 1777–1778 thus
could not have sufficed to support most or all of the Union’s practice of military
commissions in the Civil War, even under the assumption that the Constitution
preserves the federal government’s power to emulate that pre-constitutional
example.
3. Resurrecting the 1778 Resolve, and the Joshua Hett Smith Trial, in the
Lincoln Assassination Trial and the Milligan Case
The War Department raised yet another argument in defense of military commissions, however, that was expressly predicated upon the preconstitutional practice. Although this argument is rarely recalled in Civil War
histories, the government relied upon it in the two most famous Civil War
commissions cases—the trial of the Lincoln assassination conspirators, and the
Milligan case.
On May 1, 1865, President Johnson signed an order authorizing a military
commission trial, in the District of Columbia, of eight of John Wilkes Booth’s
alleged accomplices in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.621 The commis-

619. See Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45.
620. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 127 (1866). Chief Justice Chase, concurring, agreed that the
political branches’ power to authorize military trials against such civilians was limited by necessity,
although he would have allowed Congress more leeway to decide when the civil courts were effectively
closed. Id. at 139–42 (concurring opinion); see also supra note 196 and accompanying text. More
recently, the Court has indicated that the test is a demanding one:
There must be some overpowering factor that makes a recognition of [the jury right and other
constitutional trial rights] incompatible with the public safety before we should consent to
their temporary suspension. If those rights may safely be respected in the face of a threatened
invasion, no valid reason exists for disregarding them. In other words, the civil courts must be
utterly incapable of trying criminals or of dispensing justice in their usual manner before the
Bill of Rights may be temporarily suspended.
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 330 (1946) (emphasis added).
621. See PITMAN, supra note 55, at 17.
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sion consisted of nine military officers.622 The prosecutor was Judge Advocate
General Holt, aided by two Assistant Judge Advocates, John Bingham and
Henry Burnett.623 At several points during the proceedings, counsel for the
defense challenged the jurisdiction of the tribunal, arguing that Article III
required that the case be tried in the federal civilian court that was open and
operating in the District.624
In support of the tribunal’s constitutional jurisdiction, Bingham made a series
of arguments, most of which the Supreme Court effectively rejected in Milligan
two years later.625 In the midst of his long soliloquy, however, Bingham made
an aggressive appeal to practices and alleged constitutional understandings at
the Founding: “The struggle for our national independence was aided and
prosecuted by military tribunals,” Bingham noted, even in cases where “the
courts of justice were open.”626 Bingham began this historical part of his speech
by invoking the same mistaken account of the quasi-treason articles that Holt
had described two years earlier in the Smithson case.627 He also cited the spying
resolve of June 1776.628 Although, for reasons already explained, these examples did much less work than Bingham (and Holt) assumed they did,
Bingham then also specifically raised the example of the February 27, 1778
resolution involving kidnapping. “How comes it,” Bingham asked, if the defendants’ arguments about the Constitution were correct, “that this enactment was
passed by the Congress of 1778, when the constitutions of the several states, at
that day, as fully guaranteed trial by jury to every person held to answer for a
crime, as does the Constitution of the United States at this hour?”629 And why
didn’t any “loyal man ever challenge[]” its constitutionality?630
At that point Bingham ratcheted up the stakes, invoking the authority of none
other than George Washington, “the peerless, the stainless, and the just, with
whom God walked through the night of that great trial.”631 Washington, declared Bingham, enforced the February 1778 resolve—“this just and wise
enactment”—“upon all occasions.”632 As we have seen, this was an exaggera622. See id. at 18.
623. See id. at 17–18. Burnett had been the chief prosecutor of the military commission trial of
“copperheads” Lambdin Milligan and others in Indiana—a case I discuss below. Bingham went on to
become a member of the House of Representatives, in which capacity he was the principal author of
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
624. See Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45.
625. See PITMAN, supra note 55, at 351–72.
626. Id. at 361–62.
627. See supra notes 590–94 and accompanying text.
628. PITMAN, supra note 55, at 361.
629. Id. at 362.
630. Id. Later in 1865, a military prosecutor made virtually the same argument about the lack of any
challenge to the 1778 resolution, in defending the jurisdiction of a military commission convened to try
two civilians in North Carolina charged with the brutal murder of a Union scout. See Senate Exec. Doc.
11, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211–12 (1866) (argument of Brevet Major C.D. Roberts in court-martial of
Neill McGill and J.L. McMillan (Oct. 1865)).
631. PITMAN, supra note 55, at 362.
632. Id.
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tion: Washington tried to enforce the 1778 resolution only once. Yet Bingham
naturally made the most of that singular example. He pointedly described the
court-martial of Joshua Hett Smith, held at a time when the Constitution of New
York guaranteed the right to jury trial, and when the states retained their
sovereignty. If a military court had jurisdiction in that case, argued Bingham,
why not in the Lincoln assassination trial, too?633
There is no way to know whether and to what extent the Washington example
in the Smith case helped Bingham’s cause. It was virtually a foregone conclusion that the hand-picked commission he was addressing would not deny its
own power to hear the case; its rejection of the jurisdictional challenge was
overdetermined.
The next year, after the war had ended, and the question of the legality of
military commissions was finally before the Supreme Court in Milligan, the
government once again invoked General Washington, and the Joshua Hett
Smith trial, in defense of the system of military courts it had been using during
the preceding four years. Lambdin Milligan and his codefendants were U.S.
citizens living in Indiana who were convicted by a military commission for
offenses that included conspiring to overthrow the government, seizing munitions, and aiding the rebel army.634 They petitioned for writs of habeas corpus,
claiming that they should have been transferred out of military custody and
tried, if at all, by the civilian courts that were open and available in Indiana.635
In the course of his oral argument on behalf of the defendants, future President
James Garfield offered an extensive exegesis of British and American history,
placing special emphasis on the practice of Washington, as both Commander in
Chief in the Revolutionary War and as the first President, to show that the
“practice of our Revolutionary fathers” was “equally marked by respect for civil
law, and jealousy of martial law.”636 Garfield’s co-counsel, Jeremiah Black,
likewise invoked the example of the first great General: “Washington,” Black
said, “deserved the lofty praise bestowed upon him by the president of Congress
when he resigned his commission,—that he had always regarded the rights of
the civil authority through all changes and through all disasters.”637
Benjamin Butler, arguing for the United States on rebuttal, saw the Washington gambit as an opening, and decided that two could play at that game:
“Reference has been made by opposing counsel to what they consider the views
of General Washington; and an argument has been attempted to be drawn from

633. Id.
634. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 6–7 (1866).
635. Id. at 7–8.
636. Id. at 50.
637. Id. at 80. Black was referring to the congressional “answer” to Washington’s resignation of his
commission as Commander in Chief in Annapolis in December 1783; Congress lauded Washington for
having “conducted the great military contest with wisdom and fortitude, invariably regarding the rights
of the civil power through all disasters and changes.” 25 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 838 (Dec. 23,
1783).
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this,” said Butler.638 He pointed out, however, that “the first military commission upon this continent of which there is any record sat by command of
Washington himself”—namely, the trial of Major André.639 Butler conceded
that “[t]his may be said to have been the exceptional case of a spy,” but “we do
not stop there.”640 Butler then played his trump card: “To give . . . another
illustration of what Washington thought of the rights of military commanders in
the field,” said Butler, “attention may be directed to the trial of Joshua
Hett Smith,” who was “tried by a military court for treasonable practices” even
though the civil courts “were open at Tarrytown, at that time.”641 Butler went so
far as to relate, in detail, Washington’s intimidating effort to shake loose
intelligence from Smith by threatening him with swift military justice.642 From
Butler’s perspective, the Smith trial was the coup de grâce that demonstrated
that the Milligan commission was in accord with constitutional traditions:
What now, may I ask, is to be thought of the argument of my opposing
brethren, who assert that in civil courts the Constitution does not allow any
pressure to be brought upon a man to make him confess, at the same time that
they eulogize the military conduct of Washington?643

The Court overturned the petitioners’ convictions on statutory grounds, ruling
unanimously that the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863 had prohibited the trial of
Milligan and his codefendants in a military tribunal.644 Before it reached that
holding, however, the Court majority famously proceeded to further opine, as a
matter of constitutional limitation, that Congress could not subject such persons
to military justice unless the civil courts were literally or “effectually” closed.645
Neither the majority opinion nor Chief Justice Chase’s concurrence discussed
the Joshua Hett Smith case, or any of the other Revolutionary War examples on
which counsel for both sides had relied. Although the Justices may have
disagreed somewhat among themselves on the power of Congress to identify
638. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 99.
639. Id.
640. Id. at 100.
641. Id.
642. Id.
643. Id. at 100–01.
644. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 131; see also id. at 133–36 (Chase, C.J., concurring). The 1863 Act
directed the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War to furnish to the local federal court a list of all
persons within its jurisdiction who were “citizens of states in which the administration of the laws has
continued unimpaired in the said Federal courts” and who were being held by the military “otherwise
than as prisoners of war.” Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 2, 12 Stat. 755, 755. If the grand jury in the
federal court then terminated its session without indicting a person on one of those prisoner lists,
the Act required a judge of that court to discharge the person, so long as he first took an oath of
allegiance to the Union. Id. at 755–56. The Act further provided that if the Secretaries, for whatever
reason, failed to supply the court with such a list, a detainee could petition the court for the same relief,
on the same grounds. Id. § 3, 12 Stat. at 756. I discuss the 1863 Act further in Lederman, The Law(?) of
the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45.
645. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 118–30.
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dysfunctions in the civilian courts that could establish the requisite necessity for
military tribunals, none of them signaled any sympathy for the government’s
argument that the Revolutionary War precedents justified commissions even
absent any precondition of necessity.646
Indeed, it might be thought that the Court’s decision in Milligan not only
dismissed the significance of precedents such as the Joshua Hett Smith courtmartial and the Revolutionary War trials of spies, but actually resolved that the
Constitution prohibits such prosecutions. By concluding that Milligan’s prosecution for aiding the enemy could not have been convened in a military court even
if Congress had authorized it, didn’t the Milligan Court, in effect, reject the
government’s current argument that domestic-law offenses can be tried in
military tribunals? And, if so, why has the question continued to be the subject
of frequently renewed debate for a century and a half after Milligan?
There are at least two reasons why Milligan has not been viewed as having
settled the question. First, the discussion of congressional power in the majority
and concurring opinions, no matter how renowned it might be, was not necessary to the resolution of the case. The Court unanimously held that Holt and the
military had violated a federal statute that precluded the military trial—not that
Congress had actually overstepped its constitutional authority by authorizing a
military proceeding. The Justices’ debate about the scope of Article III and the
Sixth Amendment therefore is probably best viewed as obiter dicta, no matter
how well-considered it evidently was.647 Second, it is probably fair to view the
Court’s discussion of congressional power to be limited to the case of defendants who were not “part of or associated with the armed forces of the

646. In a remarkable, bitter pamphlet published soon after the Milligan decision—likely ghostwritten by Joseph Holt—an anonymous congressional committee roundly condemned virtually every
aspect of the Court’s opinions, in an effort to justify the long and extensive practice of using
commissions to help win the war. The pamphlet, quoting at length from John Bingham’s oration in the
Lincoln trial two years earlier, criticized the Court for having not adequately dealt with the Revolutionary War precedents. See THE UNION CONGRESSIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, REVIEW OF THE DECISION OF
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT, IN THE CASES OF LAMBDIN P. MILLIGAN AND OTHERS, THE INDIANA CONSPIRATORS
13–15 (Chronicle Print 1867).
647. Although the nonbinding nature of Justice Davis’s Article III discussion is often overlooked in
modern treatments of Milligan, it was widely understood in the contemporaneous assessments of the
decision, and for many decades thereafter. See generally CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864-1868, PART ONE 207–37 (1971); see
also FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 338 (rev. ed. 1976) (“I argued [to the Court in Quirin] that Ex
parte Milligan, having but enunciated a dictum, quite unnecessary to the decision of the case, was no
binding precedent, and that the Court should now take the opportunity to sweep away any lingering
authority that the case still carried.”); Charles Warren, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject
Certain Classes of Civilians to Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 AM. L. REV. 195, 209 (1919) (Milligan
“was not a decision upon the power of Congress to legislate under Article I, Section 8, of the
Constitution.”); Curtis A. Bradley, The Story of Ex parte Milligan: Military Trials, Enemy Combatants,
and Congressional Authorization, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 93, 115 (Christopher H. Schroder &
Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2009) (“[T]he majority’s unnecessary resolution of a constitutional issue . . . seems questionable by contemporary standards.”).
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enemy.”648 If so distinguished, the majority’s statements in Milligan about the
limits on Congress’s power would call into question the military prosecution of
someone who independently provides “material support” to the enemy; but it
would leave open the question of whether Article III limits Congress’s power to
prescribe military trials against members of enemy forces for violations of
domestic law.649
4. Congress’s Amendments to the Spying Statute
Before we move forward from the Civil War, one other development should
be noted. Recall that the Continental Congress’s 1776 resolution on spies,
codified after ratification of the Constitution as Section 2 of the 1806 act
establishing the Articles of War, authorized court-martial proceedings in certain
cases of spying, but only against persons who were “not members of, nor owing
allegiance to, any of the United States of America.”650 In the Civil War, this
statutory limitation made little sense, because the spies of the Confederate Army
were U.S. citizens who owed allegiance to the nation.651 Accordingly, in
February 1862, Congress struck that condition from the spying offense.652
More significantly for present purposes, the following year the House passed
a slightly amended version of the spying statute, which was appended to a
conscription bill.653 The purpose of the 1863 amendment was to make two
technical changes. First, it authorized the trial of spies in military commissions,
in addition to courts-martial. The second change was to eliminate the geographic limitation that Congress had, for some reason, included in the 1862
statute—which required the prosecution to prove that the spy was found in a
part of the United States “in a state of insurrection”654—so that the law would
apply to spies found in Army encampments in the northern as well as the border
states.
In so doing, however, the new amendment added a two-word phrase that
might have been read to expand the conditions under which the spying prohibition would apply far beyond the terms of the pre-1862 law. The new, House-

648. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39, 45 (1942) (distinguishing Milligan on the ground that Milligan
and his cohorts were not subject to, and thus could not have violated, the international law of war,
which was the touchstone of Stone’s ratio decidendi in Quirin, see supra Section III.A).
649. But see supra Section II.B.3.b (explaining why it would be difficult under modern doctrine to
argue that enemy aliens are subject to less favorable treatment for purposes of Article III and the Sixth
Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee).
650. See 5 JOURNALS, supra note 325, at 693.
651. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 387 (Jan. 20, 1862) (remarks of Sen. Wilson) (“We
recognize these persons as citizens of the United States, and hence we have no power to punish a South
Carolinian for lurking around our camps as a spy, while we have a right to punish an Englishman. This
bill applies to all persons hostile to the Government; and if we are going to carry on the war, we need
the change.”).
652. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 25, § 4, 12 Stat. 339, 339–40.
653. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1291 (Feb. 25, 1863) (remarks of Rep. Olin); see also
id. at 1293 (House approving the underlying bill).
654. Act of Feb. 13, 1862, ch. 25, § 4, 12 Stat. at 340.
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passed version provided that:
all persons who, in time of war or of rebellion against the supreme authority
of the United States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies in or about any
fortification, post, or encampment of any of the Armies of the United States or
elsewhere, shall be triable by military commission, and, upon conviction, shall
suffer death.655

The words “or elsewhere” suggested that spies could be tried in military
tribunals even if they were not apprehended “in or about any fortification, post,
or encampment” of the Army. As explained above, international law—which
circumscribes the traditional, sui generis Article III exception for the trial of
spies—allows states to prosecute spies from enemy armed forces only in cases
where they deceive the armed forces through dissimulation, and if they are
caught before returning to their own camp.656 For those reasons, the age-old
spying statute had, since 1776, required that the person be apprehended “in or
about” Army facilities. The House-passed amendment in 1863, by contrast,
could have been read to permit the trial of spies who had successfully left Army
lines and returned to their own camp, thereby extending the law beyond the
international law norm.
When the amendment came before the Senate three days later, Senator
Bayard made a motion to strike the new words “or elsewhere.”657 That term, he
explained, would introduce a “dangerous obscurity” that might lead to prosecution, by “men uninstructed in the great leading principles of law,” of persons
who were not “spies” as defined by those principles.658 The Senate rejected
Bayard’s proposed amendment—according to Bayard, because it was eager to
pass the underlying legislation that the House had already approved.659 Senator
Davis then declared that he would vote for the bill because the new spying
provision “declare[d] what is already the law of war,” and thus applied only to
the class of persons traditionally known as spies, “and to no other persons.”660
Therefore, although Davis agreed that the insertion of the term “or elsewhere”
was potentially “mischievous,” he concluded that it had “no legal effect whatever in the law,” and for that reason he was comfortable voting for it.661
Congress enacted the newly amended spying provision as the final section of
the conscription act on March 3, 1863.662

655. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1291 (Feb. 25, 1863) (remarks of Rep. Olin) (emphasis
added).
656. See supra Section IV.B.
657. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 1390 (Feb. 28, 1863) (remarks of Sen. Baynard).
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id.
661. Id.
662. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 38, 12 Stat. 731, 737. The amended spying law as enacted was
slightly different from the version that passed the House, but not in any respect relevant here. It
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Thereafter during the Civil War, a number of persons found within Union
lines in disguise—primarily Confederate officers and soldiers—were tried and
convicted by military commissions for being spies.663 On one occasion, military
authorities arrested an individual, Robert Martin, and charged him with being a
spy after he had made his way back to Confederate lines—a prosecution that
presumably depended upon an aggressive reading of the words “or elsewhere”
in the 1863 amendment.664 A New York judge granted Martin’s application for a
writ of habeas corpus. As to the charge of spying, the court did not even address
the 1863 spying statute, but the judge reached the same basic conclusion as
Senator Davis: Because the prisoner “was not taken in the act of committing the
offense charged,” and because he had, in fact, “returned within the lines of the
confederate forces, or had otherwise escaped” after his spying—and, in addition, because the judge believed the war had since ended—Martin could no
longer be tried as a spy.665 “I know of no case in modern history or in reports of
cases decided in the courts,” wrote the judge, “where any person has been held
or tried as a spy who was not taken before he had returned from the territory
held by his enemy, or who was not [] brought to trial and punishment during the
existence of the war.”666 The traditional spying exception to the right to jury
trial, reflected in the Revolutionary War proceedings against Hale and André,
thus continued apace during the Civil War, without regard to the new statutory
phrase “or elsewhere.” The potential mischief introduced by that phrase would
not become an issue again until the First World War.667
B. THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

Shortly after the Civil War and the Court’s decision in Milligan, the constitutional limits on military trials of civilians for domestic-law offenses appeared to
have become more firmly established. Attorney General James Speed, for
example, who had written a long opinion attempting to justify the military
commission trial of the Lincoln assassination conspirators,668 opined that Jefferson Davis could not be tried by military commission for his aggression against
the Union, even assuming that a state of war still existed, but instead had to be
remanded to civil authorities for a possible treason trial.669 The next year,

provided: “That all persons who in time of war or of rebellion against the supreme authority of the
United States, shall be found lurking or acting as spies, in or about any of the fortifications, posts,
quarters, or encampments of any of the armies of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be triable by a
general court-martial or military commission and shall, upon conviction, suffer death.”
663. See WINTHROP 2d ed., supra note 120, at 767 & n.100.
664. In re Martin, 45 Barb. 142, 148 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865).
665. Id.
666. Id.
667. See infra Section VI.B.2.
668. Military Commissions, 11 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 297 (1865). I discuss this opinion in greater detail in
Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45.
669. Case of Jefferson Davis, 11 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 411, 411–12 (1866). Similarly, that same year, a
federal circuit court concluded that if an 1862 enactment were construed to subject military contractors
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Speed’s successor, Henry Stanberry, likewise opined that a military commission
sitting in Washington, D.C. during the Civil War did not have jurisdiction to try
an individual for forging enlistment papers and selling them to draft evaders in
New York, where the civil courts “were in the full possession and exercise of all
their powers.”670
This apparent resolution of the question was not without complications,
however. In 1871, General William Tecumseh Sherman asked Attorney General
Amos Akerman how he should treat certain persons who had been caught
trading with members of the Comanche Indian tribe. Akerman identified offenses for which the detainees could be tried in civil courts, but then added that
if there were an ongoing war between the United States and the Coamanches,
the military could try them in a court-martial for violations of Article of War 56
(“[w]hosoever shall relieve the enemy with . . . ammunition . . . shall suffer death,
or such other punishment as shall be ordered by the sentence of a court
martial”), if they had provided ammunition to the enemy Indians.671 Akerman
simply assumed, without analysis, Joseph Holt’s contested view of Article
56—that it “applies to persons who are not, as well as to persons who are, in the
military service”—and he did not address the constitutional question at all.672
Then, in 1886, Colonel William Winthrop, who had been one of Judge
Advocate General Joseph Holt’s assistants during the Civil War, published the
first edition of his magisterial treatise on military law. In that tome, Winthrop—
who the Supreme Court has characterized as the “Blackstone of Military
Law”673—adopted Holt’s (mistaken) reading of the quasi-treason articles and
their early history, citing as authority not only Holt himself, but Attorney
General Akerman’s 1871 opinion, as well.674 Winthrop’s reading took hold;
thereafter, many (but not all) commentators simply took for granted that the
Continental Congress, as well as the 1806 Congress, intended those articles to
apply to civilians unconnected to the armed forces.675
to court-martial jurisdiction for fraud related to their contracts, it would be “clearly unconstitutional”
under Article III. Ex parte Henderson, 11 F. Cas. 1067, 1075 (C.C.D. Ky. 1878).
670. Devlin’s Claim, 12 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 128, 128 (1867). Stanberry also concluded that a congressional act of 1867, authorizing the use of military courts in Reconstruction in the South, could not
constitutionally be applied to try civilians “short of an absolute or controlling necessity.” The Reconstruction Acts, 12 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 182, 199 (1867). The subsequent use of such military courts in
Reconstruction thereafter famously occasioned an unprecedented constitutional showdown between the
political branches and the Court. See Ex parte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318 (1869).
671. Unlawful Traffic with Indians, 13 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 470, 472 (1871).
672. Id.
673. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 597 (2005) (plurality opinion) (quoting Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 19 n.38 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
674. 1 WINTHROP, supra note 398, at 123–26. By the time Winthrop wrote, Congress had renumbered
the quasi-treason Articles of War as Articles 45 and 46, in a recodification of the federal code. See
REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES, PASSED AT THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FORTY-THIRD CONGRESS,
1873–1874, tit. XIV, ch. 5, § 1342, arts. 45–46, at 233 (1875).
675. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 369, at 97–107; ROLIN A. IVES, A TREATISE ON MILITARY LAW AND
THE JURISDICTION, CONSTITUTION, AND PROCEDURE OF MILITARY COURTS 63 (4th ed. 1886); WILLIAM E.
BIRKHIMER, MILITARY GOVERNMENT & MARTIAL LAW 118–19 (1st ed. 1892). But see GEORGE B. DAVIS, A
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Most such observers, however—including Winthrop—recognized that this
capacious reading of the Articles raised a serious constitutional issue, not least
because the acts they proscribed were “mostly acts of treason”676 (at a minimum, “treasonable in their nature”677), and yet, as Winthrop acknowledged,
“treason as such is not an offense properly cognizable by a court-martial.”678
Winthrop and others thus endeavored to describe a cabined category of cases in
which the Articles could be applied constitutionally, typically by relying upon
the “arising in” clause of the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Like
Holt,679 these writers mistakenly assumed both that “arising in” described a
geographical condition, and that the exemption from the Fifth Amendment’s
grand jury guarantee would, where it applied, carry over to Article III and to the
jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.680 The trick, then, was to identify
the circumstances in which the treasonous conduct “arose in” the military
forces. For Winthrop, the permissible category of applications included those in
which civilians acted “on the theater of war or within the scope of martial
law.”681 Colonel Morgan, writing just after the First World War, argued, somewhat more broadly, that the Articles could constitutionally be applied to “civilians whose offenses occur in the theatre of war, in the theatre of operations or in
any place over which the military forces have actual control and jurisdiction.”682
1. Brigadier General Crowder and the 1916 Revision of the Articles of War
Shortly before the First World War, Holt’s esteemed successor as Judge
Advocate General, Brigadier General Enoch Crowder, addressed the quasitreason articles in his official Digest of Opinions of the Judge Advocates
General of the Army.683 Crowder took note of Holt’s broad reading from the
Civil War; echoing Winthrop, he wrote that this construction might be “warranted so far as relates to acts committed on the theater of war or within a
district under martial law,” but he also recognized that “the effect of the leading
adjudged cases,” including Milligan, “preclude[d] the exercise of the military
jurisdiction over this class of offenses, when committed by civilians in places

TREATISE ON THE MILITARY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: TOGETHER WITH THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF
COURTS-MARTIAL AND OTHER MILITARY TRIBUNALS 417 (1st ed., New York, 1898) (limiting the articles to
cover those in or connected with the military would seem to be the “sounder construction”).
676. 1 WINTHROP, supra note 398, at 126.
677. Id. at 898.
678. Id.
679. See supra notes 595–601 and accompanying text.
680. I have previously explained why both of these assumptions were dubious and eventually
rejected by the Court. See supra notes 603–08 and accompanying text.
681. 1 WINTHROP, supra note 398, at 126.
682. Morgan, supra note 369, at 107 (emphasis added). Birkhimer reasoned, more narrowly, that
“being penal in their nature and derogatory of the constitutional right of trial by jury,” the Articles could
only be applied constitutionally in cases where the offenders must be tried by the military or else go
unpunished: “Wherever the civil courts without prejudice to the interests of the service can take
jurisdiction this should be done.” BIRKHIMER, supra note 675, at 119.
683. A DIGEST OF OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY 128 (1912).
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not under military government or martial law.”684 Crowder then reasoned that
the “sounder construction” of the Articles was that they were “a code enacted
for the government of the military establishment,” and that they should therefore be understood to “relate only to persons belonging to that establishment,
unless a different intent should be expressed or otherwise made manifest”—and,
notably, “[n]o such intent is so expressed or made manifest.”685 In other words,
Crowder appeared, in effect, to have adopted Isaac Maltby’s (proper) construction of the Articles, and to have rejected Holt’s alternative reading. Indeed,
Crowder further surmised that if the 1776 legislation did, as Holt thought,
extend application of the quasi-treason articles to civilians, that extension
“seems to have become modified on the adoption of the Constitution.”686
That same year, however, Crowder himself appeared to reintroduce the
broader reading, in the context of a proposed revision of the Articles of War.
Crowder was principally responsible for drafting the first extensive amendment
to the Articles since 1806. In so doing, he combined the two quasi-treason
articles into one, a new 81st Article, entitled “Relieving, Corresponding with, or
Aiding the Enemy.” His draft article provided:
Whosoever relieves the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or
other thing, or knowingly harbors or protects or holds correspondence with or
gives intelligence to the enemy, either directly or indirectly, shall suffer death,
or such other punishment as a court-martial or military commission may
direct.687

The proposed new 82nd Article, in turn, was a revision on the longstanding
prohibition on spying:
Any person who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or
about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of the
armies of the United States or elsewhere shall be tried by a general courtmartial or by a military commission, and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer
death.688

In presenting these amendments to the House of Representatives, Crowder
testified that if Congress retained the “whosoever relieves the enemy” formulation in the 81st Article, it would at least “suggest” that the military jurisdiction

684. Id. at 128 n.7.
685. Id. at 128–29 n.7.
686. Id. at 129 n.7. Crowder further suggested that “[p]ersons not belonging to the military
establishment may be proceeded against for the acts mentioned in the article”; if so, however, it was
“by virtue of the power of another jurisdiction, namely, martial law; and martial law does not owe its
existence to legislation but to necessity.” Id.
687. DEPARTMENT OF WAR, COMPARISON OF PROPOSED NEW ARTICLES OF WAR WITH THE PRESENT ARTICLES
OF WAR AND OTHER RELATED STATUTES 43 (1912) (quoting H.R. 23628, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1912)).
688. Id.
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in question would run to the “civilian as well as the person in military
service.”689
Congress delayed consideration of the revision. Four years later, however, in
support of substantially the same revision, Crowder testified even more definitively that the offenses in the 81st Article “may, and usually will be, committed
by persons outside of the Army.”690
Congress enacted the new Articles in August 1916. They included the 81st
and 82nd Articles as Crowder had drafted them.691 There was some reason to
think that Article 81 would not apply to civilians. Article 2 of the new Articles
of War specified, in great detail, the “persons [who] are subject to these
articles”—and, notably, that enumeration did not include civilians unconnected
to the military forces.692 Likewise, when the Judge Advocate General published
a new Manual for Courts-Martial in 1917, the section discussing persons
subject to the new Articles did not mention such civilians.693
Nevertheless, Crowder’s testimony did suggest a broader reading of Article
81. Moreover, notwithstanding its constrained reading of who was “subject to”
the new Articles generally, Crowder’s Manual for Courts-Martial also stated
that Article 81, in particular, “subjects to the jurisdiction of courts-martial and
military commissions all persons, either military or civil, who, in the theater of
operations and during the continuance of war traffic with the enemy in any of
the ways herein denounced,” even though the Manual also acknowledged that
“[t]his article describes, in nearly every phrase, an overt act of treason.”694
By virtue of this rather ambiguous legislative and administrative history, it
would be fair to infer that by the time Congress re-enacted the 81st Article in
1920,695 it might have assumed that it was authorizing military trials of civilians
689. Revision of the Articles of War: Hearing before the House Comm. on Military Affairs on H.R.
23628, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 69 (1912).
690. Revision of the Articles of War: Hearing before the Senate Subcomm. on Military Affairs, 64th
Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1916).
691. Act of Aug. 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 3, 39 Stat. 619, 663. Congress did not repeal the 1863 version
of the spying provision, which continued to appear in the federal code as section 1343 of the United
States Revised Statutes. From 1916 to 1950, therefore, the code included two complementary wartime
spying provisions. For present purposes, there were no material differences between them.
692. Id. at 651.
693. JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S OFFICE, A MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, COURTS OF INQUIRY, AND OF
OTHER PROCEDURE UNDER MILITARY LAW 2–4 (1917).
694. Id. at 234 (emphasis added). The Manual’s geographic qualifier, “in the theater of operations,”
was not found in the 81st Article itself. Presumably, that was Crowder’s effort, following Winthrop, to
salvage the constitutionality of the broad reading—by limiting it to circumscribed locations. Another
passage from the Manual’s analysis indicated just how unconstrained that condition was, however,
according to Crowder’s telling: “Citizens of neutral powers resident in or visiting invaded or occupied
territory can claim no immunity from the customary laws of war which threaten punishment for
communication with the enemy. The offense of communicating with the enemy when committed by a
resident of occupied territory constitutes war treason and is properly charged under this article.” Id. at
235.
695. Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, ch. II, 41 Stat. 759, 804 (1920). The 1920 enactment amended
Article 81 to also include attempts to relieve the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies, money, or
other things. Id.
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unconnected to the military for treason-like conduct, at least to the (uncertain)
extent the Constitution allowed—even if that is not what Congress had intended
in earlier iterations of the regulation in 1776 and in 1806.
As for the new 82nd Article on wartime spying, the 1917 JAG Manual
confirmed that concealment was not enough for culpability—there had to be
deception or “dissimulation” as well.696 Thus, an accused person could only be
convicted if “found at a certain place within our lines, acting clandestinely, or
under false pretenses”; an act of espionage “completed by the escape of the
accused to his own lines can not be the subject of trial if the quondam spy is
later captured.”697
2. Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren’s Remarkable, Unauthorized
Campaign for Expansion of Military Jurisdiction Over Domestic-Law Offenses
In the heat of the First World War, Congress enacted several notoriously
harsh laws designed to punish conduct inimical to the war effort, including the
Espionage Act of 1917,698 the nation’s first comprehensive statute criminalizing
espionage and the sharing or disclosure of defense-related information. That and
related laws also criminalized various forms of aid to enemy nations and
obstruction of the war effort, especially respecting enlistment.699 Once these
laws were in place—supplementing the existing treason statute—virtually all of
the conduct covered by the 81st and 82nd Articles of War (the quasi-treason and
spying Articles) was also proscribed by civil laws, enforceable by trial in Article
III courts.700
For some members of the Senate, however, this was not enough. They were
intent on also proscribing anti-war speech, and other modes of expression
thought to be supportive of the enemy or harmful to the U.S. military cause. On
April 5, 1918, the Senate debated an amendment to the Espionage Act that
would have made it a crime, “when the United States is at war,” to
utter, print, write, or publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, contemptuous,
or abusive language about the form of government of the United States, or the
Constitution of the United States, or the soldiers or sailors of the United
States, or the flag of the United States, or the uniform of the Army or Navy of
the United States.701

696. JAG MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 693, at 236–37.
697. Id.
698. Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217.
699. See generally GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 146–85 (2004).
700. Therefore, to the extent the constitutional basis for allowing spies to be tried by court-martial
had been that no other tribunal was available to deal with such conduct, see supra notes 359–60 and
accompanying text, that rationale was rendered obsolete.
701. 56 CONG. REC. 4629 (1918); see also STONE, supra note 699, at 185–91 (discussing Sedition Act
of 1918).
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Some proponents of the bill wished to go further still. Henry Cabot Lodge of
Massachusetts, in particular, proposed an amendment prohibiting the use of the
mails for any newspapers, magazines, or pamphlets that included any German
language.702 More importantly, Lodge thought that all the criminal laws in the
world would not be enough to stop those who would undermine the war effort.
He was deeply skeptical that the ordinary criminal justice system was up to the
task of dealing with the fifth columns that he thought were present throughout
the land—“agents of the German Government” engaged not only in traditional
spying, but also in sabotage, arson, destruction of railroads, even “mixing glass
with bread.”703 Such criminals, he insisted, “have been treated altogether too
delicately” by the civilian justice system: “They come to trial and they get some
short term in the State prison or the prison of the United States, a punishment
for which they care nothing.”704 Lodge insisted that the only way to stop such
persons from doing harm was to “try them by a court-martial and shoot
them.”705 Lodge’s speech caught the attention of Oregon Senator George Chamberlain, Chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs, who had been contemplating legislation that would, indeed, dramatically expand military tribunal
jurisdiction. “[I]f our military code is not broad enough to cover that class of
cases,” said Chamberlain, “it seems to me it ought to be amended so as to place
within the jurisdiction of military tribunals the classes of men—and women,
too, if you please—mentioned by the Senator.”706 Lodge seconded the idea, and
Senator Lee Overman of North Carolina concurred: “There ought to be some
law providing for a court-martial to hang these people,” said Senator Overman,
because the existing legal tools were “utterly inefficient.”707 Other senators
interjected to remind their colleagues of the constitutional right to a jury trial,
and of the Milligan decision,708 but that did not deter Overman, Lodge, and
Chamberlain.
Over at the Department of Justice, Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren took close heed of this Senate debate. Warren would later become known
for his three-volume History of the United States Supreme Court, for which he
won the 1923 Pulitzer Prize in history; but at the time, his primary claim to
fame was that he was one of the principal architects of the Espionage Act, the
Trading with the Enemy Act, and other internal security legislation promoted by
the Wilson Administration.709 Earlier in the War, Warren had been at the heart
of the government’s efforts to counter what it perceived as pro-German and

702. 56 CONG. REC. at 4628.
703. Id. at 4645.
704. Id.
705. Id.
706. Id.
707. Id. at 4646.
708. See, e.g., id. (remarks of Sen. Nelson); id. at 4652 (remarks of Sen. Thomas).
709. See Letter from Charles Warren to Sen. George Chamberlain at 1 (Apr. 12, 1918) (on file with
the Library of Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6).
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anti-American activities in the United States, through both prosecutions and
detentions of alien enemies under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798. In October
1917, however, Attorney General Thomas Watt Gregory established a new War
Emergency Division to handle such matters, and appointed John Lord O’Brian
to run the division.710 Warren’s portfolio at the Department thus no longer
covered the treatment of internal critics and war saboteurs.711
Warren, like the senators, had become increasingly frustrated by what he saw
as the inefficiencies of the prosecutorial arm of the Department of Justice, and
the overall inadequacy of the criminal justice system to deal with persons in the
United States whose speech and conduct were undermining the war effort. As
early as August 1917, Warren met with Wisconsin Senator Paul Husting and
with Wheeler Bloodgood, a member of the executive council of the Wisconsin
Loyalty League, to discuss the growing threat.712 At the time, Wisconsin and
Minnesota had significant numbers of residents of German heritage, and there
was a robust anti-war movement in Milwaukee, including within elements of
the Socialist Party. A well-known centrist within that party, Victor Berger, who
had earlier been the first Socialist elected to the House of Representatives, was
the editor of influential newspapers, including the Milwaukee Leader. Another
Socialist, Daniel Hoan, was the mayor of Milwaukee. Senator Husting and the
Loyalty League were committed to stopping the anti-war movement in the
upper Midwest, and they quietly enlisted Charles Warren to help them do so.713
Warren—insisting that he was speaking only in his individual capacity, and not
on behalf of the Department of Justice—told Bloodgood that he was “firmly of
the opinion that a war can not be run in the criminal courts of the country or by
the Department of Justice,” and that therefore Congress should grant the Army
all necessary authority to deal with enemy activities.714 Husting and Warren
reportedly agreed that what was needed was an amendment to the 82nd Article
of War to “change the definition of a spy so it would be brought up to date and
would meet the conditions that it appeared at that time were rampant in this
country.”715
Senator Husting died in October 1917—killed by his brother in a duckhunting accident716—but his idea gathered new force with the colloquy of
710. See The Reminiscences of John Lord O’Brian 229–35 (1952), Oral History Collection, Columbia University, New York, N.Y.
711. See Letter from Charles Warren to Sen. George Chamberlain (Apr. 12, 1918) (on file with the
Library of Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6); Letter from Attorney General
Thomas W. Gregory to Rep. William Gordon (Apr. 29, 1918) (on file with the Department of Justice,
National Archives and Records Admin., Case File 190470, Section 5, Record Group 60, Box 2818),
reprinted in 56 CONG. REC. APP. 307, 308 (1918) (noting that Warren had had “practically no connection
with any of the activities” at issue “[f]or more than six months”).
712. See Extending Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals: Hearings on S. 4364 Before the S. Comm. on
Military Affairs, 65th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1918) (testimony of W.P. Bloodgood).
713. See id.
714. Id. at 9.
715. Id. at 5.
716. “Husting is Killed by Brother in Hunt,” N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1917.

1660

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 105:1529

Senators Lodge, Chamberlain, and Overman in April 1918, just a few days after
Victor Berger, the Socialist newspaperman, was defeated in the election to
replace Husting (an election that occurred while Berger was under an Espionage
Act indictment for his speeches advocating an end to the war).717 Warren was
ready and he seized the opening. On the next business day after the Senate
debate, Monday, April 8, he sent a letter to Senator Overton, explaining that he
had been “giving considerable attention” to the question and had “prepared
material” for a law review article on it.718 “Speaking personally, and not
officially, and not speaking in any way for the Department of Justice,” Warren
offered the Senator his view that military adjudication was critical because “I do
not believe that war can be effectively carried on by the criminal courts.”719
Warren attached a memorandum defending the constitutionality of legislation
authorizing such trials; it was entitled “Who Are Spies?: A memorandum of law
on the power of Congress to subject civilians to trial by court-martial under the
Constitution,” attributed to “Charles Warren, Assistant Attorney General of the
United States.”720 Warren also sent copies of his memorandum to Senators
Lodge, Chamberlain, and others, and continued to send the Senators revised
versions as he made corrections over the course of the next week.721
The day after he received Warren’s memo, Senator Chamberlain asked
Warren to help him draft legislation. Warren had been reluctant to do so,
“inasmuch as I felt that I would be trespassing on the prerogatives of the War
Department in so doing.”722 When Senator Chamberlain informed Warren that
Judge Advocate General Crowder was “entirely agreeable” to the idea, however,

717. See THE WISCONSIN BLUEBOOK 1919, at 46 (P. Hunter ed., 1919). Berger was elected to the
House of Representatives that November, after he had been convicted of the Espionage Act offenses.
The House voted 309-1 to deny Berger his seat, however—and did the same after he prevailed again in
a special election shortly thereafter. In 1921, the Supreme Court overturned Berger’s conviction on the
ground that Berger and his codefendants had sufficiently alleged anti-German animus on the part of the
trial judge, Kennesaw Mountain Landis. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921). Berger once
again ran for the House in November 1922, and was finally permitted to serve when he won for a third
time. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 545 n.83 (1969).
718. See Letter from Charles Warren to Sen. L.S. Overman (Apr. 8, 1918) (on file with the Library
of Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6).
719. Id. at 1–2.
720. See Letter from Attorney General Thomas W. Gregory to Rep. William Gordon, supra note 711,
at 1, in 56 CONG. REC. APP. at 308. Overton promptly asked the Senate Committee on Printing to publish
the memorandum as a public document, 56 CONG. REC. at 4757 (1918); but the Committee never
printed it, even after Warren pushed for such publication after he had left office. See Letter from Sen.
George Chamberlain to Charles Warren (May 21, 1918) (on file with the Library of Congress, PAPERS OF
CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6) (stating that the Committee on Printing would consider the
publication request when it had a quorum).
721. See, e.g., Letter from Charles Warren to Senator L.S. Overman (Apr. 10, 1918) (on file with the
Library of Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6); Letters from Charles Warren to
Senators Henry Cabot Lodge and Frank B. Kellogg (Apr. 16, 1918) (on file with the Library of
Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6).
722. Letter from Charles Warren to Senator George Chamberlain at 2 (April 12, 1918) (on file with
the Library of Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6).
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Warren sent Chamberlain a draft of legislation the next day, April 12.723 Warren
candidly acknowledged, at least by implication, that such a law might be on thin
constitutional ice, but that did not dissuade him: “If an Act of this nature is
required for the protection of the Government,” he explained, “it would appear
to be wise to enact it, even if after the war the courts might hold it unconstitutional.”724 “I have long believed,” Warren wrote, “that the moral effect of one
man arrested and tried by court-martial was worth a hundred men tried by the
Department of Justice in the criminal courts.”725 Warren again added the
disclaimer that these were only his personal views, and not those of the Department
of Justice.726
Four days later, Chamberlain introduced the legislation.727 Its scope was
breathtaking.728 It would apply to everyone: “any person, whether citizen or
subject of the enemy country or otherwise.” It would apply “anywhere in the
United States” (apparently premised on the idea that the entire nation was “part
of the zone of operations” of the armed forces, even without any fighting). And
it would cover virtually any and all conduct, and speech, that would “endanger
723.
724.
725.
726.
727.
728.

Id. at 2–3.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 4–5.
See 56 CONG. REC. at 5120 (Apr. 16, 1918) (noting Chamberlain’s introduction of S. 4364).
The full text of Section 1 was:

[O]wing to changes in the conditions of modern warfare, whereby the enemy now attempts to
attack and injure the successful prosecution of the war by the United States, by means of
civilian and other agents and supporters behind the lines spreading false statements and
propaganda, injuring and destroying the things and utilities prepared or adapted for the use of
the land and naval forces of the United States, thus constituting the United States a part of the
zone of operations conducted by the enemy, any person, whether citizen or subject of the
enemy country or otherwise, who shall, anywhere in the United States, in time of war,
endanger or interfere with, or attempt to endanger or interfere with, the good discipline order,
movements, health, safety, or successful operations of the land or naval forces of the United
States, (a) by causing or attempting to cause insubordination or refusal of duty by any member
of such land or naval forces, or (b) by delivering or transmitting, or causing to be delivered or
transmitted, to any member of such land or naval forces any written or printed matter which
shall support or favor the cause of the enemy country or of its allies in the war, or which shall
oppose the cause of the United States therein, or which shall contain any false reports or false
statements intended to interfere with the successful operation of such land or naval forces or
(c) by printing or publishing any such printed matter, or (d) by performing or attempting to
perform any act made by an offense against the United States by section one (a), section one
(b), section one (c), section one (d), or section two of Title I of the [Espionage Act of 1917], or
(e) by performing, or attempting to perform, any act made an offense against the United States
by the [Sabotage Act that the President would sign later that month], or (f) by performing, or
attempting to perform, any act made an offense against the United States by section twelve or
section thirteen of the act entitled “An act to authorize the President to increase temporarily
the military establishment of the United States,” approved May eighteenth, nineteen hundred
and seventeen, shall be deemed to be a spy and be subject to trial by a general court-material,
or by a military commission of the Army, or by a court-material of the Navy, and on
conviction thereof shall suffer death or such other punishment as said general court-material,
or military commission, or court-material shall direct.
Extending Jurisdiction of Military Tribunals, supra note 712, at 3–4.
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or interfere with the good discipline, order, movements, health, safety, or
successful operations of the land or naval forces of the United States,” including
any publication opposing the U.S. war cause, and violations of various provisions of the recently enacted Espionage Act and soon-to-be-enacted sabotage
statute. The audacity was not only in that the bill would have made such
conduct unlawful—for much of it already was—but, more importantly, that the
legislation would have provided that anyone engaging in such conduct would be
“deemed to be a spy,” and be subject to trial and sentence, including the
possibility of death, by a court-martial or military commission.
In hearings that week, several military officers testified in support of the
legislation, without the support of their commanding officers. Colonel Ralph
Van Deman, the chief of the Army’s Military Intelligence Division, insisted that
“summary justice” was necessary but impossible to achieve in civilian courts
because they are “tied up with form and red tape and law which they can not get
around.”729 The Assistant Director of Naval Intelligence, Captain McCauley,
similarly testified that “naval and military men are apt to consider things as
legal evidence . . . that perhaps civilians would not consider sufficient to condemn a man in court.”730 The prospect of a military trial, then, would “put the
fear of God in these people.”731
That same week, Warren himself went so far as to testify in favor of the bill,
in executive (that is, nonpublic) session.732 When the hearing resumed in open
session, Chairman Chamberlain publicly related Warren’s views “that the Department of Justice can not deal with the subject,” that a military tribunal was
necessary “to stop this propaganda,” and that the draft legislation was constitutional.733 Bloodgood further testified of Warren’s boast that “the moral effect of
one man arrested and tried by court martial was worth a hundred men tried by
the Department of Justice in the criminal courts,”734 and reported that Warren,
in his statement to the committee, had further stated (as he had in his letter to
Senator Chamberlain) that by the time the courts passed on the law’s constitutionality, “all the work necessary to have been done will have been done.”735
It bears emphasizing that Warren took all these steps in support of the
legislation while free-lancing: Not only did he not speak for the Department of
Justice; he did not even inform the Attorney General of his assistance and
testimony in support of the legislation. He simply couldn’t help himself; as he
wrote to a friend the following week: “In accordance with the unfortunate way I

729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.

Id. at 40.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
See id. As far as I have been able to determine, no transcript of that closed hearing is available.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 15.
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have, when I believe a thing, I say it.”736 Attorney General Gregory learned of
Warren’s apostasy on April 17, 1918. He immediately wrote a scathing letter to
Warren.737 Gregory reminded Warren that the subject matter was now in John
Lord O’Brian’s portfolio, not Warren’s. “I am sure,” Gregory continued, “that
you are also fully aware of the fact [that] your views . . . were in conflict with
those of [O’Brian], of the Attorney General himself, and with the policies of the
Department.”738 Gregory pointedly added that it was both his opinion and the
Administration’s that the bill Warren had drafted “is subversive of fundamental
principles of justice.”739 “[T]he least that can be said of your action,” concluded
Gregory,
is that it was taken in reckless disregard of the views of your superiors and of
the assistant in charge of the problem with which you were dealing, and that it
evidences an indifference to their opinions or an unwillingness to co-operate
with them which is entirely incompatible with the orderly administration of
the affairs of the Department.740

Gregory asked for Warren’s resignation, which Warren “tendered instantly.”741
What is more, the Attorney General wrote to Congress emphasizing that he
“entirely disapprove[d]” of Warren’s actions, and that the policies reflected in
the bill Warren had drafted were “exactly contrary to those approved” by the
Attorney General and by the Assistant Attorney General “in charge of the
problems involved.”742 In the meantime, Senator Overman had written to
President Wilson, asking what he thought of the Chamberlain bill. The President’s response, like Gregory’s, was unequivocal—indeed, he stressed that the
legislation was not only un-American but unconstitutional:
I am wholly and unalterably opposed to such legislation . . . . I think it is not
only unconstitutional, but that in character it would put us upon the level of
the very people we are fighting and affecting to despise. It would be altogether inconsistent with the spirit and practice of America, and, in view of the
recent legislation, the Espionage bill, the Sabotage bill, and the Woman Spy
bill, I think it is unnecessary and uncalled for.743

736. See Letter from Charles Warren to “Gard” (Apr. 22, 1918) (on file with the Library of
Congress, PAPERS OF CHARLES WARREN, Box 1, folder 6).
737. Letter from Attorney General Gregory to Charles Warren (Apr. 18, 1918) (on file with the
Department of Justice, National Archives and Records Admin., Case File 190470, Section 17, Record
Group 60, Box 2821).
738. Id. at 2.
739. Id.
740. Id. at 2–3.
741. Letter from Charles Warren to “Gard,” supra note 736, at 1.
742. Letter from Attorney General Thomas F. Gregory to Rep. William Gordon, supra note 711, at 2,
56 CONG. REC. APP. at 308.
743. Letter from President Wilson to Senator Overman (Apr. 20, 1918), in 47 THE PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON (Arthur S. Link ed., 1984).
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That was effectively the end of Senator Chamberlain’s proposal (which he
withdrew), and of Charles Warren’s gambit. Two months later, Attorney General
Gregory reaffirmed the Administration’s view that the existing criminal statutes
were wholly adequate to the task, adding that it was “perfectly plain” that in the
absence of a valid, nationwide declaration of martial law, “Congress could not
constitutionally provide for the trial by courts-martial of civilians charged with
offenses committed outside of military camps or other military territory.”744
So why did Assistant Attorney General Warren conclude otherwise? How
could he possibly have thought it was within Congress’s power to “deem” as a
“spy” anyone engaged in such a wide range of conduct—and then, having
effected such “deeming,” to subject such persons to the same form of military
justice, and same draconian penalties, as had long been the fate of actual
wartime spies?
The explanation appears in the “Who is a Spy?” memorandum Warren
provided to the Senate, a version of which he later published in the American
Law Review.745 Warren basically relied upon the same argument from history
and practice that has become commonplace with respect to military commissions today, a version of which Judge Kavanaugh embraced in al Bahlul: If it
has always been understood that military tribunals may constitutionally try
spies, narrowly defined—and if the February 1778 resolution of the Continental
Congress established that other persons who aid the enemy, such as Joshua Hett
Smith (whose trial Warren invoked746), may also be subject to military justice—
why can’t such tribunals also host the trial of other domestic-law offenses that
likewise undermine the war effort?747

744. Letter from Attorney General Gregory to Rep. John E. Baker (June 27, 1918), reprinted in 56
CONG. REC. 528 (1918); see also Reminiscences of John Lord O’Brian, supra note 710, at 283–85
(recounting Gregory’s resolute opposition to the “quite grotesque” legislation).
745. Charles Warren, Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes of Civilians to
Trial by Military Tribunal, 53 AM. L. REV. 195 (1919). Senator Chamberlain also borrowed heavily
from the Warren memorandum in an extended interview he gave to the New York Times, justifying his
proposal after it had been roundly criticized and withdrawn. “Spies and Plotters: Chamberlain Defends
Drastic Bill Which He Withdrew—The Trials of Enemies in England, France, and Italy,” N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 28, 1918, at 1. Chamberlain went out of his way to state that the interview “follow[ed]
closely . . . one of” the memoranda submitted to his committee—presumably that written by Warren. Id.
at 8.
746. Warren, supra note 745, at 211 n.19.
747. Warren adverted to other arguments, as well, of less direct importance to the question at hand.
For instance, like the Chamberlain bill itself, Warren asserted that the entire United States was within
the military’s “zone of operations”—hoping, perhaps, that such a finding might trigger the Fifth
Amendment’s “arising in” clause. See id. at 210; see also supra notes 600–09 and accompanying text
(discussing the inadequacy of the common “arising in” theory of military jurisdiction). And as to
individuals who were enemy aliens, Warren argued that Congress had “plenary power” to subject them
to military trial, without regard to constitutional limitations. Warren, supra note 745, at 220–23. That
argument was mistaken, see supra Section II.B.3.b, and Attorney General Gregory specifically rejected
it. See Warren Letter to “Gard,” supra note 736, at 2; Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 OP. ATT’Y
GEN. 356, 361 (1918) (explaining that the trial protections of Article III and the Sixth Amendment “are
not limited to citizens; they apply to citizens and aliens alike”). In any event, Warren did not place

2017]

OF SPIES, SABOTEURS, AND ENEMY ACCOMPLICES

1665

The predicate for this argument was Warren’s misunderstanding of why it is
constitutional to try spies in military fora. He wrote that “[t]he basis for the
subjection by Congress of civilian spies to Military Law . . . seems to be the
danger to the safety and discipline of the troops and the risk of disaster to them,
arising from acts so inherently affecting the success of military operations.”748
Having started from this mistaken premise, it was only a small step for Warren
to extrapolate the theory far beyond spying, to any other conduct that negatively
“affects the success of military operations.”749 Is the need for “protection and
safety . . . not fully as great,” he rhetorically asked, “against the acts of the
destructive enemy agent, as against the acts of the disguised ‘spy’”? And, if so,
and if a military trial is necessary and constitutional for a spy, isn’t it “equally
necessary for the other form of enemy agent”?750 This is how Senator Chamberlain put the argument in the New York Times:
We admit the necessity of the trial of spies by court-martial, in order to afford
protection to the army and navy and therewith to guard the safety of the
country. But in our present situation it is asserted, and I think with a good deal
of truth, that the greatest injury done to us in this country is not done by
enemy agents who would come under the technical description of spies, but
by those enemy agents who cause injury to aircraft, munitions of war, &c., or
by those who spread the poison of German propaganda. We control the lines
of communication between this country and Europe, so that the spy, in the
literal legal sense, is at least much hampered in sending any information from
this country to Germany. If it is our safety that is primarily concerned, and I
contend that it is, why may not offenders certainly working as much injury to
us as the technical spy be made subject to trial by court-martial?751

Two things about this rationale are noteworthy. First, Warren and Chamberlain were simply incorrect about the traditional rationale (such as it was) for
trying spies in military tribunals. The basis for permitting such trials was not

principal reliance on the “enemy alien” argument, because the vast majority of persons that he and
Chamberlain intended to reach were U.S. nationals.
748. Warren, supra note 745, at 204–05.
749. Id. at 205.
750. Id. at 219. Warren did not contend with the fact that the legislation in question would not have
been limited to persons who, like spies, are “agents” of enemy forces: It authorized military trials for
many people whose independent conduct (like Lambdin Milligan’s) might undermine the war effort,
including critics who merely spoke out against the war.
751. “Spies and Plotters,” supra note 745, at 8 (emphasis added). Warren and Chamberlain were
hardly the first to make such an argument. In his influential constitutional law treatise, John Norton
Pomeroy likewise reasoned from the example of spies. Because a spy (ostensibly) can be tried and
punished for “interfer[ing] directly with the process of waging war,” Pomeroy reasoned, it must follow
that “[w]henever a civilian citizen or alien is engaged in practices which directly interfere with waging
war, which directly affect military movements and operations, and thus directly tend to hinder or
destroy their successful result,” the President “may treat this person as an enemy, and cause him to be
arrested, tried, and punished in a military manner, although the civil courts are open, and although his
offence may be sedition or treason.” JOHN NORTON POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 714, at 597–98 (10th ed., rev. 1888).
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simply that spying threatens the protection of the armed forces or “the safety of
the country.”752 Such a rationale would prove far too much (which explains why
the Chamberlain bill was drafted so broadly), and would be impossible to
reconcile with historical practice and judicial precedent, including Milligan.753
Second, the political branches effectively, and decisively, rejected Warren’s
theory, recognizing how radically inconsistent it would be with the Constitution,
notwithstanding Warren’s reliance on the ancient spying law and the 1778
resolution. The Attorney General and President Wilson concluded that such
legislation would be unconstitutional, and Congress immediately abandoned the
initiative.
The Warren incident does, however, nicely demonstrate the sort of mischief
that can follow from a mistaken understanding of the history and rationale of
the spying and quasi-treason Articles of War.
3. The Witzke and Wessels Spying Cases
The Executive branch’s repudiation of the Warren view was confirmed later
in 1918, when the Army captured a German agent, Lieutenant Lothar Witzke, in
Nogales, Arizona, just as he crossed the Mexican border in disguise, under the
pseudonym Pablo Waberski, with plans to conduct acts of sabotage in the
United States.754 Attorney General Gregory issued a formal opinion to President
Wilson, explaining why Witzke could not be tried as a spy under Article 82 and
section 1343, the two parallel wartime spying provisions.755
Witzke had not even had an opportunity to enter—and thus was not “found
lurking” in—any military camp, fortification, or other premises. Recall, however, that in 1863 Congress had added the words “or elsewhere” to the spying
Article,756 a phrase that thus appeared in both spying provisions in 1918.
Gregory explained that “whatever may have been the meaning of those words
intended by the framers thereof,” they had to be construed in light of the
Constitution.757 And so Gregory turned to the Article III/Sixth Amendment
question. Milligan, he reasoned, appeared to settle the issue against military
adjudication, given that the civil courts were open and Congress had more
broadly authorized prosecution of any espionage, without regard to location,
under the Espionage Act. Importantly, Gregory concluded that it did not matter
that Witzke, unlike Milligan, was not a U.S. citizen but was instead an enemy
alien: “[T]he provisions of the Constitution upon which the decision was based
752. See supra Section IV.B.
753. Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957) (plurality opinion) (“The Constitution does not say
that Congress can regulate ‘the land and naval Forces and all other persons whose regulation might
have some relationship to maintenance of the land and naval Forces.’”).
754. For a detailed and colorful account of the Witzke plot and capture, see Charles H. Harris III &
Louis R. Sadler, The Witzke Affair: German Intrigue on the Mexican Border, 1917–1918, 59 MIL. REV.
36 (1979).
755. Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, 31 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 356 (1918).
756. See supra notes 653–62 and accompanying text.
757. Trial of Spies by Military Tribunals, supra note 755, at 358.
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are not limited to citizens; they apply to citizens and aliens alike.”758 Gregory
further reasoned that even “if there were no Milligan case to furnish us with an
authoritative precedent,” the relevant constitutional provisions themselves (including Section I of Article III, establishing the right to an independent judge,
which Gregory specifically flagged)759 would
plainly bring us to the same conclusions as those set forth in the opinion of
the court in that case, namely, that in this country, military tribunals, whether
courts-martial or military commissions, can not constitutionally be granted
jurisdiction to try persons charged with acts or offences committed outside of
the field of military operations or territory under martial law or other peculiarly military territory, except members of the military or naval forces or
those immediately attached to the forces such as camp followers.760

This reasoning, however, confronted Gregory with the obvious question,
which Charles Warren had flagged just a few months earlier—namely, how to
explain the fact that military tribunals had, since the Founding, tried “spies” as
defined by the law of war. Gregory insisted that this historical practice was
consistent with his reading of Milligan and Article III, for two related reasons.
First, Gregory correctly explained that the international law of war has long
permitted spies to be tried, and executed or otherwise disabled, for preventive,
not punitive, reasons—so that “all possibility of the spy’s information reaching
the enemy is destroyed.”761 Second, the law of war permits such preventive
treatment only in a very circumscribed set of cases—namely, only when the spy
has already entered the “lines or zone of military operations.”762 “That this is
the basis of the jurisdiction of the military authorities over the enemy spy,”
Gregory reasoned, “is indicated by the fact, that if he escapes and returns to his
own lines and is later captured, he may not be tried or punished as a spy, but
must be treated as a prisoner of war.”763 “This shows,” wrote Gregory, “how
inapplicable the principle of the trial and execution of spies is” to a case such as
Witzke’s; “for, if the man who escape from our military lines may not be tried
by court-martial as a spy when recaptured, surely then the man who has never
gone into our military lines may not be so tried.”764
Gregory closed his opinion by insisting that the spying “exception” had to be
so circumscribed, or otherwise its example would, logically, undermine the
constitutional protections altogether. In a passage manifestly designed as a
rebuke of the Warren/Chamberlain theory that had garnered so much attention

758.
759.
760.
761.
762.
763.
764.

Id. at 361.
Id. at 362.
Id. at 361 (emphasis added).
Id. at 363; see supra notes 364–74 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id. at 363–64.
Id. at 364.
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several months earlier, Gregory wrote:
If [Waberski] could constitutionally be tried by court-martial, then it would
logically follow that Congress could provide for the trial by military courts of
any person, citizen or alien, accused of espionage or any other type of war
crime, no matter where committed and no matter where such person be found
and apprehended. It was because I realized that this is where the claim of
military jurisdiction over Waberski would logically lead, that I felt it necessary to call your attention to the case even before it came to you in the regular
course.765

The Attorney General thus concluded that the spying Articles “can not constitutionally be applied to the Waberski case,” which “render[ed] it unnecessary to
further discuss the meaning of the words ‘or elsewhere’ in those statutes.”766
Gregory’s opinion apparently did not sit well within the Department of
Justice. “Numerous” DOJ employees “desired to have it expressly recalled and
overruled.”767 Accordingly, a year later, Gregory’s successor as Attorney General, the far more belligerent Mitchell Palmer, was asked to reassess the Witzke
case based upon a changed understanding of the facts. Palmer was informed that
Witzke had “crossed into our territory at least three times within twenty-four
hours” and, most importantly, that he was captured “about a mile distant from
encampments where were stationed officers and men engaged in protecting the
border against threatened invasion from the Mexican side.”768 Attorney General
Palmer concluded that because Witzke had been so close to Army encampments, he could be tried by court-martial.769 Whether or not Palmer was correct
that such a one-mile proximity to the Army camp brought Witzke within the
“zone of operations” that was decisive for law-of-war and constitutional purposes,770 his reconsideration of the case did not call into question Gregory’s
limiting rationale.771

765. Id. at 365.
766. Id.
767. Memorandum from Attorney General Francis Biddle to Alexander Holtzoff, Assistant to the
Attorney General, Re: Opinion in the Waberski Case, 31 Op. A.G. 356 (1918), at 1 (July 2, 1942) (on
file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, OSCAR S. COX PAPERS, Box 61).
768. Trial of Spy by Court Martial, 40 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 561, 561 (1919).
769. Id.
770. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex
art. 29 (1917). Palmer’s reasoning threatened to render the condition virtually meaningless. In April
1918, for example, a memorandum written to Judge Advocate General Crowder argued that “it must be
recognized that today, by reason of railways, telegraphs, telephones, aircraft, and other inventions
destroying space, every square foot in the United States is in the neighborhood of some center of
military operations” and thus “every square foot of the United States is covered by the eighty-second
article of war.” Memorandum for Gen. Crowder (Apr. 6, 1918), in 2 OPINIONS OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE
GENERAL OF THE ARMY 252, 253 (1918).
771. See 40 OP. ATT’Y GEN. at 561 (“This expression of my views should not be treated as overruling
the opinion of my predecessor on the facts which were before him, but merely as holding that under the
entirely different statement of facts you now submit, the principles announced in that opinion have no
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Another spying case, decided after the war ended, further tested the scope of
the spying exception. Herman Wessels was an officer in the German Imperial
Navy who used a forged Swiss passport to enter the United States.772 He
operated as an enemy agent while living in Yonkers, New York.773 After the
Navy arrested Wessels, the Department of Justice indicted him for conspiracy to
commit espionage and treason, and Wessels’s compatriots were, indeed, tried
(and acquitted) in federal court.774 Wessels himself, however, was never brought
to an Article III trial, because the Navy also charged him with spying under
Article 82, and continued to hold him for a court-martial proceeding in the
military justice system. Wessels petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that he had a constitutional right to be tried in the civilian tribunal.
The district court judge held that the spying exception was exempt from the
constitutional jury rights because “spying,” as defined by international law, is
“not [a] crime,” and “is not to be considered only as visiting punishment upon
the individual, but as a means of prevention.”775 The key question, however,
was whether Wessels fell within this exception, given that he was apprehended
in a civilian setting in New York, while there were no hostilities ongoing in the
United States. Was Wessels endeavoring to obtain information within the “zone
of operations of the belligerent,” as international law required in order for his
conduct to be rendered unprivileged and thus subject to punishment?776 Judge
Manton concluded that he was. Judge Manton’s opinion offered two distinct
rationales. First, even if the legal standard was that the spy “enter[] forts or
armed encampments in the purposes of his mission,” Manton reasoned that the
port of New York, where Wessels had entered the nation, had such establishments.777 If that had been the sum of Judge Manton’s opinion, then the Wessels
case would not have been very noteworthy—it would have been an ordinary
application of the traditional spying exception. The problem, however, was that
there did not appear to be evidence that Wessels had tried to obtain information
within those forts or encampments. Manton therefore offered a broader rationale: It wouldn’t matter whether Wessels had entered forts or armed encampments at all, in Manton’s view, because the “port of New York” came within the
application.”); see also Memorandum from Attorney General Francis Biddle to Alexander Holtzoff,
Assistant to the Attorney General, Re: Opinion in the Waberski Case, 31 Op. A.G. 356 (1918), at 1 (July
2, 1942) (on file with the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library & Museum, OSCAR S. COX PAPERS,
Box 61) (Palmer “was unwilling to make an open repudiation of his predecessor’s opinion”). The
court-martial sentenced Witzke to death, but President Wilson commuted the sentence to life imprisonment at hard labor, and in 1923 Witzke was allowed to return to Germany, where he was welcomed as a
hero and awarded the Iron Cross. See Harris & Sadler, supra note 754, at 46–47.
772. United States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 762–63 (E.D.N.Y. 1920).
773. Id.
774. See United States v. Fricke, 259 F. 673 (S.D.N.Y. 1919); United States v. Robinson, 259 F. 685
(S.D.N.Y. 1919).
775. Wessels, 265 F. at 762–63.
776. See supra note 356 and accompanying text (citing Hague Annex).
777. Wessels, 265 F. at 764. Manton did not suggest, however, that Wessels had engaged in any
spying within those encampments, or that he had been captured within them.
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“field of active operations.”778 Indeed, the judge went further still, explaining
that in the circumstances of modern warfare the entire United States counted as
a covered zone (or “field”) of operations, even if (as in the First World War) no
actual hostilities occurred there:
In this great World War through which we have just passed, the field of
operations which existed after the United States entered the war, and, especially in regard to naval operations, brought the port of New York within the
field of active operations. The implements of warfare and the plan of carrying
it on in the last gigantic struggle placed the United States fully within the field
of active operations. The term “theater of war,” as used in the Milligan Case,
apparently was intended to mean the territory of activity of conflict. With the
progress made in obtaining ways and means for devastation and destruction,
the territory of the United States was certainly within the field of active
operations. Great numbers of troops were being sent abroad, and, in larger
numbers, sailing from the port of New York. Vessels loaded with ammunition
and supplies for the army were daily, and frequently in a day, leaving this
port. German submarines were landing unheralded and unaware in our ports,
before the United States entered the war. Ships were being destroyed within
easy distance of the Atlantic coast; there was the constant threat of and fear
for airships above the harbor and the city of New York on missions of
destruction. A spy of the enemy might well have aided these hostile
operations.779

This latter, broader rationale, in which an entire nation might be deemed the
relevant “zone of operations of a belligerent,” was, to say the least, questionable, at least as a matter of hewing to the international law test for denying
combatant immunity to enemy spies. Judge Advocate General Frederick Bernays Wiener would later write that there is “reason to believe that this precedent
may be a doubtful one.”780
Wessels appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Court had already
decided, in Milligan, that the threat of enemy conduct in a particular jurisdiction
where the courts were open did not transform that area into a “theater of
operations” in which the constitutional trial protections do not apply to spies.781
Before the Court had an opportunity to resolve the question, however, the
Secretary of the Navy dismissed the court-martial proceedings “at the instance
of the Department of Justice,”782 and the appeal to the Supreme Court case was

778. Id. at 763–64.
779. Id.
780. FREDERICK BERNAYS WIENER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAW 138 (1940).
781. Brief for Appellant at 7–11, Wessels v. McDonald (No. 287) (Oct. Term 1920).
782. See WIENER, supra note 780, at 138 n.31. Judge Advocate General Wiener surmised that the
Department of Justice might have insisted on pretermitting the court-marital proceedings because the
war had officially ended by April 1921, and there was some doubt about whether a spy could be
prosecuted by court-martial after the close of a war. Id. at 138–39 n.31.
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therefore dismissed pursuant to stipulation.783
C. THE MODERN ERA

There has been far less treatment of the spying and quasi-treason Articles in
the past century or so. When Congress enacted the Uniform Code of Military
Justice in 1950, both articles were incorporated without significant change.784
The quasi-treason Article is now found at 10 U.S.C. § 904, with the historical
(and ambiguous) term “whosoever” replaced by “any person”:
Any person who—
(1) aids, or attempts to aid, the enemy with arms, ammunition, supplies,
money, or other things; or
(2) without proper authority, knowingly harbors or protects or gives intelligence to, or communicates or corresponds with or holds any intercourse with
the enemy, either directly or indirectly;
shall suffer death or such other punishment as a court-martial or military
commission may direct.

The war-spying Article is now 10 U.S.C. § 906. It, too, uses the term “any
person,” and it now includes a somewhat more specific list of covered places in
which the spy must be “found lurking,” although retaining the catch-all term “or
elsewhere” that the 1863 Congress had added:
Any person who in time of war is found lurking as a spy or acting as a spy in
or about any place, vessel, or aircraft, within the control or jurisdiction of any
of the armed forces, or in or about any shipyard, any manufacturing or
industrial plant, or any other place or institution engaged in work in aid of the
prosecution of the war by the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by a
general court-martial or by a military commission and on conviction shall be
punished by death.785

Whatever might be said about earlier congressional intent, by the time it
enacted the UCMJ in 1950 Congress might well have assumed that Articles 104
and 106 would, by virtue of the “any person” language, cover persons who are
neither in, nor associated with, the armed forces. Indeed, one witness in the
Senate hearings in 1949, a Colonel in the Judge Advocate General Reserve,
specifically inveighed against the broad scope of those articles, warning that
they might be unconstitutional as applied to civilians: Because Article 104, for
example, refers to “any person” who “communicates or corresponds with or
783. See Wessels v. McDonald, 256 U.S. 705 (1921).
784. Pub. L. No. 81-506, ch. 169, 64 Stat. 107, 138 (1950).
785. 10 U.S.C. § 906 (2012).
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holds any intercourse with the enemy, either directly or indirectly,” he surmised
that a military commission could be convened to try a “mother [who] writes to
her son who is in a foreign army,” in which case “Ex parte Milligan goes out the
window.”786
As the preceding discussion concerning World War I demonstrates, the
military and the Department of Justice have long been aware of such constitutional problems in cases where the articles would be invoked to try civilians
unconnected to the military, or to try enemy agents for domestic law offenses
other than the traditional war-spying offense. Accordingly, over the past ninetyseven years the government has rarely tried to use those articles to try such
persons in military courts, even though there have been plenty of opportunities
to do so. The modern history is not, however, entirely consistent, principally by
virtue of a single, notorious counterexample—the 1942 trial of the Nazi saboteurs, in which charges were brought under both articles, even though the
defendants were not part of the U.S. military, and even though one or two of
them were U.S. citizens.
1. Aiding the Enemy
During the past century the military has occasionally used the quasi-treason
Article for the court-martial of U.S. service members—for example, those who
have assisted the enemies who captured them.787 Yet the military has almost
never used that Article to prosecute civilians who aid the enemy; instead, the
Department of Justice has typically prosecuted such individuals for treason in
Article III courts.788 The constitutional question therefore has rarely been
addressed in the context of an actual prosecution.789

786. Uniform Code of Military Justice: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Armed
Servs. on S. 857 and H.R. 4080, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1949) (statement of Col. P.G. McElwee).
787. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 144, 149 (C.M.A. 1956) (prisoner of Korea
violated Article 104 by “communication with the enemy without proper authority”); see also Note,
Misconduct in the Prison Camp: A Survey of the Law and an Analysis of the Korean Cases, 56 COLUM.
L. REV. 709, 745–50 (1956), and cases cited therein.
788. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945); Gillars v. United States, 182 F.2d 962
(D.C. Cir. 1950); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948); United States v. Haupt, 136
F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1943).
789. See United States v. Dickenson, 20 C.M.R. 154, 163–64 (C.M.A. 1955) (because the accused
was a member of the military, the court declined to reach the question of whether “civilians not
otherwise validly subject to the Uniform Code cannot be tried by a military tribunal if the offense
charged is not a violation of the laws of war, or if martial law has not been constitutionally
established”); Dickenson v. Davis, 245 F.2d 317, 319–20 (10th Cir. 1957) (similarly not reaching that
question). In its 1940 Field Manual, the War Department assumed that Article 81 would authorize the
trial of civilians by military tribunals, and that in wartime it could apply “to persons of all classes,
without regard to citizenship or military or civil status,” but candidly warned that “it is believed that
this statute, when subject to judicial interpretation, will be held [to apply] only when the offense has
been committed within territory under martial law or military government, or within the zone of
military operations, or within a military reservation, post, or camp, or in a place otherwise especially
subject to military jurisdiction.” WAR DEPARTMENT, BASIC FIELD MANUAL 27–10, RULES OF LAND WARFARE
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The one fleeting exception was in the Quirin case itself, where the government charged the saboteurs with a violation of the 81st Article—even though
most of the defendants did not owe any allegiance to the United States. The
petitioners argued that Article 81 could only be constitutionally applied to them,
if at all, if their alleged conduct occurred in a “zone of military operations,”
which they insisted was not properly alleged in the case.790 The government did
not really engage with the constitutional question in its brief, nor did the
Solicitor General explain how, exactly, the defendants had “relieved” Germany
with any “thing” or given intelligence to Germany—or how the 81st Article
could possibly be read to prohibit German nationals from providing aid to the
German cause.791 The Court and the advocates addressed the 81st Article only
briefly at oral argument, when Chief Justice Stone and Justice Reed queried
how the saboteurs’ conduct might possibly fit within the Article.792 Most
importantly, the Court chose not to issue any ruling with respect to the statutory
or constitutional questions raised by the Article 81 charge.793
2. Spying
Likewise, since 1920 the government has typically tried spies for espionage
in Article III courts; therefore there has been little occasion for courts to
consider the proper scope or constitutional limitations of Article 82 (and its
successor, UCMJ Article 106).794
Once again, however, the 1942 saboteurs case stands as a rare, and indeterminate, exception. The third charge before the commission alleged that the saboteurs had engaged in spying in violation of Article 82. In the Supreme Court, the
petitioners, invoking the War Department’s own 1940 Field Manual—which in
turn cited Attorney Gregory’s 1918 opinion—insisted that Article 82 could not
properly be applied to them because the government had accused them of

59 (1940); accord DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27–10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 33
(1956) (same as to revised version of article as Article 104 of the UCMJ).
790. Brief in Support of Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 27–28, Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(1942) (Nos. 1–7), in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 286, at 332–33.
791. See Brief for the Respondent at 80–81, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (Nos. 1–7), in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS,
supra note 286, at 481–82.
792. Transcript of Oral Argument, July 30, 1942, at 56, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (Nos. 1–7), in 39
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 286, at 657.
793. See 317 U.S. at 46 (“Since the first specification of Charge I sets forth a violation of the law of
war, we have no occasion . . . to construe the 81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges II and III allege violations of those Articles or
whether if so construed they are constitutional.”).
794. In 1940, the War Department’s Law of War Manual appeared to adopt the narrow reading of the
phrase “or elsewhere,” citing Attorney General Gregory’s 1918 opinion for the proposition that it does
not justify trial by military tribunals of “persons charged with acts or offenses committed outside of the
field of military operations or territory under martial law or other peculiarly military territory, except
members of the military or naval forces or those immediately attached to the forces, such as camp
followers.” 1940 BASIC FIELD MANUAL 27–10, supra note 789, at 58–59 (quoting 31 OP. ATT’Y GEN. at
361). In 1956, the Field Manual stated that it “has not been decided whether” that is the proper reading.
1956 FIELD MANUAL 27–10, supra note 789, at 32.
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engaging in espionage “outside of the field of military operations or territory
under martial law or other peculiarly military territory.”795 At oral argument, the
Justices repeatedly engaged with petitioner’s counsel on the permissible scope
of Article 82.796 When it came time to write the Court’s opinion, however, Chief
Justice Stone recognized that there were “difficulties . . . both constitutional and
in the construction of the [81st and 82nd Articles],” as applied “to a citizen who
does his dirty work at points remote from military establishments.”797 He
decided to “avoid[] all this by sustaining the jurisdiction of the Commission to
try charge one.”798 Accordingly, in his opinion for the Court, Stone specifically
noted that the Court was not resolving the question of whether the commission
had lawful jurisdiction over the spying charge—or of any of the other charges,
either, apart from one of the specifications of Charge I, alleging that the
defendants had crossed U.S. Army lines in disguise for purposes of sabotage.799
In 1945, the government likewise included an Article 82 spying charge in
another military commission case very similar to Quirin, involving two German
agents, William Colepaugh and Eric Gimpel, who alit secretly from a submarine
in Frenchman’s Bay, Maine, in civilian garb.800 In the subsequent habeas
proceedings, the court of appeals concluded that the case was basically on all
fours with Quirin, and did not separately address the spying charge.801 The
difficulty with this holding, Colepaugh explained in his certiorari petition to the
Supreme Court, was that the government had only demonstrated that Colepaugh
engaged in surveillance, or espionage, in the United States, rather than the sort
of sabotage that the 1942 saboteurs had planned.802 Nor did the government try
to show that Colepaugh had been spying within any actual military facilities or
encampments—it merely argued that he had avoided detection by the military
patrol when he arrived on shore in Maine (the government showed that naval
units regularly patrolled the area, and that the Army occasionally patrolled the
surrounding highways), and that he had planned to gather scientific data regarding shipbuilding, airplanes, and rockets, to be transmitted back to Germany.803
Colepaugh’s case thus, at least in theory, teed up the question of whether the

795. Brief of Petitioners, Quirin, at 22–23, in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 286, at 327–28.
796. See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument, July 29, 1942, at 26–27, 36, 43, Quirin, 317 U.S. 1
(Nos. 1–7), in 39 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 286, at 521–22, 531, 538.
797. Letter from Harlan Fiske Stone to [Law Clerk] Bennett Boskey (Aug. 20, 1942) at 1 (on file
with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Div., HARLAN FISKE STONE PAPERS, Box 69, folder marked
“July Special Term 1942 Ex parte Quirin et al.”).
798. Id.
799. 317 U.S. at 46 (“Since the first specification of Charge I set forth a violation of the law of war,
we have no occasion to pass on the adequacy of the second specification of Charge I, or to construe the
81st and 82nd Articles of War for the purpose of ascertaining whether the specifications under Charges
II and III allege violations of those Articles or whether if so construed they are constitutional.”).
800. Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 431–32 (10th Cir. 1956).
801. Id. at 432–33.
802. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Colepaugh v. Looney, No. 381 Misc., Oct. Term 1956.
803. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 3, Colepaugh v. Looney, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957),
No. 381 Misc., Oct. Term 1956.
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circumstances of his espionage fell within the limited ambit of Article 82.
In its opposition to certiorari, the government invited the Supreme Court to
do what it had done in Quirin—namely, to avoid a decision on Article 82—
because it was allegedly sufficient that Colepaugh’s espionage violated the
international law of war, separate and apart from the domestic law Article of
War.804 The Solicitor General explained—correctly—that Article 82 did not
codify the law of war. Nevertheless, he insisted that the law of war itself
established a distinct spying offense that was less constrained than Article 82,
applying whenever a spy “passes the military lines” of the enemy.805 The only
authority the government offered for this (mistaken) proposition about the
international law of war was Chief Justice Stone’s own, confused dictum in
Quirin:
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a
belligerent in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes
secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life
or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are generally deemed
not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders against
the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals.806

The Court denied certiorari in Colepaugh.807 The issue, therefore, remained
unresolved, and has not been raised again in the past sixty years.
VII. WHAT TO MAKE OF THE HISTORY
In the absence of any compelling textual, functional, or equitable reasons for
using military commissions to try domestic-law offenses in our current armed
conflicts, the government has, quite reasonably, invoked history. Likewise,
historical precedents are virtually the be-all and end-all of the rationale of the
court of appeals judges who concluded in al Bahlul III that the domestic-law
offense of conspiracy could be tried by a military commission. A significant
component of this historical argument—not surprisingly—consists of an appeal
to the practices of the Revolutionary War, and to an assumption that the
Constitution was designed to preserve the government’s “power of carrying on
war as it had been carried on during the Revolution.”808 Such an argument is
hardly unprecedented. As the preceding historical survey has demonstrated,
military lawyers and scholars—and, significantly, the Supreme Court in Quirin—
have often looked to the practices of the Revolutionary War for insight into the
804. Id. at 6–7.
805. Id. at 6 (The commission had convicted Colepaugh of violating the law of war in addition to the
separate charge under Article 82.).
806. Id. at 7 (quoting Quirin, 317 U.S. at 31) (emphasis added).
807. 352 U.S. 1014 (1957).
808. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. 268, 312 (1871).
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constitutional limits on military jurisdiction to try war-related offenses. At the
outset of the Civil War, military officers, especially Judge Advocate General
Joseph Holt, began to articulate an account of the nation’s first war in which
both the Continental Congress and General George Washington—“the peerless,
the stainless, and the just, with whom God walked through the night of that
great trial”809—approved the use of courts-martial to try all manner of civilians
who aided the British cause. Once that story took hold, both within the military
justice system run by Holt, and in the leading military law treatise penned by his
acolyte, William Winthrop, it rapidly became the standard narrative, one that
many other commentators and officers accepted uncritically. At the same time,
Washington’s practice of trying spies found near Army encampments began to
be cited for the proposition that the Constitution permits military trials against
any and all conduct that might undermine the military’s prosecution of war—an
argument that fully flowered during the (unsuccessful) effort in World War I to
transfer a huge swath of domestic-law cases to military jurisdiction.
Neither of these narratives, however, offered an accurate account of the
pre-constitutional practice. As this Article has demonstrated, both the Continental Congress and General Washington were (with one noteworthy exception)
acutely sensitive to the right of those accused of aiding the enemy, and similar
treasonous conduct, to be tried in the available state civil justice systems by
juries of their peers. Indeed, Washington abjured use of a court-martial even
when a congressional resolution, by its terms, would have authorized it, in a
case where the rationale for that authorization (the disability of the local civilian
courts) was inapposite. There were two principal exceptions to this general
practice: Congress plainly authorized courts-martial to try members of the
armed forces for numerous offenses, including providing aid to the enemy—a
practice that is now well-established as compatible with the Constitution. And
in late 1777, Congress authorized courts-martial to convene trials around Philadelphia for a limited period, because the British occupation of that city had
rendered the civil courts there incapable of dealing with the problem—an
instance of genuine necessity, which is also consistent with modern constitutional doctrine, but which does not provide a justification for military trials of
offenders in our current armed conflicts, all of whom could easily, indeed, more
efficiently, be tried in Article III courts.
There was, however, one conspicuous deviation from this norm during the
Revolutionary War. The Continental Congress did not offer any excuse of
exigency (or any other explanation, either) in February 1778 when it authorized
courts-martial to try civilians accused of kidnapping on behalf of the British
cause. And although George Washington and his generals virtually never invoked that unusual authority, Washington did personally insist on using it in one
very high-profile case: the 1780 trial of Joshua Hett Smith. Given that Washing809. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (quoting John Bingham’s jurisdictional argument in
the Lincoln assassination trial).
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ton is often viewed “as a sort of constitutional paragon and a model for
constitutional virtue,”810 it is not surprising that this singular precedent has been
invoked to justify expansive military court jurisdiction.
The Smith case, however, is a thin reed on which to establish an authoritative
constitutional understanding—especially one that cuts against the (later-ratified)
constitutional text. It is telling, and important, that Washington never offered
any justification for his actions in the Smith case, even when Smith confronted
him with the jury-right argument.811 It is not unreasonable to think that, in this
one case, Washington was swayed by circumstances that he felt were more
compelling than constitutional fidelity.812 Washington was panicked by the
prospect of a British attack that might have spelled defeat for the colonists, and
thus was desperate to obtain as much intelligence as he could from Smith so he
would be able to prepare for whatever stratagem General Clinton had in mind.
Once he had threatened Smith with the prospect of severe military justice—and
a swift execution—as a means of inducing the detainee to talk, perhaps Washington felt as if he had to follow through on the threat.813
For these reasons, it would surely be rash to look to the singular example of
the Smith court-martial—an example difficult to square with Washington’s
otherwise punctilious sensitivity to the primacy of civilian justice—as compelling evidence of an implied exception to the constitutional guarantee that the
Framers would secure almost a decade later. “Even the good Homer nods,” but
“in so long a work it is allowable if drowsiness comes on.”814 Indeed, as
Washington himself famously remarked in his Farewell Address, “I am . . . too
sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many
errors.”815 Or one, anyway.

810. Balkin, supra note 58, at 684.
811. See supra notes 470–71 and accompanying text.
812. Similarly, on one occasion during the Civil War, President Lincoln confessed to acting “without
any authority of law,” to ensure that “the Government was saved from overthrow.” CONG. GLOBE, 37th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2383 (1862) (message from the President to the Senate and House of Representatives).
For discussion of this uncharacteristic episode, see Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History,
supra note 60, at 1001–03.
813. There are other ways in which Washington probably cut legal corners in the Arnold/André
affair, too, such as by hanging André as a spy, see supra note 481, and by offering to release André if
Sir Henry Clinton, the British Commander, would surrender Benedict Arnold back to the Continental
Army for punishment, an “inadmissible proposal” that “no man of honour could have entertained.”
Haines, supra note 448, at 34–36. See also Letter from “A.B.” [possibly Alexander Hamilton, writing at
Washington’s behest] to Sir Henry Clinton (Sept. 30, 1780), in 2 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 445 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1961) (notifying Clinton that Major André had been captured “in such a
way as will according to the laws of war justly affect his life”). One historian later surmised that
although Washington was generally an “upright man” who suppressed his strong and angry passions
“by a resolute exertion of his will,” Arnold’s treachery, which might have destroyed the republic, “hit
Washington hard,” and was a singular occasion that “seems to have roused all that was worst in
Washington.” Haines, supra note 448, at 34.
814. HORACE, DE ARS POETICA 359–60.
815. General George Washington, Address to the People of The United States on his Declining of
the Presidency of the United States (Sept. 19, 1796).
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Proponents of military jurisdiction have not limited their arguments to the
pre-constitutional era, however; they have also invoked the actions taken by
Congress shortly after 1787. In particular, Judge Kavanaugh has assumed that
the first Congresses, even in the shadow of the Treason Clause, ratified preconstitutional Articles of War that authorized courts-martial to try civilians who
aid the enemy in war, and that the 1806 Congress specifically re-enacted those
authorizations.816
This sort of historical argument is a familiar one; it rests upon the notion,
often accepted by the Supreme Court, that early congressional enactments can
“provid[e] contemporaneous and weighty evidence of the Constitution’s meaning.”817 Founding-era practice has, in particular, been thought to settle, or at
least strongly inform, certain questions concerning the operation of Article III,
such as whether Congress can require Supreme Court Justices to “ride circuit,”818 and whether “qui tam” actions are “cases” or “controversies” justiciable in Article III courts.819
On the other hand, it is important not to overstate the significance of early
enactments. As cases no less canonical than Marbury v. Madison and New York
Times v. Sullivan demonstrate, early congressional understandings surely are not
conclusive of close constitutional questions.820
In any event, the factual premise of this argument, too, is simply wrong: there
is no evidence that the early Congresses believed they were ratifying, or
authorizing, courts-martial proceedings against civilians engaged in treasonous
conduct. The first Congresses merely rubber-stamped the existing Articles of
War as a stopgap until such time as they got around to a comprehensive
revision—and even then, they added the conspicuous caveat that the Articles

816. al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
817. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
818. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299, 309 (1803) (“[P]ractice and acquiescence [by the Justices]
under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system, affords
an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the construction.”).
819. See Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 776–77 (2000)
(recounting the history of British and pre-constitution qui tam actions, and their equivalent, and
concluding that this history is “well nigh conclusive with respect to . . . whether qui tam actions were
‘cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process’”
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998))).
820. The Court decided Marbury just six days after its decision in Stuart v. Laird, in which the
Justices afforded extraordinary deference to an early congressional understanding of Article III. That
deference to the first Congresses’ understanding of the Constitution disappeared in Marbury: The Court
held that section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 80, which the Court construed to give the Court
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus to public officers, was inconsistent with Article III.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803). The Court did not so much as suggest that the First
Congress’s (purported) understanding was relevant. Likewise, in Sullivan, the Court effectively affirmed what it referred to as a “broad consensus” that the Sedition Act of 1798 was unconstitutional.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S 577, 626
(1992) (Souter, J., concurring) (“If the early Congress’s political actions were determinative, and not
merely relevant, evidence of constitutional meaning, we would have to gut our current First Amendment doctrine to make room for political censorship.”).
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were to apply only “as far as [they] may be applicable to the Constitution of the
United States”—a concession that, in certain unspecified circumstances, the
Constitution might impose limits on the court-martial system that had been in
place during the Revolutionary War.821 It is true that the Ninth Congress, acting
seventeen years after the Constitution was ratified, enacted two articles (Articles
56 and 57) prescribing the court-martial of “whosoever” provided certain forms
of aid to the enemy in war. At the time, however, it is unlikely that members of
Congress considered those articles to apply to ordinary civilians unaffiliated
with the armed forces—and the general understanding during the War of 1812,
and for the next few decades, was that they did not. The alternative narrative—
that the 1806 Articles and their antecedents applied to authorize military trials
of what was, in effect, treasonous activity by ordinary civilians—only began to
take hold during the Civil War, when Holt and other military officers found it
useful to construe the language in question to have a much broader scope, a
reading that even the Confederacy rejected with respect to its own, identically
worded, articles of war.
I do not mean to suggest that the controversy at hand was definitively settled
in 1777, or in 1787, or in 1806. There was no particular occasion to engage the
intricacies of the question between 1780 and the War of 1812, and thus it is
unlikely that most Framers, and members of the first nine Congresses, even paid
the question any mind. Moreover, as Professor Flaherty has written, any “story
of continuity and consensus” with respect to difficult constitutional questions
during this era of “rebellion, revolution, and innovation” should be viewed with
a healthy dose of caution, for that past “is notoriously messy” and typically
“replete with conflicting voices.”822
Even so, the denial of the right to trial by jury was certainly among the most
important grievances that prompted independence; virtually nothing else in the
Constitution engendered quite so strong and broad a consensus as the (double)
guarantee of that right. As Hamilton put it, the only disagreement was whether
the jury guarantee was merely “a valuable safeguard to liberty,” or whether it

821. See supra notes 521, 524 and accompanying text. Indeed, just before World War I, an esteemed
Judge Advocate General surmised that, assuming the 1776 legislation extended application of the
quasi-treason articles to civilians, that extension “seems to have become modified on the adoption of
the Constitution.” See supra note 686 and accompanying text.
822. Martin S. Flaherty, The Future and Past of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 169, 171 (2004); see also, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Assessing the Role of History in the Federal
Courts Canon: A Word of Caution, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2015) (“[O]ne should never
forget that certain aspects of the Constitution—including Article III and the structural framework within
which it is situated—represented major innovations in their time. . . . [T]he separation of powers
framework was, at the least, a transformation of the British model, if not a dramatic departure from it.
Against this backdrop, it would be curious indeed if the details of the Article III power were fully
settled from the outset.”); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Many and Varied Roles of History in
Constitutional Adjudication, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1753, 1758 (2015) (“[D]espite the controlling
significance of norms of practice, no simple, algorithmic formula dictates how pertinent kinds of
history fit together to yield determinate conclusions in many cases that provoke constitutional
controversy.”).
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was, in fact, “the very palladium of free government”823—in Justice Scalia’s
words, “the spinal column of American democracy.”824 Viewed from that
perspective, there is no historical evidence, either before or shortly after constitutional ratification, compelling enough to establish an implied preservation of a
wartime exception for the trial of treasonous conduct or other domestic-law
offenses.825
It is equally undeniable, however, that during the Civil War the military (and,
to a certain extent, President Lincoln himself) did act on the presumption that
the political branches have extensive, albeit not unlimited, authority to subject
domestic-law offenders to military justice in a wide range of circumstances—
culminating in “the highest-profile and most important U.S. military commission precedent in American history,”826 the 1865 trial of the Lincoln assassination
conspirators. Not surprisingly, the government cites that dramatic example,
together with a handful of less well-known trials in the Civil War and World
War II, as having established a “longstanding practice of the government,” long
after the Founding, that ought to “inform our determination of what the law
is.”827 Likewise, the judges who have voted with the government in the al
Bahlul case cited the Lincoln assassination proceeding—along with the Nazi
saboteurs’ trial in 1942—as canonical authority that might liquidate a constitutional settlement.828 Accordingly, in a forthcoming article I examine whether
such a fleeting but high-profile historical practice in two of the nation’s most
important wars, and arguably endorsed by two of the nation’s greatest wartime
presidents, offers persuasive justification for a broader military-tribunal exception to Article III.829 As this Article has demonstrated, however, whether or not
those later landmark cases are to be afforded precedential respect, that question
should be considered without any illusion that those adjudications were faithful
adaptations of a well-entrenched practice derived from the Founding. To the
contrary, they were, if anything, a sharp break from the original foundations—
including the experience of the Revolutionary War—and a deviation from the
guarantees enshrined in Article III.

823. THE FEDERALIST No. 83 (Alexander Hamilton), at 499 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
824. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
825. To be sure, it might be fair to assume that by the time of World War I, some members of
Congress believed the ancient spying and quasi-treason statutes reflected the permissibility of authorizing military proceedings to try civilians who aid the enemy in at least some circumstances. As we have
seen, however, the Executive decisively rejected the effort of several senators and Assistant Attorney
General Warren to read that purported legislative authority for all it was worth—and other officials and
commentators, who accepted some such congressional authority, were nonetheless at pains to try to
craft an implied constitutional limit, beyond which the quasi-treason article could not apply. See supra
Sections VI.B.2, VI.B.3.
826. al Bahlul I, 767 F.3d 1, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
827. U.S. al Bahlul III Brief, supra note 23, at 32 (quoting NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550,
2560 (2014)); see also id. at 36–44 (canvassing Civil War and World War II cases).
828. al Bahlul III, 840 F.3d 757, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
829. Lederman, The Law(?) of the Lincoln Assassination, supra note 45.

